Neutralizing Moral Constraint
| Author | Richard Wortley |
| Published date | 01 December 1986 |
| Date | 01 December 1986 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/000486588601900405 |
| Subject Matter | Original Articles |
AUST &NZ
JOURNAL
OF CRIMINOLOGY (December 1986) 19 (251-258)
NEUTRALIZING MORAL CONSTRAINT
Richard Wortley*
251
Introduction
Amajor issue in the debate about explanations of crime concerns the extent to
which offenders may be considered members of a distinct and deviant subculture.
On the one hand, traditional wisdom holds that those engaged in crime and
delinquency subscribe to values which condone law violation, and which set them
apart from non-offenders (eg Sellin, 1938; Cohen, 1955; Sutherland and Cressey,
1974). On the
other
hand, neutralization theory, advanced by Sykes and Matza
(1957), contends that offenders are not morally committed to their crimes, and
generally share the values and legal proscriptions of the wider community.
According to neutralization theory, the dissonance between
the
offender's values
and behaviour is resolved by a process of self deception and distortion. The offender
is able
to
periodically "drift" from conventional morality by invoking avariety of
excuses prior to acting illegally, which serve to portray his behaviour as essentially
non-criminal and an exception to the usual rule. Such neutralization techniques
include the denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim,
condemnation of the condemnor, and appeal to higher loyalties. By neutralizing
moral constraint as the situation arises, the offender is simultaneously able to
violate social standards while still retaining them.
Neutralization theory may be reduced to three specific propositions:
(i) that offenders accept techniques of neutralization for their illegal
behaviour;
(ii)
that
offenders also hold conventional moral prohibitions against their
illegal behaviour in general; and
(iii) that neutralization precedes and permits law violation.
Ultimately the theory stands or falls on whether the third proposition, that there is
a causal relationship between neutralization and criminal behaviour, can be
demonstrated.
At
the very least, investigation of this issue would require
longitudinal study, although even then establishing sequence would fall well short
of establishing cause.
The
present study is less ambitious and is primarily concerned
with examining the first proposition, that offenders accept neutralizations for crime.
The
inherent limitations on extrapolating from such data, however, are obvious.
While there is a good deal of qualitative evidence, based on interviews and first
hand accounts, which supports the contention that offenders advance excuses to
legitimize their actions (eg Cressey, 1953; Klockars, 1974), there has
been
relatively
little formal investigation of the issue.
The
few reported studies have in
turn
yielded
conflicting findings (eg Ball, 1966; Hirschi, 1969; Austin, 1977; Minor, 1980).
Moreover, there have been two pervading methodological problems which have
compounded the ambiguity surrounding research in the area.
First has
been
the fundamental difficulty of deriving a satisfactory test instrument
with which to quantify neutralization use. As Minor (1980) has noted, Ball's (1966)
items - for example, "People should not blame Jack (for shoplifting) if the owner
•Lecturer in Psychology, Centre for Studies in Justice, School of Social Science and Welfare Studies,
Mitchell College
of
Advanced Education, Bathurst.
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