‘Neutrality: A really dead concept?’ A reprise
| Published date | 01 September 2011 |
| Author | Karen Devine,Christine Agius |
| Date | 01 September 2011 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836711416955 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Cooperation and Conflict
46(3) 265 –284
© The Author(s) 2011
Reprints and permission: sagepub.
co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0010836711416955
cac.sagepub.com
‘Neutrality: A really dead
concept?’ A reprise
Christine Agius and
Karen Devine
Abstract
This article approaches ‘neutrality’ as an essentially contested concept and traces its meaning
and purpose over centuries-long historical timelines and situated political, societal and security
contexts. It distinguishes neutrality from other concepts such as ‘neutralization’ ‘non-belligerency’,
‘non-alignment’, ‘military non-alignment’, ‘military neutrality’ and ‘non-allied’. The article explains
the politics of defining neutrality in the current European political and legal landscape and in
the context of shifting definitions and practices of war, peace, security and state sovereignty.
This episteme-based analysis focuses on changes to neutrality in accordance with the rise and
fall of particular empires and international actors over time, and changes to its status linked to
the development and reification of particular meta-theoretically-based subfields of International
Relations and Political Science, setting the background to this special issue of Cooperation and
Conflict. A renewed emphasis on the normative aspects of neutrality (i.e. the role of domestic
values, politics, preferences, history and mass publics in foreign policy formulation) is achieved
by employing a range of perspectives, characterized by increased pluralism in levels of analysis
and theoretical approaches. Through this pluralism, authors engage with (1) the strategic and
normative drivers underpinning the norm of neutrality, (2) the potential for neutrals to serve as
norm entrepreneurs in the field of peace promotion, (3) the tenuous legal status of elites’ quasi-
neutral foreign policy constructions underpinned by tensions between discourses and practices
and (4) the discursive strategies underpinning the move from neutral states’ traditional forms of
neutrality to what is termed ‘post-neutrality’ in the current politico-legal context.
Keywords
Conceptualizations, epistemes, military non-alignment, neutrality, security
In this journal, in the year 1999, Laurent Goetschel explored whether neutrality was a
‘really dead concept’, noting that it persisted as a principled belief and could contribute
to European security cooperation in a unique manner. Separating the legal and political
core of neutrality, he argued along broadly constructivist lines that the norms of neutrality
Corresponding author:
Karen Devine, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Glasnevin, Dublin 9.
Email: karen.devine@dcu.ie
416955CAC46310.1177/0010836711416955Agius and DevineCooperation and Conflict
Article
266 Cooperation and Conflict 46(3)
and their importance to national identity meant there was still something left of value.
Indeed, this was manifest as neutral states actively contributed to European security,
notably in terms of conflict management and the promotion of non-military security
solutions (Jørgensen, 1999; Ingebritsen, 2002; Eliasson, 2004; Miles, 2005; Strömvik,
2006; Väyrynen, 2006; Björkdahl, 2007). Since the end of bipolarity, and as Member
States of the European Union (EU), Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Malta now
devise their security policies in line with broader European priorities, and, subsequently,
neutrality has been slowly disappearing as a description and concept of security policy
for these European states, which now define their status as militarily non-aligned as
opposed to neutral (Sundelius, 1994; Miles, 1995; Goetschel, 1999; Ojanen, 2000, 2002,
2003; Ojanen et al., 2000; Tiilikainen, 2001; Munro, 2005; Möller and Bjereld, 2010).
As a result of the altered external security environment and international structure, the
purpose of neutrality has come under scrutiny. Non-territorial security problems and
greater interdependence have redirected the security priorities and practices of the militar-
ily non-aligned states, as seen in the restructuring of their defence forces and greater
involvement in European and NATO security initiatives and operations. In this context, it
is certainly questionable whether neutrality or military non-alignment has any particular
strategic or security value, and, if it does, whether it currently comes in the form of their
engagement in wider security initiatives and working alongside NATO and other European
partners. In formal terms, the European militarily non-aligned states also refer to the EU
in their security formulations, with countries such as Austria and Sweden arguing that
membership of the EU means that any claim to neutrality is unsustainable. Commitment
to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the acquis of the EU appear to
rule out the possibility of being neutral, and as solidarity and mutual defence obligations
were increasingly mooted as an integral part of the profile of the EU’s foreign and security
policy there appears to be little space to be neutral, particularly in the post-Cold War con-
text where the concept of sovereignty is more porous, security threats are no longer con-
fined to military and territorial matters, and non-state actors play a greater role. It is
therefore unsurprising that much of the scholarly work on the foreign and security policies
of these states works on the assumption that neutrality is part of the past, and even the
current status of being militarily non-aligned is a temporary p hase before t hese states
commit fully to NATO and European defence initiatives (Dahl, 1997; Dörfer, 1997;
Penttilä, 1999; Jopp and Ojanen, 1999; Ries, 1999; Vaahtorant a and Fors berg, 2000;
Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, 2001; Sivonen, 2001; Winnerstig, 2001; Honkanen, 2002;
Pursiainen and Saari, 2002; Ferreira-Pereira, 2007: 318; see also the various c ontribut ions
in Bailes et al., 2006).
Additionally, against the background of a global war on terrorism, neutrality appears
distinctly antiquated and state-centric. As security becomes more complex, the demarca-
tion between internal and external security erodes the neat lines of sovereign division
that provided the rationale and context for neutrality. For the militarily non-aligned
member states of the EU, this takes on deeper resonance and has policy implications.
Ekengren observes that even though the EU’s response to 9/11 was essentially ‘non-
military in nature’, it goes far deeper in integrating a form of ‘functional security’
designed to protect a different referent, aiming to secure democracy and, governance and
to safeguard the functions of governmental and societal institutions, further cemented
To continue reading
Request your trial