Metaphorical Shadow Boxing: A Response to Cornelissen’s Reply to our Rejoinder
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.00245 |
| Date | 01 December 2002 |
| Author | Dennis A. Gioia,Majken Schultz,Kevin G. Corley |
| Published date | 01 December 2002 |
It is clear that Cornelissen stands by his asser-
tions. We stand by ours, as well.
After these several rounds of point/counterpoint,
punch and counterpunch, we ask only that you, the
reader, do two things: 1) carefully consider that
Cornelissen’s entire case against the value of the
identity metaphor hinges on his questionable and
weakly defended assertion that there is allegedly
little conceptual similarity between individual and
organizational identity and 2) carefully consider
the implicit power of paradigmatic assumptions in
assessing the value of any concept or metaphor.
On the first point, we believe his philosophical
grounds for making this assertion are not work-
able. Almost any reasonable consideration would
dismiss his assertion that there is little isomorphic
similarity between ‘organization’ and ‘identity’
as simply untenable. Actually, the similarity at
issue is not between organization and identity,
per se, but between individual identity and organ-
izational identity. No matter. In the end, we trust
that the power of the organizational identity
metaphor and its use by interested scholars will
settle this debate in the academic marketplace of
ideas anyway.
On the second point, even if we acknowledge
that Cornelissen’s proposed procedures have some
usefulness for the field in weeding out metaphors
of marginal value, we nonetheless disagree that
the procedures are as universalist as he implies.
Clearly, the criteria of their application favors
metaphors that can be parsed and concretized
over those that are more gestalt – a not-so-subtle
hint that, despite his protests, functionalist criteria
are once again being invoked to evaluate non-
functionalist ways of understanding.
We reiterate that according to the criteria
articulated, many rich metaphors would fail
Cornelissen’s tests of usefulness. Conceiving of
organizations as brains, as theatres, as psychic
prisons, as instruments of domination, etc. would
all now be purged from our vocabulary. Curiously,
the main metaphor that would appear to pass his
‘rigorous’ tests is the machine metaphor, which
we believe to be adequate testament to the
functionalist roots of his analysis and the perhaps
unwitting hidden agenda of his article.
We continue to see this method of metaphor
assessment as essentially one that sets up meta-
phors that it can knock down on paradigmatically
inappropriate criteria. That old tactic suggests yet
another useful (but probably not very long lived)
metaphor by which Cornelissen might better
understand his own project: he appears to be
shadow boxing with metaphorical opponents of
his own making. It is not surprising, then, that
the match he has set up is rigged and that his
metaphorical sparring has more to do with an
image he has created than with the pragmatics of
metaphor use in organizational study.
British Journal of Management, Vol. 13, 281 (2002)
© 2002 British Academy of Management
Metaphorical Shadow Boxing:
A Response to Cornelissen’s
Reply to our Rejoinder
Dennis A. Gioia
Penn State University
Majken Schultz
Copenhagen Business School
Kevin G. Corley
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
09_Gioia2 26/11/02 1:12 pm Page 281
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