Local government innovation diffusion in China: an event history analysis of a performance-based reform programme
| Date | 01 March 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852315596211 |
| Published date | 01 March 2018 |
| Author | Pan Zhang,Jiannan Wu |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
International Review of
Administrative Sciences
2018, Vol. 84(1) 63–81
!The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0020852315596211
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International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Article
Local government innovation
diffusion in China: an event history
analysis of a performance-based
reform programme
Jiannan Wu
Shanghai Jiao Tong University and Xi’an Jiaotong University, China
Pan Zhang
Xi’an Jiaotong University, China
Abstract
The performance-based reform programme launched by Fujian province in 2000 has
been adopted by many other Chinese provinces, including Zhejiang, Hebei, Anhui and
Sichuan, over the past 12 years. This article aims to explore the antecedents of the
adoption of this programme, in particular, the effects of senior figures’ political promo-
tion incentives and diffusion mechanisms. Specifically, event history analysis based on
probit regression is used to examine data from 31 Chinese provinces for the 2000–2012
period. The results show that leaders’ relative age and chances of being appointed to the
Politburo, and distance to the general election, are significantly negatively correlated
with the reform programme’s adoption, but top-down diffusion is significantly positively
correlated with it.
Points for practitioners
This study confirms that the nomenklatura system in China shapes the diffusion of
innovations through the mechanisms of political promotion incentives and intergovern-
mental interactions. Thus, the dynamics of innovation diffusion are, to some
extent, rooted in particular political institutions and shaped by political contexts.
Furthermore, the desire for political promotions may figure as a general deep reason
for decisions about whether to adopt innovations; therefore, strengthening these incen-
tives for adopting reforms becomes a key strategy.
Corresponding author:
Jiannan Wu, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Room 3013 Xinjian Building, Huashan Road 1954, Shanghai 200030,
China.
Email: jnwu@sjtu.edu.cn
Keywords
diffusion mechanisms, performance management, political promotion incentives, reform
in China
Introduction
Recently, many countries have adopted innovative reforms to improve government
performance (Borins, 2001; Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg, 2013; Walker, 2007; Wu
et al., 2013). These include the well-known New Public Management practices
used in Western countries and China’s performance-based reform programme,
which was launched with a comprehensive framework of performance-improving
measures in 2000. Wejnert (2002) noted that reforms and innovations only become
fully effective, leading to social change, when they are widely adopted by local
governments and departments. Hence, understanding innovation diffusion has
begun to attract the attention of many scholars (Berry and Berry, 2007;
Damanpour and Schneider, 2006; Kim, 2013; Shipan and Volden, 2008; Walker,
2007). Although the Chinese reform programme is part of a global public
management movement, the determinants of its diffusion in China have not been
investigated.
Previous studies have argued that innovation diffusion is driven by two clusters
of factors: socioeconomic factors that are internal to particular jurisdictions as
parts of local policy environments (Damanpour, 1991; Damanpour and
Schneider, 2006; Lee et al., 2011; Ma, 2013; Moon and deLeon, 2001; Walker,
2007); and diffusion mechanisms through which innovation ideas cut across juris-
dictional borders (Berry and Berry, 1990, 2007; Kim, 2013; Mooney, 2001; Shipan
and Volden, 2008; Welch and Thompson, 1980). However, both strands of the
literature conceptualise government organisations as the ‘actors’ that adopt poli-
cies; they do not examine how individual leaders make decisions about policy
innovations in their organisations. This omission is an important gap in the under-
standing of innovation diffusion in China, which is a centralised country with a
monopolistic nomenklatura system (Burns, 1987, 1994; Chan, 2004; Kung and
Chen, 2011). This public personnel system divides public positions into different
ranks (Edin, 2003; Manion, 1985) and provides different degrees of political pro-
motion incentives for different provincial leaders at different times (Burns, 1989).
Our knowledge is still very limited about how innovations spread in the state
administrative system and what role potential political promotion incentives play.
Furthermore, previous studies of the mechanisms of diffusion have focused on
the federal system in the US and have emphasised horizontal interactions, espe-
cially between neighbouring states (Berry, 1994; Berry and Berry, 1990; Mooney,
2001; Oakley, 2009; Rincke, 2007). However, the drivers of innovation diffusion
may be very different in centralised countries, and especially in China, due to
different and significant vertical influences. For example, Heilmann (2008) found
that an experimentation-based policy process, with a pattern of central–local
64 International Review of Administrative Sciences 84(1)
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