Lyons (J.) & Sons v Wilkins (No. 2)

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Date1899
Year1899
CourtCourt of Appeal
[COURT OF APPEAL] J. LYONS & SONS v. WILKINS. [1896 L. 153.] 1897 Nov. 16, 17, 18, 19. 1898 Feb. 3. 1898 Nov. 30; Dec. 1, 20. BYRNE J. LINDLEY M.R., CHITTY and VAUGHAN WILLIAMS L.JJ.

Trade Union - Picketing - “Watching and besetting” - “Wrongfully and without legal authority” - Injunction - Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 32), s. 1 - Conspiracy, and Protection of Property Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 86), ss. 3, 7.

Per Lindley M.R. and Chitty L.J.: To watch or beset a man's house, with the view to compel him to do or not to do that which it is lawful for him not to do or to do, is, unless some reasonable justification for it is consistent with the evidence, a wrongful act: (1.) because it is an offence within s. 7 of the Conspiracy, and Protection of Property Act, 1875; and (2.) because it is a nuisance at common law for which an action on the case would lie; for such conduct seriously interferes with the ordinary comfort of human existence and the ordinary enjoyment of the house beset: Bamford v. Turnley, (1860) 3 B. & S. 62; Broder v. Saillard, (1876) 2 Ch. D. 692, 701; Walter v. Selfe, (1851) 4 De G. & Sm. 315; Crump v. Lambert, (1867) L. R. 3 Eq. 409.

Proof that the nuisance was caused by an attempt “peaceably to persuade other people” would afford no defence to such an action; though persons may be peaceably persuaded provided the method employed is not a nuisance.

In the expression at the beginning of s. 7 “with a view to compel,” the word “view” does not import motive — it imports purpose.

Per Vaughan Williams L.J.: The words “wrongfully and without legal authority” in s. 7 of the Act of 1875 mean unwarranted by law.

According to the true meaning of s. 7 all watching and besetting is unlawful except such as is merely for the purpose of obtaining or communicating information; but the fact that a communication invites workmen to discontinue working as soon as they lawfully may does not take such communication out of the proviso in s. 7.

By the Court: Watching and besetting a person's house with a view to compel some one else is within s. 7, sub-s. 4, for the expression “such other” in the sub-section means “any other.”

Sect. 7 of the Conspiracy, and Protection of Property Act, 1875, discussed and explained.

The decision of the Court of Appeal in J. Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins, [1896] 1 Ch. 811, approved, and held to be in no way overruled by Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1, or by any principle laid down therein.

Appeal from decision of Byrne J., holding the plaintiffs entitled to a perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants from watching or besetting either the plaintiffs' works or the works of a sub-manufacturer for them for any purpose except merely to obtain or communicate information, dismissed.

APPEAL from Byrne J.

This action was originally brought by J. Lyons & Sons, leather bag and portmanteau manufacturers, against P. C.

Wilkins, the secretary, and C. Clarke, one of the executive committee, of a trades union called the Amalgamated Trade Society of Fancy Leather Workers. It arose out of a strike against the plaintiffs ordered by the society, in the course of which the plaintiffs' works, and also the works of Adolph Schoenthal, who was a sub-manufacturer for the plaintiffs, were picketed by persons employed by the executive committee, who (as it was found) watched and beset the works of the plaintiffs and of Schoenthal and the approaches thereto for the purpose of persuading workpeople to abstain from working for the plaintiffs. It was admitted that the pickets used no violence, intimidation, or threats; but in the opinion of the Court the evidence shewed that the picketing and the acts done by the pickets were done with the view to compel the plaintiffs to change their mode of conducting their own business, and constituted watching and besetting as distinguished from attending in order merely to obtain or communicate information.

On February 20, 1896, upon motion by the plaintiffs, North J. granted an interlocutory injunction, which, as modified in form by the Court of Appeal on March 19, 1896, restrained the defendants, their servants and agents, until trial of the action, from watching or besetting the plaintiffs' works or places for the purpose of persuading or otherwise preventing persons from working for the plaintiffs, or for any purpose except merely to obtain or communicate information, and also from preventing Schoenthal or other persons from working for the plaintiffs by withdrawing his or their workmen from their employment respectively. The Court of Appeal also directed the costs of the appeal to abide the result of the action: see [1896] 1 Ch. 811, where the facts are fully reported.

