Multinational Negotiation Parties: The Case of the European Community
| Published date | 01 November 1973 |
| Author | Arild Underdal |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677300800403 |
| Date | 01 November 1973 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Multinational
Negotiation
Parties:
The
Case
of
the
European
Community*
ARILD
UNDERDAL
University
of
Oslo,
Norway
Underdal,
A.
Multinational
Negotiation
Parties:
The
Case
of
the
European
Commu-
nity.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
VIII,
1973,
173-82.
An
outline
and
explanation
are
given
of
some
of
the
main
characteristics
in
the
negoti-
ating
behaviour
of
the
European
Community,
and —
more
generally
—
of multi-
national
actors
at
a
similar
level of
integration.
The
EC
is
considered
to
be
a
coalition
of
states
—
more
pluralistic
and
more
complex
than
state
actors.
In
this
analysis
focus
is
on
the
implications
of
pluralism.
The
dimension
of
pluralism
itself
is
held
to
be
relevant,
first,
to
decision-making
capacity,
and,
second,
to
the
decisions
produced,
and —
by
implication
—
to
the
character
and
outcome
of the
negotiation
processes.
One
main
proposition
submitted
is
that
decision-making
capacity
is
inversely
related
to
pluralism
of
authority
and
structural
complexity.
Two
main
characteristics
with
regard
to
the
actual
decisions
produced
are
found
and
discussed:
First,
the
decisions
taken
usually
have
to
be
close
to
the
position
advocated
by
the
member
that
feels
its
vital
interests
at
stake
on
a
particular
issue,
and
second,
very
often
Community
de-
cisions
are
hard
to
modify
or
change.
Throughout
the
article,
the
significance
of
the
characteristics
described
is
analysed
in
relation
to
three
models
of
negotiation:
inte-
grative
negotiations,
negotiations
governed
by
the
principle
of
fairness,
and
distributive
bargaining.
Finally,
the
author
explains
to
what
extent
and
how
the
choice
of
procedure
might
affect the
conclusions
arrived
at.
Arild
Underdal.
University
of
Oslo. Norwary
.
I.
INTRODUCTION
With
the
development
of
common
policies
in
general,
and
external
policy
in
partic-
ular,
the
European
Community
finds
it-
self
engaged
in
an
increasing
number
of
negotiations
with
other
states.
At
the
same
time
other
regional
organizations
try
to
breath
a
life
of
their
own,
aspiring
to
strongcr
and
more
extensive
co-ordination
of
positions
towards
the
outside
world.
Thus,
the
development
of
regional
inte-
gration
makes
it
important,
theoretically
as
well
as
practically,
to
improve
our
un-
derstanding
of
how
organizations
like
the
EC
are
functioning
as
negotiatiun
parties.
This
task
calls
for
a
combination
of
sev-
eral
fields
of
political
science;
more
par-
ticularly
theories
of
integration
and
the-
ories
of
negotiation.
In
this
article
we
shall
focus
on
the
European
Community.
Hopefully,
how-
ever,
our
conclusions
may
apply
also
to
other
organizations
at
a
similar
level
of
integration
(and
complexity).
This
article
proceeds
from
the
assumption
that
one
of
the
most
powerful
keys
to
understanding
Community
negotiating
behaviour
is
to
be
found
in
the
logic
of
Community
decision-
making.
Its
purpose,
then,
is
to
outline
some
main
implications
for
negotiations
of
the
political
system
of
the
European
Community.
Our
approach
is
primarily
deductive,
and
the
propositions
suggested
have
not
been
submitted
to
any
extensive
empirical
tests.
Moreover,
we
should
like
to
stress
that
this
paper
aims
at
a
very
general
outline.
Admittedly,
our
portrait
will
be
subject
to
modifications,
depending
upon
which
’:.
This
paper
is
based
upon
an
carlier
unpub-
lished
study
of
the
negotiations
on
Norwegian
membership
of
the
EC.
In
a
somewhat
different
form
and
context
the
main
conclusions
will
also
appear
in
a
forthcoming
book
on
these
negotia-
tions.
I
would
like
to
thank
Knut
Midgaard,
Martin
Saeter,
and
Halvor
Stenstadvold
for
their
comments
on
earlier
drafts.
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