Judicial Decisions
| Published date | 01 July 1930 |
| Date | 01 July 1930 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0032258X3000300313 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
THE
QUARTERLY RECORD 473
The
general rule is that it is only when the direct and positive evidence
of eyewitnesses cannot be supplied that circumstantial evidence is admissible.
But circumstantial evidence should be ' such as to produce nearly the same
degree of certainty as that which arises from direct testimony, and to exclude
rational probability of
innocence'
(Tichborne Case, April 30th 1873, cited
Stone's Justices' Manual 61st Ed. 236).
That
there are possible risks in
relying upon evidence of this kind cannot of course be denied,
but
the risks
such as they are can be avoided.
It
is the business of the presiding judge to
warn the
jury
against those risks and in particular to be on their guard against
accepting a theory as to the means by which and the person by whom a crime
has been committed, if some of the facts proved (however unimportant they
may appear to be) are inconsistent with that theory. Again, as everyone con-
cerned with the administration of criminal law knows, there are certain
elementary principles always to be kept in
sight-such
principles as those
wise rules simply and cogently stated 250 years ago by Sir Matthew Hale in
his
famous'
History of the Pleas of the Crown ' :
, I would never convict any person for stealing the goods of a person
unknown merely because he would not give an account of how he came by
them, unless there were due proof made that a felony was committed of these
goods.'
, I would never convict any person of murder or manslaughter unless the
fact were proved to be done, or at least the body found dead.'
Through
succeeding generations our system of criminal law has been
developed under the influence of simple and common-sense ideas such as
these;
and loyalty to such principles has secured for it an unrivalled reputa-
tion for efficiency and fairness.
JUDICIAL
DECISIONS
OBSTRUCTION OF THE
POLICE
IN THE EXECUTION OF
THEIR
DUTY
THE question of what amounts to unlawful and wilful obstruction of a
constable in the execution of his duty, contrary to Section 2 of the Prevention
of Crimes (Amendment) Act, 1885, is often one of considerable difficulty.
In
the recent case of Webb and Johnson v. Chantrey, which was heard in the
Divisional Court in November 1929, some interesting observations bearing
on this subject were made.
The
case was one in which a man and woman
were charged with dangerous driving, and the man was also charged with
obstructing the police in the execution of their duty.
The
Magistrate
decided that although the driving was obviously dangerous, the fault could
not be attributed to either of the defendants, as they had acted as they thought
best at the time, and it was by a series of unfortunate events
that
the accident
had occurred. He further held that, as no offence had been proved, there
could be no obstruction of the police.
The
alleged obstruction in this case was that the man had misled the
police and pretended that he was the driver of the car when, in fact, the woman
was the driver and he had only attempted to take control
just
before the
accident.
The
Lord ChiefJustice, after quoting the remarks of Mr. Justice Darling
In
my
opinion if a policeman who is seeking information which might lead to the
conviction of the perpetrators of a crime was wilfully misled by false infor-
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