Learning to assert themselves: Small states in asymmetrical dyads – two Scandinavian dogs barking at the Russian bear
| Author | Maria Mellander,Hans Mouritzen |
| Date | 01 December 2016 |
| Published date | 01 December 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836716652427 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Cooperation and Conflict
2016, Vol. 51(4) 447 –466
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836716652427
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Learning to assert themselves:
Small states in asymmetrical
dyads – two Scandinavian dogs
barking at the Russian bear
Maria Mellander and Hans Mouritzen
Abstract
By measuring foreign policy assertion, we document that Danish and Swedish Russia policies
have fluctuated widely in the 21st century, as well as in relation to each other. Specifically, big
assertion leaps took place in 2002 (Denmark) and 2008 (Sweden). Having conceptualised and
operationalised small state assertion, we proceed to the explanation of these leaps. The same
factor turns out to be the efficient explanation in both cases: an individual policy-maker’s so-called
‘lesson of the past’ – what he believes ‘history teaches us’. It is shown how existing theory of
lessons of the past can contribute to the understanding of small state assertion in asymmetrical
dyads, but only if the proper permissive circumstances are identified. First and foremost these
amount to the presence of a reasonable foreign policy action space.
Keywords
Assertion/restraint, lessons of the past, Russia policy, Scandinavia, small states
Russian great power ambitions as well as the skill to attain them increased with Vladimir
Putin’s coming into presidential office in 2000. Combined with an authoritarian develop-
ment in its domestic politics, Russia has engaged in controversial military action in rela-
tion to neighbouring countries (Georgia and Ukraine). On this background, and in spite
of significant common interests in some fields, Russia has increasingly been a challenge
to European foreign policy interests and conceptions of democracy.
Whereas the Russia policies of European countries in the post-Cold War era have
been heterogeneous, each of them has been stable. That is, irrespective of Russia’s per-
formance, the same countries have always tended to be the ‘hawks’ in the European
spectre (Poland, the Baltic countries, and to a lesser extent the UK and Romania).
Corresponding author:
Hans Mouritzen, Danish Institute for International Studies, Østbanegade 117, 2100 Copenhagen, Denmark.
Email: hmo@diis.dk
652427CAC0010.1177/0010836716652427Cooperation and ConflictMellander and Mouritzen
research-article2016
Article
448 Cooperation and Conflict 51(4)
Correspondingly, others have always tended to be ‘doves’ (the south Europeans, the
Visegrad countries minus Poland, Norway, and to some extent Germany). The whole
spectre moved in 2008 (Georgia) and 2014 (Ukraine), notably, but the hawks and the
doves were largely the same. As seen here, this is because fundamental and very stable
geopolitical, geoeconomic and historical factors are behind for each country.1
However, Denmark and Sweden deviate from this overall picture;2 since the begin-
ning of this century alone, they have fluctuated between being the most assertive (hawks)
and being restrained (or even accommodating). Some might explain this by asserting that
the ‘rational’ Scandinavians are more fine-tuned in their Russia policies than the rest of
Europe by having risen above ‘old-fashioned’ geopolitical or historic predispositions.
The latter may be true, but a shared rationality is hardly the reason: the two Scandinavian
countries – not too different in capabilities and with similar societal value systems – have
been totally out of sync with each other. Sweden was cautious in the early 2000s, but has
become one of Russia’s most hawkish critics since 2008. By contrast, Denmark initiated
a markedly assertive profile from the autumn of 2002, but then became restrained and
accommodating from about 2008. With common interest in mind, the two Scandinavian
states could have supported each other’s credibility by being simultaneously assertive,
thus pre-empting Russian ‘divide and rule’ between them. Why did the Russia policies of
these two countries fluctuate so much between 2000 and 2014, even mutually? For rea-
sons of space not least, we have chosen to focus specifically at the two decisive situa-
tions, where Denmark (2002) and Sweden (2008) took their highest assertive leaps (as
will be visualised in trend graphs, cf. Figures 1 and 2).
This article will, first, stipulate the meaning of ‘small state’ and ‘Russia policy’. Then
it will be shown that our core concept of assertiveness is useful for the study of foreign
policy dyads, in this case small power–great power relationships. After some conceptual
clarification and operationalisation, we proceed to the actual measurement of Danish and
Swedish assertiveness towards Russia 2000–2014, emphasising the two situations where
Figure 1. Danish assertiveness vis-à-vis Russia 2000–2014 (on the basis of nine episodes,
encompassing all bilateral and selected multilateral ones).
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