Monica Jane Ramnarine v Chandra Bose Ramnarine (Trinidad & Tobago)
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Lord Wilson |
| Judgment Date | 31 July 2013 |
| Neutral Citation | [2013] UKPC 27 |
| Date | 31 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No 0021 of 2011 |
| Court | Privy Council |
[2013] UKPC 27
Lady Hale
Lord Kerr
Lord Wilson
Appeal No 0021 of 2011
Privy Council
Appellant
James Guthrie QC
Iain McLeod
(Instructed by MA Law (Solicitors) LLP
Respondent
Lesley-Ann Lucky-Samaroo
Alisa Khan
(Instructed by Alisa Khan)
Heard on 1 July 2013
An ex-wife (whom it will be convenient to call "the wife") appeals against an order made by the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago (Mendonca, Stollmeyer and Smith JJA) dated 15 March 2010 in proceedings for financial relief between her and her ex-husband ("the husband") following divorce. On that date, by an outline judgment delivered orally by Mendonca JA (with which the other Justices of Appeal agreed and which, upon request, was amplified by a written judgment of the court dated 19 October 2010), the Court of Appeal dismissed the wife's appeal against orders made by Tam J sitting in the High Court on 8 February 2006. He had dismissed the wife's claims against the husband for financial relief and had made an order (with which she had complied) that she should vacate the matrimonial home in Arouca by 30 April 2006.
The wife was born in Trinidad in 1944 and is now aged 68. The husband was born in Trinidad in 1945 and is now aged 67. As a teenager, the wife moved from Trinidad to Britain and she has dual nationality. The husband, who is a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, married the wife in London in 1967. By then, the eldest of the four children of the family had been born. The three others were born in 1969, 1974 and 1982.
From 1967 to 1980 the parties lived first in London, then in New York City and then in Trinidad. From 1980 until 1996 the wife lived basically in London together with two, and at times all three, of the younger children and the husband lived basically in Trinidad; but they visited each other. The wife lived in local authority accommodation. The husband lived in the home in Arouca, which he had inherited from his father and became vested in his name.
In 1996, for no obvious reason, the wife returned to live basically in Trinidad, where, subject to substantial visits to London and elsewhere, she has remained. But she did not return to live with the husband. At least by then, if not before, the marriage was at an end. The husband vacated the home and the wife moved back into it and there, for two years, she cared for their youngest child.
In July 1996 the husband petitioned for divorce. A welter of litigation between the parties then ensued. The wife filed an answer to the petition. She applied for an order restraining the husband from interfering with her occupation of the home in Arouca, which resulted in his undertaking to allow her to have exclusive occupation of it until her applications for financial relief, made in her answer and activated in February 1997, had been determined. There were cross-applications for relief against molestation. There was an issue about the custody of the youngest child, then aged 14, and, once custody of him had been awarded to the wife, about his maintenance; later she issued a judgment summons about the husband's alleged non-payment of it. She also applied unsuccessfully for maintenance pending suit. In particular, however, following the grant of a decree nisi in July 1997 (made absolute in August 1997), the wife was able fully to proceed with her applications for other forms of financial relief.
Before the Board the wife is represented by Mr Guthrie QC and Mr McLeod. They appear for her free of charge and also as a service to the Board, which is deeply grateful to them. Unlike their predecessor in the Court of Appeal, who may have felt some inhibition in this regard, they place at the forefront of the appeal the history of delay in the conclusion of the proceedings for financial relief. The delay can be broken down into five main periods:
The Board will address the delay later in this judgment and will seek to express itself in measured terms. But, although the delay must also be appraised in its totality (16 years and five months), the reader should keep in mind in particular the length of the delay at (b) above, namely of four years between the conclusion of the hearing before the judge and the oral delivery of his judgment. Mr Guthrie contends that this delay, which the Board believes to be of a length beyond its previous experience, led the judge into fatal error and, in particular, led him to fail to perform his duty under section 27(1) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act ("the Act").
-
(a) The period between the date of the activation of her applications and the date when Tam J began to conduct the substantive hearing of them. This was four years and nine months (February 1997 to November 2001).
-
(b) The period between the date of the conclusion of the substantive hearing and the judge's judgment, which he delivered orally. This was in effect four years (January 2002 to February 2006).
-
(c) The period between the date of the oral delivery of the judge's judgment and the date of the court's issue of it in writing (11 pages), together with the court's notes of evidence (62 pages). This was one year and ten months (February 2006 to December 2007).
-
(d) The period between the issue of the judge's written judgment, together with the notes, and the hearing of the wife's appeal, notice of which she had issued immediately following the oral delivery of his judgment. This was two years and three months (December 2007 to March 2010).
