McGreevy v DPP

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
JudgeLord Reid,Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest,Lord Hodson,Lord Simon of Glaisdale,Lord Cross of Chelsea
Judgment Date01 February 1973
Judgment citation (vLex)[1973] UKHL J0201-1
Date01 February 1973
CourtHouse of Lords
William McGreevy
and
The Director of Public Prosecutions

[1973] UKHL J0201-1

Lord Reid

Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest

Lord Hodson

Lord Simon of Glaisdale

Lord Cross of Chelsea

House of Lords

Upon Report from the Appellate Committee, to whom was referred the Cause McGreevy against Director of Public Prosecutions (on Appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland), That the Committee had heard Counsel as well on Thursday the 30th day of November last, as on Monday the 4th, Wednesday the 6th and Thursday the 7th, days of December last, upon the Petition and Appeal of William McGreevy of 17 Knocknagow, Portaferry, County Down in Northern Ireland praying, That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely an Order of Her Majesty's Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland of the 3d of June 1972, might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered, or that the Petitioner might have such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, might seem meet; and Counsel having been heard on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Respondent to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:

It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Order of Her Majesty's Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland of the 3d day of June 1972, complained of in the said Appeal, be, and the same is hereby, Affirmed, and that the said Petition and Appeal be, and the same is hereby, dismissed this House.

Lord Reid

My Lords,

1

For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, I would dismiss this appeal.

Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest

My Lords,

2

The Appellant was charged with murdering Margaret Magee in her house in High Street, Portaferry, on the 17th November, 1970. When he was tried at the Spring Assizes in County Down in 1971, the jury failed to reach a verdict. He was thereafter tried at the Autumn Assizes before Mr. Justice Jones and a jury. The trial took place on the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th days of November, 1971. The jury found the Appellant guilty and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The appeal was based on various grounds. It was contended that the learned Judge had in many respects misdirected the jury: particular prominence was given to a contention that the learned Judge had failed to direct the jury or to give them guidance "as to how they should view and aproach circumstantial evidence". It was further contended that in all the circumstances of the case the verdict of the jury was unsafe and unsatisfactory. The appeal was fully heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal on the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th April, 1972. By their judgment delivered by the Lord Chief Justice on the 3rd May, 1972, the Court dismissed the appeal. The Court dealt with the contentions as to misdirection and in particular with the argument relating to circumstantial evidence. The Court rejected the submission that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory. The Court held that there was evidence upon which the jury properly directed were fully justified in finding the Appellant guilty. The charge of the learned Judge earned the commendation of the Court as having been "full, accurate, careful and conspicuously fair".

3

The trial involved a consideration by the jury of the evidence of over 30 witnesses. There was no doubt that the deceased woman had been murdered by someone. The case for the prosecution was that the Appellant had gone into the deceased's shop with the intention of stealing money from the till and in the hope that he would not be heard by the deceased from her room at the back: that the deceased had come in to the shop and that thereupon the Appellant had bolted the shop door, had pushed the deceased to the back room, and, in order to silence her, had struck her over the head with a bottle of lemonade and, after she had fallen, had kicked or stamped her to death. All that was firmly denied by the Appellant. The Appellant had undoubtedly been in the vicinity of the shop and there was much detailed evidence relating to his movements during the time before he joined his fiancee: she had driven to Portaferry to meet him and had then taken him to her house which was a few miles away. No occasion now arises, to summarise the mass of the evidence. It suffices to say that there was much evidence relating to the issue whether the Appellant had had the opportunity to do what the prosecution suggested. He himself gave an account of his movements. There were witnesses who had seen him and spoken to him and been with him. He had paid one perfectly lawful visit to the deceased's shop. He made a purchase there. He accounted for a period of about 10 minutes which, on the prosecution case, was the most relevant time by saying that he had left the vicinity of High Street and had returned to his house. There was evidence dealing with the discovery of the body of the deceased and the time of such discovery. There was evidence as to the probable time of the death and evidence as to the state of the room where the deceased was found. There was evidence as to the route taken by the assailant when he left the rear of the premises. There was evidence that some blood stains were found on certain clothing and attire of the deceased and evidence as to the blood grouping of the stains. There was evidence as to what clothing was worn or was not worn by the Appellant on the night in question and evidence as to how and when on a later day he visited the police and subsequently produced clothing for their inspection. The Appellant gave explanations as to how blood stains came to be on the clothing. There was evidence that footprints were found in what was spilled on to the floor of the deceased's room and evidence on the question whether they were or were not of a size and nature that showed that they were made or could have been made by the Appellant.

4

From this brief indication of the range of the evidence it is apparent that there were many matters which demanded the attention of the jury and further that it was open to them to draw conclusions from the evidence which would warrant them in deciding that the guilt of the Appellant had been established.

5

On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, some of the grounds of appeal were of misdirection in specific respects including ( a) misdirection as to what was the Crown case in regard to the footprints; ( b) misdirection as to what Dr. Grant (an expert witness) had said in regard to the footprints; (c) misdirection by failing to direct the jury that there was no evidence that certain blue trousers (on which there were blood stains) had been worn by the Appellant on the evening of the 17th November, 1970, and ( d) misdirection as to a test relating to the blood on the Appellant's car coat.

6

Counsel for the Appellant renewed in this House certain of the specific submissions as to alleged misdirection which he had advanced in the Court of Criminal Appeal, but more especially he related them to the contention which, as I have stated above, formed so prominent a part of the case which he argued in the Court of Criminal Appeal and which became the basis of an appeal to this House. After the Court of Criminal Appeal had given judgment on the 3rd May, 1972, application was made, pursuant to the provisions of section 36(2) of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act, 1968, and the Court certified that a point of law of general public importance was involved and the Court granted leave to appeal to this House. The point of law so certified was as follows:

"Whether at a criminal trial with a jury, in which the case against the accused depends wholly or substantially on circumstantial evidence, it is the duty of the trial judge not only to tell the jury generally that they must be satisfied of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but also to give them a special direction by telling them in express terms that before they can find the accused guilty they must be satisfied not only that the circumstances are consistent with his having committed the crime but also that the facts proved are such as to be inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion."

7

In presenting his most careful and lucid argument Counsel formulated his proposition of law in somewhat varied terms as follows:—That in a criminal trial in which the prosecution case, or any essential ingredient thereof, depends, as to the commission of the act, entirely on circumstantial evidence, it is the duty of the trial judge, in addition to giving the usual direction that the prosecution must prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, to explain to the jury in terms appropriate to the case being tried that this direction means that they must not convict on circumstantial evidence unless they are satisfied that the facts proved are ( a) consistent with the guilt of the accused and ( b) exclude every reasonable explanation other than the guilt of the accused.

8

I think that it is apparent that if the proposition were accepted there would hereafter be a rule of law which it would be obligatory upon the judges to follow. As I will indicate it would, in my view, be a new rule. It would be a rule applicable in criminal cases where (as to the commission of the act) the prosecution case (or an essential ingredient of it) depended entirely on circumstantial evidence. It is not contended that the rule would apply if the case depended partly on direct and partly on circumstantial evidence. The application of the rule would therefore depend upon defining and identifying what evidence is direct and what...

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