Judging extreme forgivers: How victims are perceived when they forgive the unforgivable
| Published date | 01 January 2022 |
| DOI | 10.1177/02697580211028021 |
| Date | 01 January 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Judging extreme forgivers:
How victims are perceived
when they forgive
the unforgivable
Judy Eaton
Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Jenniffer Olenewa
University of Waterloo, Canada
Cole Norton
Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Abstract
When one individual commits a transgression or aggressive act against another, third parties often
have expectations about how the victim should respond, even when they do not have any personal
involvement in the event. When their justice expectations are violated, such as when a victim
forgives the offender for an act that third parties deem too heinous to forgive, third parties may
react in a way that is critical of the victim. This research examines how third-party observers react
when victims forgive seemingly ‘unforgivable’ offences. Study 1, a scenario-based experiment,
showed that although third parties were not directly critical of a forgiving victim, they did not agree
with the decision to forgive. Study 2 replicated these findings and explored in more depth third
parties’ justice-related feelings about the transgression and the victim, using both quantitative and
qualitative data. Results suggest that although third parties are reluctant to directly criticize
‘extreme’ forgivers, they are not supportive of their decision to forgive. This could have impli-
cations for victims, who may interpret this disagreement with their choice as a lack of support.
Keywords
Victims, forgiveness, third parties, justice expectations
Corresponding author:
Judy Eaton, Department of Ps ychology, Wilfrid Laurie r University, Brantford C ampus, 73 George Street, Bran tford,
Ontario N3T 2Y3, Canada.
Email: jeaton@wlu.ca
International Review of Victimology
2022, Vol. 28(1) 33–51
ªThe Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/02697580211028021
journals.sagepub.com/home/irv
I walked over, shook his hand and introduced myself. I wanted to show him it had not affected my life
and that I had understood and forgiven him. (Katja Rosenberg, on meeting the person who raped her
(Lines, 2014))
I have no idea why people think this is something to be praised. The lady sounds like a very decent and
compassionate person, but equally she sounds dippy and naı
¨ve. Rapists are scum and always will be
scum. (Anonymous Internet commenter, on the Katja Rosenberg story (Anonymous, 2014))
Forgiveness is generally considered to be a virtue, and those who forgive are often seen in a
positive light (Berry et al., 2005; Petersen and Seligman, 2004). There may be limits, however, to
how much forgiveness is perceived to be a good thing. When victims of particularly heinous crimes
such as the murder of a child, kidnapping and torture, and gendered violence express forgiveness
(e.g. Jaeger, 1998; Knight and Burford, 2014) they are not always judged by others as being
virtuous or wise, as the quotations above demonstrate.
This research sets out to explain why an individual who was not directly harmed by an offence
would be unsupportive of a victim who chooses to forgive this kind of extreme offence. It seems
especially counterintuitive for an uninvolved third party to criticize the victim’s forgiving response
when the victim is making a seemingly positive gesture that could have positive personal benefits.
Although there is a considerable amount of literature on third-party responses to offenders and
punishment, there are gaps in our understanding of the emotional reactions of third parties to
victims themselves (Gromet, 2012). This is also an important issue for victims, because there may
be instances where victims may want to forgive the transgressor but are reluctant to do so publicly
because they fear that they will be judged negatively. This may put victims in a situation where
they must balance their own desires with the expectations of others. As one victim who forgave her
new husband for kidnapping and assaulting two women said, ‘[It’s] hard to feel pressure to hate
when it [isn’t] what [you] feel’ (Moroney, 2012: 304).
In this research we examine how and why third parties respond to victims who forgive serious
offences. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, we aim to better understand
the role that justice expectations play when individuals form judgments of these ‘extreme
forgivers.’
Third-party judgments of offenders and crime
When one individual commits a transgression against another it violates social norms about how
people should behave (Gromet et al., 2012; Vidmar, 2000). Relatively minor interpersonal trans-
gressions, such as lying to a friend or betraying a trust, may be seen as breaking common codes of
social conduct, because it is generally expected that individuals will be honest and trustworthy.
More severe transgressions, such as those involving crime and interpersonal harm, violate more
widely held societal rules, because it is expected that individuals will obey moral and legal codes.
In addition to the victims who experience the direct harms of these offences, third parties may
also be negatively affected despite not having any personal involvement in the event. As ‘observers
of injustice’ (Van Doorn and Brouwers, 2017: 68), third parties are witness to the violation of
social and moral codes, and thus will have expectations about how the injustice should be rectified
or resolved (Carlsmith and Darley, 2008; Gromet, 2012). Depending on the offence, this may
include sanctions against the offender (e.g. punishment), and/or compensation to the victim (Van
Doorn and Brouwers, 2017). When no such resolution is forthcoming, it violates the justice
expectations of the third party, resulting in a perceived justice failure (Zhu et al., 2012). Because
34 International Review of Victimology 28(1)
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