Job Control and Productivity: New Evidence From Canada
| Date | 01 November 1989 |
| Published date | 01 November 1989 |
| Author | Jacques Bélanger |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1989.tb00344.x |
British
Journal
of
lndiistrial Rrlutions
27:3
November
1989
0007-1080
$3.00
Job
Control and
Productivity:
New
Evidence
From
Canada
Jacques
Belanger*
1.
INTRODUCTION
A
resurgence
of
interest
in
the impact of trade unions on productivity has
been in evidence on both sides of the Atlantic. While these recent studies
have made a contribution to the literature, too much weight is often
attributed to the single factor
of
being unionised
or
not (as noted by Edwards
1987: ch.
6).
Without denying the effects of unions on productivity,
it
should
be stressed that such effects are
likely
to
be highly variable, and indeed
minimal
in
many work situations. Not only should these effects on
productivity vary with a union’s strength in the work-place, they should also
vary with the type and degree of union pressure at shop-floor level. This
paper seeks to address the issue of productivity in a more direct way by
examining the impact
of
the actual control exercised by labour over its work.
A good number
of
recent publications have focused on the relatively high
degree of
job
control developed by British semi-skilled workers since the
Second World War, especially
in
the engineering industry. The attention
so
far has focused on the origins of this phenomenon (e.g. Zeitlin 1980; Lyddon
1983; Tolliday
1985),
on its social reproduction in specific work-places
(Edwards and Scullion 1982; Belanger and Evans 1988) and, with growing
critical interest, on the impact of such patterns of control on productivity
(Kilpatrick and Lawson
1980;
Hyman and Elger 1981; Nichols 1986;
Edwards 1986: 215-22; Edwards and Terry 1988). This paper seeks to
contribute to this critical work by presenting some results of a study
conducted in 1987 in a Canadian engineering factory. This empirical
material shows that forms of worker control that may first be interpreted as
‘restrictive’ are in fact assisting production, because they are a means of
getting work done. Hence, in a situation where the form
of
management
control was well adapted to technical conditions
of
production, a high
degree of job control was found
to
be quite compatible with high production
standards.
In
two
of
the factories studied by Edwards and Scullion (1982),
production workers showed high degrees
of
collective control over the
*Associate
Professor
of
Industrial Relations, Universite
Laval,
Quebec
348
organisation of their working day. In one
of
the factories
I
previously studied
in England, a strong pattern
of
early finishing was also documented.
In
this
Coventry factory, a group
of
134
press operators had enough control to
consolidate high levels
of
work intensity during several hours in order to
accumulate a substantial reserve
of
time off. Once the production target was
reached, they would stop work and retire
to
their rest area until the end
of
the shift. The length
of
these leisure periods obviously varied between
individuals and work-groups,
but
typically ranged from
one
to three hours
each day. Moreover,
the
minority of operators working
on
the basis
of
measured daywork regularly completed their daily production around lunch
time.
1
sought to explain this collective behaviour by looking at the
interaction of technical and social forces accounting for a particular pattern
of control over labour (Belanger 1985, 1987).
In
the large Canadian manufacturing site where fieldwork was conducted
in 1987, the extent of early finishing was at least as important as in this
Coventry factory. In fact, in the two large departments where systematic
observation was carried out, the practice was even more widespread, and
the average period of time off longer, than in the British factory. The fact
that
a
high degree of worker autonomy over work intensity and working
time could be very compatible with the achievement
of
good productivity
suggests a reassessment
of
the effects
of
social relations
on
productivity.
Indeed, the empirical material suggests that,
in
a situation where the overall
organisation of production was highly efficient and well
in
the hands
of
management, early finishing was instrumental in achieving a pattern
of
consent at work and the maintenance
of
co-operative work relations.
The structure
of
this paper is fairly straightforward. Drawing
on
recent
research, the following section develops an analytical framework. Section
3
briefly outlines the field research methodology. The subsequent empirical
section documents
in
some detail the social process whereby workers came
to work very hard
in
the first part
of
the shift in order
to
accumulate a
substantial period of time
off.
This is followed by
an
attempt to explain the
pattern of behaviour under study and, finally, by a general conclusion on the
broader implications of these findings.
British
Journal
of
Industriul Relations
2.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A major feature
of
control
in
the work-place is the contrast between the
great potential of labour power and the many constraints upon its realisation
in the labour process. Some of these constraints are due to problems
of
technology and work organisation, and many others are independent
of
the
will of workers
or
managers. Certain constraints, however, are the result
of
conscious and deliberate obstruction by the work-force
to
the realisation of
the potential inherent
in
their labour power. This form of resistance, which
may be spontaneous or organised, is peculiar to labour.
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