The strike came to an end some time ago, and Messrs. A. Thompson, J. Laverick, and F. Goodhall, the trustees of the society, having been added as defendants, the action came on for trial before Byrne J. on November 16, 17, 18 and 19, 1897.

Eve, Q.C., and Ward Coldridge, for the plaintiffs.

Jenkins Q.C. and W. H. Cozens-Hardy, for the defendants.

At the conclusion of the arguments, Byrne J. postponed his decision until after the House of Lords should have given judgment in the case of Allen v. FloodF1, which was then proceeding before them. Judgment was delivered in Allen v. FloodF1 on December 14, 1897; and on February 3, 1898, Byrne J. delivered judgment in the present case.

Cur. adv. vult.

1898. Feb. 3. BYRNE J. In this case the plaintiffs have obtained an injunction until judgment to restrain the defendants, their servants or agents, from watching or besetting the plaintiffs' works for the purpose of persuading, or otherwise preventing persons from working for them, or for any purpose except merely to obtain or communicate information; and also from preventing Adolph Schoenthal or other persons from working for the plaintiffs by withdrawing his or their workmen or workwomen from their employment respectively. By a slip, the order as drawn up has been made more extensive, but the terms I have mentioned are the true terms of the order pronounced by the Court of Appeal, as appears by the judgment of Kay L.J.F2

In substance, at the trial the plaintiffs have clearly proved the case made upon the motion as to watching and besetting the plaintiffs' premises illegally, and in my judgment they are entitled to have the injunction made perpetual, so far as the first part of the injunction is concerned, for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal upon disposing of the motion; and I do not consider it necessary to add anything upon the law bearing on this part of the case. I consider that it is clearly proved that the defendants Wilkins, Clarke, and Thompson watched and beset the plaintiffs' works, or place of business, and the approaches thereto for the purpose of persuading or otherwise preventing persons from working for the plaintiffs, and for purposes other than that of merely obtaining or communicating information.

In reference to the second part of the injunction, I think the case made upon the motion is fully proved, and I think also that it has been clearly shewn that the same defendants illegally watched and beset the premises of Adolph Schoenthal for the purpose of preventing him from working for the plaintiffs; but I think it probable that the Court of Appeal would have framed the second part of the injunction granted in a different manner had the case of Allen v. FloodF3 then been decided by the House of Lords. At any rate, the point has not been specifically argued whether or not, apart from the question of malice, it was unlawful to call out the workmen of Schoenthal in order to prevent him from working for the plaintiffs. Had the matter been one of importance in the present case, I should probably have required further argument; but the strike is long since over, and I have assumed that the parties would prefer not being put to the trouble and expense of a re-argument upon this point. I propose, therefore, to grant a perpetual injunction following the terms of the first part of the order of the Court of Appeal, but to frame the latter part of the injunction as follows: “and also from watching or besetting the premises of Adolph Schoenthal for the purpose of persuading or otherwise preventing him from working for the plaintiffs, or for any purpose except merely to obtain or communicate information.” The injunction must extend to the defendant Thompson, who participated in the wrongful acts committed. The acts in question being unlawful, the other defendants, if they conspired to induce the commission of such acts, are equally liable to an injunction, and by their amended defence all the defendants make common cause and accept common responsibility in respect of the matters I have referred to, as well as in respect of the alleged libels, which still remain to be dealt with. And, indeed, it is difficult to see how, as officers of the society under an obligation to attend all meetings of the executive council, under whose directions the defendant Wilkins acted, and with power to express their opinion, they could well do otherwise, whatever the domestic constitution of the society they belong to may provide as to their voting powers.

The plaintiffs further ask for an injunction to restrain the defendants from maliciously inducing or conspiring to induce persons not to enter into contracts with the plaintiffs, and I postponed judgment at the request of the parties until after the decision of the House of Lords in Allen v. FloodF4 should be given. The effect of that decision, which has now been given, is, in my opinion, to shew that the plaintiffs are not entitled to this injunction. It was conceded by the plaintiffs that they could not succeed unless they could shew malice; and it is the law, as finally determined by the House of Lords, that the existence of a malicious motive cannot in such a case as this render unlawful an act or acts otherwise lawful...

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