NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF HIS SCHOLARLY WORK AND INFLUENCE
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1983.tb00127.x |
| Author | PAUL J. McNulty,James W. Kuhn,David Lewin |
| Published date | 01 July 1983 |
| Date | 01 July 1983 |
NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS
OF
HIS SCHOLARLY WORK AND INFLUENCE
JAMES
W.
KUHN*
DAVID
LEWIN*
PAUL
J.
MCNULTY
*
AND
NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN’S recent retirement from Columbia University provides an
opportunity to assess the work
of
a leading American scholar. Though he is most
closely identified with the field
of
industrial relations, his interests and published works
are wideranging. Judging the output of
so
prolific a scholar is a formidable task. To
make this task manageable, we have chosen to focus on Chamberlain’s writings in
three areas: industrial relations, industrial organisation and the theory
of
the firm, and
the role
of
corporate management in society. These are dealt with sequentially below.
In the last portion
of
the paper, we attempt a synthesis of the assessments in order to
reach an overall judgment concerning the intellectual contributions of Chamberlain’s
scholarly work.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
Even within this single field, Chamberlain’s writings are voluminous
so
that, here
too, only a selective assessment of his scholarship can be attempted. In particular, we
will
analyse Chamberlain’s work on bargaining power, the impact of the union on
management, and the nature
of
the management function. It should be clear that
space constraints, rather than disinterest, prevent
us
from examining Chamberlain’s
writings on the bargaining unit, strikes, union politics, grievance procedures, and the
labour agreement.
Further, the choice of certain areas
of
industrial relations for analysis does not stem
from a belief on our part that Chamberlain’s work in each
of
them has had an equally
large impact on the field. To the contrary, and as will be detailed in the following
sections, we judge the impact on industrial relations theory and research
of
Chamberlain’s work on bargaining power to be substantial, the impact
of
the work on
the union penetration into management to be modest, and the impact
of
the work on
the management function to be negligible. We also believe, however, that there are
significant aspects
of
Chamberlain’s research in these three areas, especially the
second and third areas, which have been largely overlooked by industrial relations
scholars. If this assessment is correct-which is to say, if it is shared by readers-then
perhaps some scholars will be motivated to re-examine certain of Chamberlain’s
works, with a view toward advancing the state
of
industrial relations theory and
research.
Bargaining Power
Most industrial relations scholars would probably concur in the judgment that
Chamberlain’s principal contribution to the field lies in his analysis of bargaining
power. The simplest definition of bargaining power offered by Chamberlain (1958) is
‘...the ability to secure another’s agreement on one’s own terms’. However, this
concept is more complex, as the following passage indicates (Chamberlain, 1951):
We may define bargaining power
(of
A,
let
us
say) as being the cost to
B
of
dbagreeing
on
As
terms relative
to
the costs
of
agreeing
on
A’s
terms
...
Stated in another way, a (relatively)
*
Professors
of
Business, Columbia University
143
144
BRITISH JOURNAL
OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
high cost
to
B of disagreement with
A
means that
As
bargaining power is strong.
A
(relatively) high cost
of
agreement means that
A’s
bargaining power is weak. Such statements
in themselves, however, reveal nothing of the strength
or
weakness of
A
relative
to
B, since B
might similarly possess a strong
or
weak bargaining power. But if the cost to B of disagreeing
on
A’s
terms
is
greater than the cost of agreeing on
A’s
terms, while the cost to
A
of
disagreeing on B’s terms is less than the cost
of
agreeing on B’s terms, then
A’s
bargaining
power is greater than that of
B.
More generally, only if the difference to B between the costs
of
disagreement and agreement on
As
terms is proportionately greater than the difference to
A
between the costs of disagreement and agreement on B’s terms can
it
be said that
As
bargaining power is greater than that of B (italics in original).
In
developing this analysis
of
bargaining power, Chamberlain
(1951)
assessed
concepts previously offered by others, including Pigou
(1938),
Commons
(1934),
Simons
(1948),
Slichter
(1940),
Dunlop
(1944),
Lindblom
(1948),
and Hicks
(1932),
all
of which he found wanting in
one
or
another respect.
In
particular, Chamberlain felt
that his own notion of bargaining power went beyond that
of
Hicks, whose analysis
proceeded ‘solely from the standpoint
of
price and wage determination’.
Having laid out this concept
of
bargaining power, Chamberlain went
on
to study
specific union and management tactics that were undertaken to affect the opponent’s
cost
of
disagreement. On the union side, these tactics included thi timing
of
strikes in
the automobile, printing and hat manufacturing industries; the influence
of
unemployment insurance
on
the duration
of
strikes in the New York City newspaper
industry in
1962-3
and the steel industry in
1959;
the control by craft unions
of
the
labour supply to some industries and firms; and certain unions’ (such as the
Teamsters’) ability to secure sympathetic action, for example, refusals to cross a picket
line, from other unionists. The management tactics examined by Chamberlain and
Kuhn
(1965)
included violent opposition to union organisers; the circulation
of
employee black-lists and the hiring of
agents provocateur,
both before and after
passage
of
the Wagner Act in
1935;
refusals to employ union members except
on
terms
agreeable to management; the use of strike insurance in such industries as air
transportation, railroads, newspaper publishing and Hawaiian sugar growing during
the
1950s
and
1960s;
and the lockout
of
unionised employees. These and other union
and management tactics are
of
a piece within Chamberlain’s framework
of
analysis in
that they are undertaken
to
influence relative bargaining power.
Chamberlain’s bnceptualisation
of
bargaining power has not gone uncriticised.
For
example,
Cross
(1969)
contends that ‘there is
no
such thing as
“the
cost
of
disagreement”
or
“the
cost
of
concession”
’
(italics in original); rather, these
expressions must be defined not only in terms of the parties’ current demands, but also
in terms
of
the environmental circumstances under which they choose to negotiate.
Cheng
(1968)
points out that Chamberlain failed to quantify the term ‘cost’ and that
other definitions
of
bargaining power ‘...hold even more intuitive appeal’. Writing in
1973,
Hamermesh asserted that ‘bargaining theory contains very few interesting
propositions that can be tested empirically’, and that the testable models were limited
to those offered by Zeuthen
(1930)
and Nash
(1950).
Mabry
(1966)
has criticised
Chamberlain’s model
of
bargaining power for being one-sided, ‘since it focuses
primarily
on
the losses incurred in bargaining’, and also because it lacks a theory
of
motivation. More recently, Bacharach and Lawler
(1981)
have taken Chamberlain to
task
for
the failure
to
develop sufficient theoretical and empirical links between
bargaining theory and bargaining power.
Nevertheless, a close reading
of
the industrial relations literature reveals the wide
influence that Chamberlain’s analysis
of
bargaining power has had on scholars in the
field. For example, Walton and McKersie
(1965)
indicate that Chamberlain’s analysis
has ‘improved our understanding by formulating [an] explanatory model..
.of
the
outcome
of
distributive bargaining’. The emphasis that Chamberlain placed
on
strategic and tactical actions to alter bargaining power can be said to have provided
a
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