Local government’s response to dissatisfaction with centralized policies: the “do-it-yourself” approach
| Published date | 01 September 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00208523221094414 |
| Author | Anna Uster,Nissim Cohen |
| Date | 01 September 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Local government’s
response to dissatisfaction
with centralized policies:
the “do-it-yourself”
approach
Anna Uster
The Max Stern Academic College of Emek Yezreel, Israel
Nissim Cohen
University of Haifa, Israel
Abstract
The literature on intergovernmental relationships discusses the tension between cen-
tralization an d local autonomy. However, few studies questio n local authori ties’
response when dissatisfied with central government policies. Using Hirschman’s
model of exit, voice and loyalty, we explore local government’s response to such dis-
satisfaction. Specifically, we suggest that local authorities may adopt a “do-it-yourself”
approach, unilat erally engaging in s emi-legal strat egies to improve outco mes. This
solves immediate local organizational problems, without waiting for approval. Using
the Israeli case, we show how a pervasive culture of “do-it-yourself”affects local gov-
ernments’responses. We also discuss implications for the relationship between the
two bodies.
Points for practitioners
Our findings shed light on local–central government relations, emphasizing the do-it-
yourself approach. While this approach could strengthen political participation, increas-
ing local government’s involvement in public policy, it also enables local players to use
semi-legal behaviors. Central government decision-makers might prevent these beha-
viors, strengthening administrative institutions’enforce, regulatory enforcement and
Corresponding author:
Anna Uster, Department of Political Science, The Max Stern Academic College of Emek Yezreel, Emek Yezreel
Mobile Post 1930600, Israel.
Email: annau@yvc.ac.il
Article
International
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
International Review of Administrative
Sciences
2023, Vol. 89(3) 825–841
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00208523221094414
journals.sagepub.com/home/ras
enhancing local autonomous political culture, transparency and integrity. By contrast,
continuing to maintain weak formal institutions encourages the appearance of strong
informal institutions.
Keywords
Central and local government relations, dissatisfaction, exit, Hirschman’s model, voice
Introduction
Local government’s relationship with the central government has both theoretical and
practical consequences for local autonomy. This relationship is inherently tense, as
reflected in the “quarrelsome relatives”paradox (Kröger, 2011: 150). The more the
central government delegates responsibilities in the name of local autonomy (Ladner
et al., 2016), the more it then attempts to exert control over local governments as imple-
menters of national policies (Haveri, 2015: 139). In recent decades, direct centralized
control has shifted to more indirect control through the use of regulatory policy instru-
ments (Goldsmith, 2002). Several studies seek to strike the right balance in this major
challenge (Pratchett, 2004).
The legal structure from which this increasing move in the west toward decentral-
ization derives often makes this balance difficult (Ladner et al., 2019; Wilson and
Game, 2011). The principle of ultra vires is an important legal constraint on the
local government’s autonomy (Leigh, 2000), in that, while local government exer-
cises control over its own community, it remains subordinate to the central govern-
ment’s laws and regulations (Page, 1991). Tension arises when local officials seek
to meet residents’needs by providing specifically tailored services, while still
depending on centralized resources and their accompanying constraints. In such
cases, when local government finds itself dissatisfied with the central government’s
policy, it must find creative work-arounds (Bel and Fageda, 2007; Hefetz and
Warner, 2007). Scholars define these methods as forms of municipal activism
(Cooper and Herman, 2020; Spencer and Delvino, 2019). Municipal activism mani-
fests in various ways, including policies providing services under controversial cir-
cumstances and despite restrictive national legal policies. The literature on the
relationship between central and local governments has generally focused on decen-
tralization as a solution, with less attention paid to the local government’s actions in
response.
Our research fills this gap in the literature by investigating what local governments do
when they are dissatisfied with central government policies. To this end, we modified
Albert Hirschman’s (1970) model of exit, voice and loyalty. Local governments can
use their voice through participatory channels in the administration to improve a situ-
ation. However, their voice may be insufficient or too costly. Given that they cannot
exit the relationship owing to traditional institutional structure, an alternative strategy
826 International Review of Administrative Sciences 89(3)
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