MOVING INTO THE NEW AID APPROACH, DILEMMAS FOR NGOs: THE BELGIAN CASE
| Author | Sebastian Dellepiane,Sara Dewachter,Nadia Molenaers |
| Date | 01 August 2011 |
| Published date | 01 August 2011 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/pad.600 |
MOVING INTO THE NEW AID APPROACH, DILEMMAS FOR NGOs:
THE BELGIAN CASE
NADIA MOLENAERS*, SARA DEWACHTER AND SEBASTIAN DELLEPIANE
Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Antwerp Belgium
SUMMARY
Under the new aid approach, nongovernmental development organizations (NGOs) are expected to move from “delivery”(service
delivery projects) to “leverage”(lobbying and advocacy). In line with this international tendency, the Belgian government has
signed a pact with the NGO sector in which a move away from delivery and toward leverage is being proposed. Given that Belgian
NGOs are heavily dependent on government funding and strongly oriented toward the “delivery”model, this pact implies that a
number of NGOs will have to undergo organizational changes. This article shows that there is a major cleavage in the NGO
landscape in Belgium. Some organizations clearly favor the leverage, whereas others prefer the delivery roles. Those that are more
dependent on government funding tend to incline toward the leverage orientation. The attitudinal orientation toward the leverage
model however does not imply that organizations are effectively willing and able to change. A number of identity and legitimacy
concerns are perceived by NGOs to be important sources of organizational inertia. Copyright ©2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
key words—organizational change; new aid approach; civil society; Belgium; NGO
INTRODUCTION
The turn of the millennium has produced a major shift in development thinking. The new aid approach (NAA),
endorsed by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, implies new challenges for civil society and
nongovernmental development organizations (NGOs) (OECD/DAC, 2005; OECD/DAC, 2008). NGOs need to
refocus their attention from micro to macro, from projects to policies, and from beneficiaries to citizens (Cornwall
and Gaventa, 1999). They are expected to move away from service delivery projects and toward lobbying and
advocacy to push the good governance agenda (Edwards et al., 1999; Fowler, 2000; Lewis, 2007). Yet, the
implementation of the proposed policies should not be taken for granted given the gap between the rhetoric and
practice of aid.
The case of Belgium illustrates this tension. A bargaining process between the Belgian Directorate General for
Development (DGD) and NGOs resulted in a pact, which set up an agenda to improve “indirect cooperation”
(DGDC, 2009a). This pact implies that Belgian NGOs (BNGOs) should shift away from the provision of services
through projects and instead contribute to developing its southern partners in terms of empowerment, networking,
and political lobbying. NGOs should work toward “strengthening local development actors and support to the
efforts of vulnerable population groups in the South who strive for a sustainable exercise of their rights”(DGDC,
2009b). The new rules of the game are a powerful signal for BNGOs, which are highly dependent on government
funding. However, the implementation of the pact is not without challenges. For one thing, the BNGO landscape is
heavily oriented toward service delivery. For another, the historical right of initiative of NGOs in Belgium may
clash with the need to accommodate the standards of international development agencies.
This article sheds new light on the attitudes of BNGOs toward the emerging development as leverage model. In
particular, we seek to understand how NGOs assess the coercive pressures for change and whether they perceive
*Correspondence to: N. Molenaers, Institute of Development Policy and Management, Universityof Antwerp, Lange St Annastraat 7, Antwerp,
Antwerp 2000, Belgium. E‐mail: nadia.molenaers@ua.ac.be
public administration and development
Public Admin. Dev. 31, 188–204 (2011)
Published online 13 July 2011 in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.600
Copyright ©2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
the proposed changes as legitimate. We also seek to know if there are systematic variations in the behavior of
BNGOs and whether such variation can be attributed to certain organizational and environmental characteristics.
To address these ques tions, we build upon i deas from resource dep endency theory and so ciological
institutionalism. Resource dependency theory puts the emphasis on the incentives stemming from the patterns
of financial support. Sociological institutionalism, on the other hand, suggests that the process of organizational
change is more complex because organizations face multiple and often conflicting demands. This brings up the
issue of how organizations make sense of their environments and how they attach more or less meaning and
legitimacy to a myriad of pressures.
This article presents a case study of NGOs in Belgium. The case study method involves an intensive and
context‐sensitive investigation of a single case with the purpose of shedding light on a broader phenomenon
(Yin, 2009). Case studies are good for uncovering missing mechanisms, developing hypotheses, and dealing with
causal complexity (George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007). They are particularly apt for approaching “how”
and “why”questions about relatively understudied issues. There is very little academic research on NGOs in
Belgium. Our analysis attempts to fill this gap, stimulating further research in this area and potentially informing
policy interventions. Although Belgium is not one of the biggest donors, it has an established tradition in
development cooperation. Perhaps more importantly, the country’s cultural and political diversity offers a fertile
ground for comparative research. Notwithstanding, the case is relevant in its own right; it also has comparative
merits. Case studies are cases of something; they are histories with a point (Moses and Knutsen, 2007). This
exploratory study speaks of the current debates about the plausibility of the NAA. It also contributes toward the
accumulation of knowledge about the ways real actors experience institutions (Suddaby, 2010) and the systematic
study of NGOs (Woods, 2000; Campelo Koslinski and Reis, 2009).
This research is firstly based on a comprehensive desk study of the Belgian NGO landscape. This study covered
available online databases on development NGOs, policy articles from both the federal and regional development
agencies, and unpublished documents originated in the recent consultation process. Second, we conducted a
modest but original survey explicitly aimed at mapping out the attitudes of BNGOs regarding the issue of
development as delivery versus development as leverage. The survey was launched in October 2008, and 58
organizations of 115 responded. Third, we further investigated the perceived incentives of NGOs by conducting
about 10 in‐depth interviews with representatives from DGDC, NGO federations, and their umbrellas.
The results of our research, visualized in Figure 1, indicate that NGOs react differently toward the incentives
and disincentives coming from the wider environment. Three important insights surge: (i) In line with the resource
Development as Leverage
Development as Service Delivery
Figure 1. “Development as leverage”versus “development as delivery”.
189MOVING INTO THE NEW AID APPROACH, DILEMMAS FOR NGOs: THE BELGIAN CASE
Copyright ©2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 31, 188–204 (2011)
DOI: 10.1002/pad
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