A model of electoral alliances in highly fragmented party systems
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629820963182 |
| Date | 01 January 2021 |
| Published date | 01 January 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2021, Vol.33(1) 3–24
ÓThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629820963182
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A model of electoral alliances
in highly fragmented party
systems
Marcelo de C Griebeler
Federal University of Rio Grandedo Sul, Brazil
Roberta Carnelos Resende
UNISINOS, Brazil
Abstract
Highly fragmented party systems are composed of a large number of political groups, many of
which have negligible bargaining power when it comes to negotiations of electoral alliances.
Inspired by the Braziliansystem—one of the most fragmented in the world—we providea stylized
model of electoral alliances in which there is a competition for the support of the small parties.
Two leading parties try to entice a small one by simultaneously offering transfers (e.g. government
positions, support in other elections, prestige). Through a first-price sealed-bid auction approach,
we can analyze the role of two particular factors in alliance formation, namely pragmatism and
ideology. Our findings show that, in equilibrium, the favorite party tends to offer lower transfers
than the underdog. Furthermore, the closer the leadingand the small parties are in terms of ideol-
ogy, the smaller the transferred amount. When the ideological closeness between the small party
and the underdog is sufficiently large—relative to the favorite—the effect may be strong enough
to overcome the electoral advantageof the favorite.
Keywords
Auctions; elections; political economy
Corresponding author:
Marcelo de C Griebeler, Universidade Federaldo Rio Grande do Sul – UFRGS, Faculdade de Cie
ˆncias
Econo
ˆmicas, Departamento Economia e Relacxo
˜es Internacionais, AvenidaJoa
˜o Pessoa 52, CentroHisto
´rico,
Porto Alegre -RS 90040-000,Brazil.
Email: marcelo.griebeler@ufrgs.br
1. Introduction
During the Brazilian presidential campaign of 2002, the domestic political scene
was surprised by the unlikely alliance between the Workers’ Party (PT) and the
Liberal Party (PL).
1
While PT was one of the largest left-wing Brazilian parties,
with a history highly identified with popular movements and known by its antica-
pitalism speech, PL was a small right-wing political group founded by businessmen
and strongly associated with, for example, the defense of taxes cuts.
2
The alliance,
which contained three other left-wing parties (PCdoB, PCB, and PMN
3
), chose
Luiz Ina
´cio Lula da Silva (PT) and Jose
´Alencar (PL) as presidential and vice-
presidential candidates, respectively. Despitethe ideological differences between the
two main parties, the alliance succeeded and won the election, receiving 61.27% of
the valid cast votes. The great success of the alliance made PT and PL continue the
cooperation in the following election in 2006, when the same candidates were
reelected.
4
The examples of the aforementioned presidential elections are far from being an
exception in the Brazilian political scenario. The indifference regarding ideology is
even more common in campaigns for offices at the regional level (state and munici-
pal), where well-known political enemies often ally with each other with the objec-
tive of winning. Consider, for instance, the alliance between the Party of the Liberal
Front (PFL, currently Democrats, DEM), a political group traditionally viewed as
a symbol of the national right wing, and PT in the elections for governor in 2014 in
the states of Maranha
˜o, Para
´, and Paraı
´ba. As an example, at a local level, in 2008,
the Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), a traditional opponent of PT
in presidential elections, allied with the latter in more than 20% of the Brazilian
municipalities. Finally, consider the alliance between PT and the Progressive Party
(PP)—which, despite the name, is one of the largest right-wing national parties—in
the race for the mayor of the city of Sa
˜o Paulo in 2012, the largest Brazilian elec-
toral college.
These examples may suggest that electoral alliances are always formed pragmati-
cally, with the only objective of winningthe election.
5
In fact, the majority of the lit-
erature on Brazilian electoral alliances finds that pragmatism is one of the main
reason why parties choose to join and form a coalition (Borges et al., 2017; de Lima
Ju´ nior, 1983; Lavareda, 1991; Machado, 2012; Miguel and Machado, 2007; Soares,
1964).
6
However, although pragmatism seems to be the strongest driving force
behind the alliance decision-making process,
7
empirical evidence has reported that,
in some contexts, ideology does have an important role in the choice of whom to
ally with (Miranda, 2013; Oliveira, 1973; Santos, 1987; Krause and Godoi, 2010;
Schmitt, 1999).
In this paper, we build a model in which political parties have to decide whom
to ally with in order to win an election for an executive office. Inspired by the
Brazilian scenario, we highlight the role of two particular factors in the decision of
allying with another party,
8
namely pragmatism and ideology. Instead of investi-
gating the determinants of the formation of electoral alliances—or explaining their
formation—our model studies how the two different factors (determinants)
4Journal of Theoretical Politics 33(1)
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