Latin American Migration to Spain: Main Reasons and Future Perspectives
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12056 |
| Author | María Hierro |
| Published date | 01 February 2016 |
| Date | 01 February 2016 |
Latin American Migration to Spain: Main
Reasons and Future Perspectives
María Hierro*
ABSTRACT
Over the last two decades, Spain has evolved rapidly from a classic labour exporter to a labour
importer. Until the 1930s Spain’s migration history was predominantly marked by emigration
to the Americas, and from the end of World War II until the early 1970s by emigration to
some industrialized countries in Western Europe. For the first time in modern times, Spain is
now the second country in the world with large-scale immigration. Its strategic location, a rela-
tively permissive immigration policy and economic opportunities derived from Spain’s entry
into the European Community have positioned this country as a major destination for immi-
grants. Additionally, since the mid-1990s international migration in Spain has dramatically
changed in origin composition. Despite the common perception of Africa as the most impor-
tant source of immigration, some Latin American countries, in a very short time, have become
some of the major sources of immigration to Spain; indeed, the term “Latin-Americanization”
has been coined to describe this process. This being so, the aim of this article is twofold. First,
we examine the main reasons behind the extremely rapid increase of Latin American migration
to Spain during the last decade. Then we briefly discuss some future perspectives.
INTRODUCTION
Demographic stagnation and population ageing have become issues of increasing interest and con-
cern in Europe. The slow pace of population growth in the European Union (EU) contrasts strongly
with demographic pressures in the developing world. Between 1960 and 2005, the EU-25 popula-
tion increased by nearly 21 per cent (from 605 to 731 millions), when the world’s population more
than doubled (from 3,031 to 6,514 millions). Future perspectives are even less promising. Accord-
ing to United Nations projections for the 2005–2050 period, as the world population is expected to
increase, although at lower rates, Europe is likely to lose population (Figure 1).
As regards demographic aging, the proportion of the EU-25 population aged 65 or over has
grown rapidly, from 8.8 per cent in 1960 to 15.9 per cent in 2005. According to United Nations
forecasts, this proportion will increase in the coming decades, and is projected to reach 27.6 per
cent by 2050. The world population will also be affected by ageing, but less acutely (16.2 per cent
in 2050). Forecasts also hint that the effects of demographic ageing on the balance between the
active and inactive populations, commonly referred as to old-age dependency ratio, will be severe.
Specifically, EU-25’s old-age dependency ratio is projected to rise to 48 per cent by 2050, nearly
twice the ratio of 25 per cent projected for the world population.
As opposed to what happened in the EU, demographic pressures in most developing countries,
along with a combination of economic, political and social factors, have pushed hundreds of
* University of Cantabria, Spain.
doi: 10.1111/imig.12056
©2013 The Author
International Migration ©2013 IOM
International Migration Vol. 54 (1) 2016
ISS N 00 20- 7985 Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
thousand international migrants to settle in Europe, attracted mainly by economic prosperity and
political stability. All in all, and despite a propitious scenario for international mobility, since the
mid-1970s perceived threats of mass immigration have created, in most of European countries, a
strong preference for restrictive migration policies such as compulsory visas, stringent border con-
trols and deportation of illegal immigrants. This strategy for a policy of “closed doors”in Europe
has its roots in the 1973 oil price shock (Zimmermann, 1995:57; Massey et al., 1998:5; Stalker,
2002:153; Martin and Widgren, 2002:19). Industrial restructuring and the reduced absorption capac-
ity of labour markets forced Western European governments to limit the number of immigrants
entering and staying (Fassmann and Munz, 1992:461). Additionally, with the removal of internal
borders within the EU, many European countries have been forced to follow the steps of pioneer
countries in the introduction of more restrictive national immigration policy actions. At this time,
the idea of building a new “fortress Europe”around a restrictive migration frame, developed in the
Dublin Convention of 15 June 1990, seems to be consolidated.
Among the challenges arising from the demographic decline in Europe, shortages of skilled
labour might pose a potential and serious threat in most European countries in the coming years. It
should be noted that baby-boom generations reaching retirement in the current decade, and the very
low birth rates of the last few decades, might entail significant difficulties in meeting the demand
for labour (Fargues, 2004:1356). To offset this drawback, labour immigration might be a solution
but a transitional one. As pointed by Fargues (2004:1355), someone will have to compensate in
future decades for the ageing of immigrants who arrived in Europe at younger ages. In addition to
that, if immigrants are not highly qualified, the shortage of professionals might become a chronic
problem for Europe. Indeed, concerns about this issue has led some EU member states, such as the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden and Netherlands, to encompass a selective immigration
policy based mainly on tax discounts to recruit highly qualified foreign workers (Appleyard,
2001:14; Mahroum, 2001:31–32; Kofman, 2000:47). With immigration to Western and Northern
Europe becoming more restrictive, Southern European countries have emerged as major destina-
tions for immigrants. Factors contributing to this include lower differences in wages and living
standards between the South and the North of Europe concerning, a growing demand for immigrant
workers in the secondary economy –particularly the construction, agriculture and service sectors–
and less restrictive migration policies (Laubenthal, 2007:113–114; Carella and Pace, 2001; Hun-
toon, 1998) (Table 1). Thus, clear differences between Western and Southern European countries
FIGURE 1
POPULATION GROWTH RATE (1950-2050).
–1
0
1
2
3
1950-1955
1955-1960
1960-1965
1965-1970
1970-1975
1975-1980
1980-1985
1985-1990
1990-1995
1995-2000
2000-2005
2005-2010
2010-2015
2015-2020
2020-2025
2025-2030
2030-2035
2035-2040
2040-2045
2045-2050
EU-25 World
%
Source: The United Nations Population Division.
Latin American Migration to Spain 65
©2013 The Author. International Migration ©2013 IOM
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