Much Ado about Nothing: Pinner v. Everett
| DOI | 10.1177/0032258X6904201110 |
| Published date | 01 November 1969 |
| Date | 01 November 1969 |
| Author | L. N. W. Prince |
| Subject Matter | Article |
INSPECTOR
L.
N.
W.
PRINCE
Birmingham City Police
MUfJH ADO
ABOUT
NOTHING:
Pinner
v,
Everett
The
eagerly awaited decision from the House
of
Lords in the case
of
Pinner v. Everett (The Times, July 29) appears to have created a
certain
amount
of
confusion, as have so
many
recent decisions
dealing with the question
of
"driving or attempting to drive" as it
applies to the
Road
Safety
Act
1967.
Hugh
Pinner
was successful in his appeal against the dismissal
of
his appeal to
quarter
sessions by the Divisional
Court,
following a
conviction by
Huntingdon
magistrates
of
failing without reasonable
cause to provide aspecimen
of
blood
or urine, contrary to s. 3(3)
of
the Act.
At
about
1a.m. on
January
5, 1969, he was driving home
and
was
followed by two police officers. There was nothing
abnormal
about
his driving
but
he was stopped because his rear
number
plate was
not
illuminated. He got
out
of
his car after stopping
and
it was
noticed
that
his
breath
smelt
of
alcohol. He was required to take a
breath
test,
but
refused, on the grounds
that
there was no cause to
suspect him
of
having alcohol in his
body
whilst driving
and
he
had
not
committed amoving traffic offence or been involved in an acci-
dent. However, after the lapse
of
some 20 minutes
and
after he
had
been
told
that
if he did
not
provide aspecimen he would be arrested,
he agreed to
take
a
breath
test. This proved positive
and
he was
arrested. A secorid
breath
test at the police station was also positive
and
he was required to provide aspecimen
of
blood
or urine. This
he refused to do
and
this action led to his subsequent conviction.
His appeal to the Divisional
Court
was dismissed
but
leave was
granted
for him to appeal to the House
of
Lords on the following
questions: (1) whether in the case
of
the requirement to provide a
specimen
of
breath
for a
breath
test
under
s. 2(1)(a)
of
the Act
of
1967, the suspicion by the police
that
the person driving or
attempt-
ing to drive
had
alcohol in his
body
must
arise during the time
of
actual driving;
and
(2) whether the requirement could only be made
of
aperson who,
though
no longer actually driving, could in general
terms be described as the driver.
From
the outset the second question seemed to be somewhat
ambiguous
and
Lord
Reid declined to answer this point, saying
that
it asked him to choose between two phrases, "actually driving"
and
"the
driver", neither
of
which was to be
found
in the Act.
Actual
Driving
It
will be
noted
that
question
No.
1includes the words
"actual
503 November 1969
To continue reading
Request your trial