-
(e) The period between the issue of the wife's notice of appeal to the Board and the hearing before the Board. This was three years and two months (May 2010 to July 2013), of which the first five months were spent waiting for the written amplification of the Court of Appeal's judgment and the next 21 months were devoted to the ventilation of issues relating to the husband's claim for substantial security for his costs of the further appeal.
In substance the wife was applying for orders for the husband to make periodical payments and/or a lump sum payment to her under section 24(1)(a) and (c) of the Act and, in particular, for an order for a settlement of property in her favour under section 26(1)(b) of the Act, whereby she would receive a life interest in the home in Arouca. In the Court of Appeal, however, as an alternative to a life interest in the home, the wife contended for an order under section 53 of the Act which would afford to her a right personally to occupy it for the rest of her life.
The applications before Tam J were governed by section 27(1) of the Act. The Act was enacted in 1972 and the terms of the subsection closely followed those of section 5(1) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970, which had come into force in England and Wales on 1 January 1971 and which was soon to be replaced in almost identical terms by section 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. It is important to note, however, that, although section 27 (1) has been amended, the Republic has not chosen to make changes to it analogous to those made in England and Wales by the new subsections (1) and (2) of section 25 which were substituted for subsection (1) by section 3 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.
The judge correctly noted that, in determining whether, and if so in what manner, to accede to the wife's applications, section 27(1) placed him under a duty. The subsection required him to have regard to "all the circumstances of the case including the following matters". Although the judge paraphrased it as a reference to "all the circumstances…but including certain other matters", the Board is clear that his use of the word "other" was no more than an infelicity. He then duly recited the specified matters, which the Board summarises as follows:
Then the judge quoted the tail-piece of section 27(1), which in England and Wales was eliminated by the 1984 Act and which the Board should set out in full:
"… and so to exercise those powers as to place the parties, so far as it is practicable and, having regard to their conduct, just to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards the other."
-
(a) income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources;
-
(b) needs, obligations and responsibilities;
-
(c) standard of living;
-
(d) age of each party and duration of marriage;
-
(e) disability;
-
(f) contributions;
-
(g) any order made under section 53, i.e. in relation to occupation of the matrimonial home; and
-
(h) any pension lost as a result of the divorce.
At the hearing before the judge there was no issue about many of the relevant matters, including the following:
No doubt the judge considered it more important to address what was in contention. But it was unfortunate that he referred only to some of the above matters because they were all relevant under section 27(1) and the exercise thereunder has to be conducted rigorously (see Scheeres v Scheeres in the English Court of Appeal, [1999] 1 FLR 241 at p 243G). The discharge of the judge's duty under the subsection would more easily have been demonstrated if he had referred to all of them, perhaps even, as an aidemémoire, in the order set by the subsection. The husband's interests in the family properties and in the roti business may well have been of small value; but in any event the judge would have been wise to refer to their value and it is good practice for the court to draw a balance sheet of the value of all of the parties' assets, reflective of its conclusions.
-
(a) The wife was then aged 57.
-
(b) The husband was then aged 56.
-
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ahmad Hamad Algosaibi and Brothers Company v Saad Investments Company Ltd, Al Sanea and Others
...(No. 3), [2018] UKSC 3; [2018] 1 W.L.R. 973; [2018] 2 All E.R. 945; [2018] Env. L.R. 24, referred to. (54) Ramnarine v. Ramnarine, [2013] UKPC 27, considered. (55) Relfo Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Varsani, [2014] EWCA Civ 360; [2015] 1 BCLC 14, considered. (56) Rhesa Shipping Co. ......
-
Fine Lady Bakeries Ltd v EDF Energy Customers Ltd (Formerly EDF Energy Customers Plc)
...apparent from the judgment. On that basis, the appeal was dismissed. 40 The Privy Council considered Crinion in Ramnarine v Ramnarine [2013] UKPC 27. In delivering the judgment of the Board, Lord Wilson observed: “It is not, of itself, bad practice for a judge who has considered the rival c......
-
XW v XH
...specifically the need for the exercise to be conducted rigorously, was cited with approval by the Privy Council in Ramnarine v Ramnarine [2014] 1 FLR 594, at 85 Having regard to the way in which the jurisprudence has developed since 1999, it is interesting also to note what was said in the ......
-
Between: Ahmad Hamad Algosaibi and Brothers Company Plaintiff/Appellant v (1) Saad Investments Company Ltd (2) Maan AL Sanea and Others Defendants/Respondents
...together with a. reasoned rejection of it… 304 Longmore LJ's recommendations were indorsed by Lord Wilson JSC in Ramnarine v. Ramnarine [2013] UKPC 27 at [13], but, subject to that, Lord Wilson also said: It is not, of itself, bad practice for a judge who has considered the rival contentio......