Microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors: An interdisciplinary exploration
| Published date | 01 December 2021 |
| Date | 01 December 2021 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1023263X211042471 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Microtargeted propaganda
by foreign actors: An
interdisciplinary exploration
Ronan Ó Fathaigh *, Tom Dobber**,
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius***,
and James Shires****
Abstract
This article discusses a problem that has received scant attention in literature: microtargeted pro-
paganda by foreign actors. Microtargeting involves collecting information about people, and using
that information to show them targeted political advertisements. Such microtargeting enables
advertisers to target ads to specific groups of people, for instance people who visit certain web-
sites, forums, or Facebook groups. This article focuses on one type of microtargeting: microtar-
geting by foreign actors. For example, Russia has targeted certain groups in the US with ads,
aiming to sow discord. Foreign actors could also try to influence European elections, for instance
by advertising in favour of a certain political party. Foreign propaganda possibilities existed before
microtargeting. This article explores two questions. In what ways, if any, is microtargeted propa-
ganda by foreign actors different from other foreign propaganda? What could lawmakers in Europe
do to mitigate the risks of microtargeted propaganda?
Keywords
Propaganda, microtargeting, freedom of expression, data protection, regulation, EU law
*
Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
**
Amsterdam School of Communication Research, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
***
Interdisciplinary Hub for Security, Privacy, and Data Governance (iHub) and Institute for Computing and Information
Sciences (iCIS), Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
****
Institute for Security and Global Affairs, University of Leiden, Leiden, the Netherlands
Corresponding author:
Ronan Ó Fathaigh, Institute for Information Law, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166,
1018 WV Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Email: r.f.fahy@uva.nl
Article
Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law
2021, Vol. 28(6) 856–877
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1023263X211042471
maastrichtjournal.sagepub.com
1. Introduction
As technology evolves, foreign adversaries’means to intervene in democratic processes evolve as
well.
1
For instance, foreign actors interfered in the presidential election in the US in 2016, including
by buying political ads on social media in the names of US persons and entities.
2
Indeed, according
to the European Commission, there were attempts at foreign interference in the 2019 European
Parliament elections.
3
Techniques like political microtargeting, which involves collecting informa-
tion about people, and using that information to show them tailored political advertisements, can be
used to spread propaganda. Microtargeting enables advertisers to target ads to specific groups of
people. Advances in artificial intelligence enable foreign actors to create potent propaganda, such
as AI-generated fake videos: deepfakes. By combining microtargeting techniques with such new
forms of propaganda, foreign actors could send the ‘right’propaganda message to the ‘right’
person and influence the integrity of fundamental democratic processes, including European
elections.
4
Extant research has focused mainly on the role of microtargeting within democratic states, focus-
ing on scenarios in which microtargeting will be used by legitimate domestic political actors, such
as domestic political parties and candidates.
5
But while these domestic political actors mostly play
by the rules, foreign actors have less reason to conform to domestic norms and regulation. Of
course, foreign propaganda aimed at influencing democratic processes existed before microtarget-
ing. However, microtargeting brings new dimensions to the problem. This article thus focuses on
the following questions. In what ways, if any, is microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors differ-
ent from other forms of propaganda? What could lawmakers in Europe do to mitigate the risks of
microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors?
For brevity, we also speak of ‘foreign microtargeting’when referring to ‘microtargeted propa-
ganda by foreign actors’. We combine insights from different disciplines: law, political science,
international relations and communication science. The article does not discuss all aspects of micro-
targeting. Outside the scope are, for instance, general questions relating to the promises and threats
of microtargeting for democracy.
6
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 discuss the notion of propaganda, and how inter-
national law defines propaganda. Section 3 discusses to what extent foreign microtargeting differs
from other forms of propaganda, and gives examples of how foreign actors have used, and could
use, microtargeting. Section 4 explores what lawmakers in the EU could do to mitigate risks of
1. By ‘foreign’we mean outside the political community (usually a state) where democratic processes take place –see dis-
cussion at the end of section 2 for more details. To limit the scope of the analysis, we focus only on democratic processes,
not other political systems. Foreign intervention in non- or semi-democratic political processes using the means dis-
cussed here is highly plausible but raises very different questions of fundamental rights and international law.
2. US Department of Justice, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election,
Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III (US Department of Justice, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf.
3. European Commission, Communication on the European Democracy Action Plan, COM/2020/790 final, p. 3. See also
European Commission and the High Representative, Joint Communication on the Report on the implementation of the
action plan against disinformation, JOIN(2019) 12 final, p. 3.
4. J.-B. Jeangène Vilmer et al., Information Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies (French Ministry for Europe
and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for the Armed Forces, 2018); and European Commission, Tackling online disin-
formation: a European Approach, COM(2018) 236 final.
5. F.J. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., ‘Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for Democracy’,14Utrecht Law
Review (2018), p. 82–96.
6. See on such topics: ibid., p. 82.
Ó Fathaigh et al 857
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