Lynch v Knight
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 17 July 1861 |
| Date | 17 July 1861 |
| Court | House of Lords |
English Reports Citation: 11 E.R. 854
House of Lords
Mews' Dig. v. 270, 670; vii. 710. S.C. 5 L.T. 291; 8 Jur. N.S. 724. Followed in Chamberlain v. Boyd, 1883, 11 Q.B.D. 412; and cf. Davies v. Solomon, 1871, L.E. 7 Q.B. 114; Miller v. David, 1874, L.B. 9 C.P. 126; Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q.B.D. 339; Whitney v. Moignard, 1890, 24 Q.B.D. 631; notes to Vicars v. Wilcocks, 2 Smith, L. G. 10th ed. 507, and Slander of Women Act, 1891 (54 and 55 Vict. c. 51).
Slander - Special Damage - Husband and Wife - Pleading.
[577] JAMES LYNCH,-Plaintiff in Error; WILLIAM KNIGHT and JANE KNIGHT, his Wife,-Defendants in Error [May 9, July 17, 1861]. [Mews' Dig. v. 270, 670; vii. 710. S.C. 5 L.T. 291; 8 Jur. N.S. 724. Followed in Chamberlain v. Boyd, 1883, 11 Q.B.D. 412; and of. Davies v. Solomon, 1871, L.E. 7 Q.B. 114; Miller v. David, 1874, L.B. 9 C.P. 126; Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q.B.D. 339; Whitney v. Uoignard, 1890, 24 Q.B.D. 631; notes to Vicars v. Wilcocks, 2 Smith, L. G. 10th ed. 507, and Slander of Women Act, 1891 (54 and 55 Viet, c. 51).] Slander-Special Damage-Husband and Wife-Pleading. Qu. whether a wife can maintain an action against a third person for w rds occasioning to her the loss of the consortium of the husband? Per Lord Campbell (Lord Chancellor): She can. If she can, the words must be such that from them the loss of the consortium follows as a natural and reasonable consequence: Where therefore a wife (her husband being joined for conformity as a Plaintiff) brought an action to recover damages from A. for slander uttered by him to 854 LYNCH V. KNIGHT [1861] IX H.L.C., 578 her husband, imputing to her that she had been almost seduced by B. before her marriage, and that her husband ought not to let B. visit at his house, and the ground of special damage alleged was, that in consequence of the slander the husband forced her to leave his house and return to her father, whereby she lost the consortium, of her husband: Held, that the cause of complaint thus set forth would not sustain the action, for that the alleged ground of special damage did not show (in the conduct of the husband) a natural and reasonable consequence of the slander. Dull. Lord Wensleydale. Allsop v. Allsop, 5 Hurl, and Nor. 534, confirmed. Per Lord Campbell (Lord Chancellor), though a case is of first impression, if it shows a concurrence of loss and damage arising from the act complained of, the action will be maintainable. The loss by the wife of her maintenance by the husband, occasioned by slander uttered by a third person, may be made the subject of a claim for damages, but such loss cannot be presumed to have so arisen: it must be distinctly averred. Vicars v. WUcocks, 8 East, 1, observed upon. In such a case, though the act of the husband in sending away his wife was wrongful, because the slander was false, the fact that it was false, cannot be taken advantage of by the slanderer as an objection to the husband appearing on the record as a Plaintiff. Observations on the unsatisfactory state of the law with regard to slanders on women. In this case an action had been brought in the Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland, in the names of Knight and his wife (the former being joined for conformity), to recover damages for slanderous words spoken of the wife. [578] The words complained of were alleged to have been uttered to the husband, and were thus set forth in the first paragraph of the plaint: " Jane is a notorious liar, and she will do her best to annoy you, as she takes delight in creating disturbances wherever she goes, and I advise you not to introduce her into society. Any singularity of conduct which you may have observed in your wife must be attributed to a Dr. Casserly of Roscommon, as she was all but seduced by him; and I advise you, if Casserly comes to Dublin, not to permit him to enter your place, as he is a libertine and a blackguard; I have no other object in view in telling you about her conduct, and in speaking to you as I have done, but your own welfare. She is an infamous wretch, and I am sorry that you had the misfortune to marry her; and if you had asked my advice on the subject, I would have advised you not to marry her." Innuendo: " That the Defendant thereby meant to impute to the Plaintiff Jane, that she had been guilty of immoral conduct before her marriage, and that she was a person of immoral and abandoned character and habits, and that she was a person likely to be guilty of committing adultery with said Dr. Casserly, if Plaintiff William were