Mimicry, Persuasion, or Learning? The Case of Two Transparency and Anti‐Corruption Policies in Romania
| Author | Sabina Schnell |
| Published date | 01 October 2015 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1721 |
| Date | 01 October 2015 |
MIMICRY, PERSUASION, OR LEARNING? THE CASE OF TWO
TRANSPARENCY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES IN ROMANIA
SABINA SCHNELL*
Syracuse University, USA
SUMMARY
Public sector reforms in developing countries based on global “best practices”have come under increasing criticism in the de-
velopment community. The charge is that in trying to increase international legitimacy, governments copy institutional forms
that are not suited to the local context. Yet, such mimicry is not the only driver of international policy diffusion. Domestic policy
entrepreneurs learn from experiences of other countries and invoke global norms and values in advancing their preferred policy
options. Pressures for mimicry can help such policy entrepreneurs counter resistance from domestic elites, especially in the case
of value-based policies, such as transparency and anti-corruption policies. The cases of the Freedom of Information Act and the
Asset Disclosure Laws in Romania are used to illustrate how external pressure for legitimacy can empower domestic policy en-
trepreneurs and facilitate a process akin to “problem-driven iterative adaptation”advocated by critics of isomorphic mimicry in
public sector reform. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
key words—policy diffusion; policy learning; transparency; anti-corruption; freedom of information; asset disclosure;
problem-driven iterative adaptation; Romania
INTRODUCTION
Transparency and anti-corruption (TAC) policies have experienced a rapid spread around the world—from the dra-
matic increase of freedom of information laws, to asset disclosure regulations, to the setup of anti-corruption
agencies, to the recent Open Government Partnership. Global pressure has played a significant role in this spread.
Transnational civil society organizations and networks, such as Transparency International, Article 19, or the Open
Society Institute, have been strong advocates for TAC (McCoy and Heckel, 2001; Wang and Rosenau, 2001).
International regimes requiring governments to disclose information (Roberts, 2003) or to adopt a variety of
anti-corruption measures have also proliferated in the last decades. Last but not least, good governance and anti-
corruption have become prominent issues on the agenda of powerful bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors (Marquette,
2001; McCoy and Heckel, 2001; Bukovansky, 2006).
Transparency and anti-corruption policies generate an apparent paradox. Unlike other government activities,
such as service delivery or regulation of economic activity, the main goal of TAC policies is to put constraints
on decision-makers themselves. They are expected to contribute to better governance by exposing government
wrongdoing and allowing citizens to better hold government officials to account. If they work as expected, they
are likely to impose high costs precisely on the people who adopt and implement them—decision-makers, public
officials, and public sector employees. In countries with high—systemic—corruption, these costs can be particu-
larly high. Thus, TAC policies are likely to be opposed most in the contexts in which they are needed most.
This apparent divergence between international pressure and domestic incentives increases the danger of
mimicry in the area of TAC policies. “Isomorphic”or “insincere”mimicry occurs when states or organizations
adopt certain policies or institutional forms as a strategy for external legitimization, without really implementing
*Correspondence to: S. Schnell, Public Administration and International Affairs, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse
University, 215 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244, USA. E-mail: dsschnel@syr.edu
public administration and development
Public Admin. Dev. 35, 277–287 (2015)
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.1721
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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