Life’s chances and choices – A study of entrapment in career decisions with reference to Becker’s side bets theory
| Date | 01 April 2001 |
| Published date | 01 April 2001 |
| Pages | 186-202 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/00483480110380343 |
| Author | Helga Drummond,Elizabeth Chell |
| Subject Matter | HR & organizational behaviour |
Personnel
Review
30,2
186
Personnel Review,
Vol. 30 No. 2, 2001, pp. 186-202.
#MCB University Press, 0048-3486
Received February 1998
Revised September 1999
Accepted January 2000
Life's chances and choices
A study of entrapment in career
decisions with reference to Becker's side
bets theory
Helga Drummond
University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK, and
Elizabeth Chell
University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
Keywords Decision making, Careers, Commitment
Abstract This paper explores a phenomenon known as entrapment. Entrapment refers to
situations where people become ``locked into'' decisions through the passage of time as distinct
from actively re-investing in failing projects. The present study examines Becker's so called ``side
bets'' theory which suggests that entrapment results from extraneous investments made during
the course of employment. The exploration is conducted via two contrasting case studies of
solicitors, one successful, the other unsuccessful. Analysis suggests some support for Becker's
theme. More importantly the study reveals that post hoc rationalization of events plays an
important part in sustaining persistence. This insight raises a question. Do people become
trapped by events as Becker suggests, or, do they largely imprison themselves?
``Suddenlyyou're old. Fifty-eight, fifty-nine, sixty-one ± it just happens: shattering thing'', said
Harvey.
Thirty years ago, Harvey was an articled clerk in a city centre solicitors'
practice specialising in commercial work. It was a career which might have
culminated as a partner in an international law firm. Now, a lonely sole
practitioner and almost bankrupt, Harvey surveyed the dingy office with its
three plastic seats, a burst armchair, dirty carpet and dusty shelves littered
with old copies of the Financial Times. ``Look at me,'' he said with emotion, ``you
can see where I've got in 30 years.''
Few people, we imagine, embark upon a career intending to end up like
Harvey. Yet if a career fails to meet expectations, it can be difficult to change
direction. More specifically Becker (1960) has suggested that people seldom
change jobs and careers in accordance with the economics of the market
conditions because they are restrained by ``side bets.'' ``Side bets'' are made by
mixing extraneous interests with a specific course of action. By involving
outside interests in the decision, the decision maker:
Has staked something of value to him, something originally unrelated to his present line of
action, on being consistent in his present line of behaviour. The consequences of
inconsistency will be so expensive that inconsistency ... is no longer a feasible alternative
(Becker, 1960, p. 35).
Side bets include cultural expectations for consistency, that is, that people
should not change jobs too often; so called ``impersonal bureaucratic
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Life's chances
and choices
187
arrangements'' such as pension rules which disadvantage leavers, and seniority
rights, for instance. Hence in various ways the process of adjustment to social
positions may commit people by making them unfitted for any other
occupation. The question arises; does Becker's ``side bets'' theory allow for the
individual to take conscious decisions to engage actively in additional activities
in order to make more bearable or tenable their present career or job position?
The purpose of the present study is to explore the relevance of Becker's
proposition. The exploration is conducted via case studies of two individuals
who have embarked upon careers which have not turned out as planned but
who have persisted with them nevertheless. The research question is; why do
people engage in continuous lines of activity?
Theoretical context
The theoretical context of the present study is derived from a corpus of
literature known as escalation in decision making. Escalation is defined as
persistence with a course of action beyond an economically defensible point
(Staw, 1996). Examples of potential escalation predicaments include decisions
about whether to invest money repairing a car which could soon become a
liability, or whether to keep or sell poorly performing shares.
The literature is largely devoted to specifying the precise factors which may
prompt individuals to actively re-invest when objective conditions indicate
withdrawal is the more sensible course of action. The major escalatory
pressures which have been identified by researchers are personal responsibility
for an unsuccessful decision; so called ``framing effects'' whereby the experience
of loss prompts excessive risk taking, and the perceived social costs of failure
(e.g. Drummond, 1996; Staw, 1996). Moreover, escalation theorists suggest that
persistence may be facilitated by information processing biases which shield
decision makers from reality. For example, it has been suggested that decision
makers respond to information systematically. Data which appears to support
their predilections is sought out and emphasised. Contra-indicators are
overlooked or played down (Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Staw and Ross, 1987), thus
suggesting a narrowing of choice.
The literature depicts escalation scenarios as desperate predicaments
characterised by reckless and foolhardy behaviour (e.g. Janis, 1989). There is
another image of escalation, however, which suggests that persistence may be
a function of the passage of time; the so called ``Rosencrantz and Guildenstern
effect'' (Rubin and Brockner, 1975). This dimension of escalation is known as
entrapment.
Becker's so called ``side bets'' theory implies that entrapment occurs because
people fail to see the long term implications of their decisions. This raises a
number of issues, including, fundamentally, the extent to which people are the
``sculptors'' of their lives (Bell and Staw, 1989). In the case in question it raises
the issue; are situations which give rise to escalation effects so powerful that
there is no room for individual agency?
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