to permit him to visit his said wife; and that the Defendant also meant thereby that the Plaintiff Jane was a person who, from her bad conduct, habits, and character, was likely to bring disgrace on the Plaintiff William, and that he ought not to allow her to mix in society, lest she might do some act which would bring disgrace on him as her husband; and that the defendant farther meant thereby that the Plaintiff William was to be pitied for having married the Plaintiff Jane from her immoral character and abandoned habits, and that he should be on his guard against her bringing him into farther trouble [579] and disgrace by future immoral or improper conduct on her part." The second paragraph set forth the following words: " He threatened to shoot me. I told him of his wife's misconduct. It was all owing to his wife. She had been insinuating to him that he had seduced her. She is a horrid young villain, and a notorious liar. Her brother, one Thomas Jones, is also a liar, but his lies are of the most harmless kind, whereas hers are of the most dangerous. In fact, she is such a dangerous character to have in the house, that I was obliged to have the back door in the yard nailed up." Innuendo: " That the Defendant thereby meant to impute to the Plaintiff Jane 855 1XH.L.C., 580 LYNCH V. KNIGHf [1861] that she had been guilty of immorality as aforesaid with the said Dr. Casserly, and that for the purpose of trying to conceal her said guilty conduct, she falsely represented to her husband that the Defendant himself had tried to seduce her, and had, in fact, seduced her; and also that the Defendant meant thereby to impute to the Plaintiff Jane that she was a woman of the most abandoned habits and character, and that she was capable of inventing any story to suit her own purposes, and that, in fact, it was unsafe for the Defendant to have her living in his house from her conduct and character, and that Defendant had, in fact, been obliged to adopt precautions to prevent her having access to a portion of his premises, lest she might commit some crime therein." The averment of special damages was in these terms: " And the Plaintiffs aver that from the said false, scandalous, and malicious statements of the Defendant, the Plaintiff William was at first led to believe, and that he did in fact believe that his wife, the Plaintiff Jane, had been guilty of improper and immoral conduct before her [580] marriage, and that her character and conduct was such as represented as aforesaid by said Defendant; that he, the Plaintiff William, ought not any longer to live with the Plaintiff Jane as his wife; and the Plaintiff William, influenced solely by the Defendant's said slanders, and then believing that the statements so made by the said defendant, who was the stepbrother of his wife, were true, shortly after the speaking of said matter by the Defendant, and in consequence thereof, was induced to refuse, and did in fact refuse to live any longer with the Plaintiff Jane as his wife, and on the contrary, the Plaintiff William required the father of the Plaintiff Jane, who lived in the country, to take her home to his own house, which he accordingly did; and the Plaintiff Jane, in fact, thereupon left Dublin and returned to her father's house, where she resided for a considerable time, separated from her said husband. And the Plaintiffs aver that such separation was solely and entirely caused by and resulted from the acts of the Defendant as aforesaid." And the Plaintiffs aver that they have sustained damage. The Defendant demurred to the plaint upon the grounds, that the words not being actionable in themselves, the special damage assigned was too remote; also, that the damage, if taken to be damage to the wife alone, was not such a temporal loss as a court of common law could take cognizance of; also, that the damage complained of having resulted from the wrongful and illegal act of one of the Plaintiffs, he could not maintain an action for it; also, that in any case the action being for words spoken of the wife, not actionable in themselves, the Plaintiff Jane should not have been joined as Plaintiff. The Defendant also, as a defence, denied the uttering of the words, and farther pleaded that they were not spoken in the sense imputed. [581] The issues settled by the Court were, first, whether the Defendant spoke the words; secondly, whether they were spoken in the defamatory sense mentioned in the two paragraphs of the plaint. The jury found a verdict for the Plaintiffs, damages £150. The Court of Queen's Bench having overruled the demurrer, judgment was given for the Plaintiffs on this finding. The case was then...
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