Neutrals as brokers of peacebuilding ideas?
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836711416957 |
| Author | Laurent Goetschel |
| Date | 01 September 2011 |
| Published date | 01 September 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
416957CAC46310.1177/0010836711416957GoetschelCooperation and Conflict
Article
Cooperation and Conflict
46(3) 312 –333
Neutrals as brokers of
© The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836711416957
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Laurent Goetschel
Abstract
Neutral and alliance-free states continue to exist. Even though neutrality has lost its realistic
survival function, it continues to serve as provider of national identity for neutral states. This
identity is rooted in neutrality’s idealistic function, according to which neutral states used to
engage for humanitarian issues and the reduction of violence in international relations. The
argument developed suggests an extension of this traditional role concept of neutral states:
they should engage as promoters of ideas in international peacebuilding which are contested
because they are perceived as a threat to national sovereignty, such as the responsibility to
protect (R2P). While neutrality’s realistic functions make neutral states credible advocates of
sovereignty and autonomy, its idealistic functions provide them with a track record in positive
reforms in international relations. Acting as norm entrepreneurs, neutral states could reduce the
contradiction between ‘prevention’ and ‘intervention’. Therefore, the key argument of this article
focuses on the basis of neutrality’s conceptual roots, the conditions for success of political ideas
and examples from recent peacebuilding practice.
Keywords
foreign policy, ideas, neutrality, peacebuilding, small states
Introduction
After the end of the Cold War, the future of neutrality became an open question: the con-
cept of neutrality had been developed in Europe as a survival strategy by smaller states.
Once the period of major wars on the European continent seemed to have expired by the
end of the 1980s, there were good arguments to raise about the remaining raison d’être
of neutrality. Interestingly enough, more than twenty years after the end of the Cold War,
neutrality has yet to disappear. Switzerland still labels itself as neutral, as do Austria and
Ireland, yet their policy statements are more ambiguous.1 Finland and Sweden use the
term ‘alliance-free’, a policy they have clung to also inside the European Union (EU)
(Ferreira-Pereira, 2006; Gehler, 2001; Ojanen, 2003; Ritterband, 2007). None of the
Corresponding author:
Laurent Goetschel, Europe Institute, University of Basel, Gellertstr. 27, CH - 4020 Basel, Switzerland
Email: laurent.goetschel@unibas.ch
Goetschel
313
Western European states that claimed the status of neutrality during the Cold War have
joined NATO. Discussions about abolishing neutrality, which were frequent in the 1990s,
have virtually disappeared.
This raises the question about the utility of neutrality in the current context.
Historically, explanations of neutrality are typically built on a functionalist approach:
neutrality fulfilled specific functions for the neutral states and for their neighbours which
were usually related to security and stabilization (Riklin, 1992: 199–204). Besides these
realistic functions, however, neutral states also supported normative change in interna-
tional relations by promoting humanitarian and human rights instruments, and by com-
mitting themselves to restricting and regulating the use of force in international relations
(Joenniemi, 1993; cf. Agius, [in this special issue]). These idealistic functions of neutral-
ity provided the foundation of the important contribution neutrality made to the national
political identity of neutral countries (Goetschel, 1999).
These idealistic functions also provide the basis for this article’s argumentation. It is
argued that the continued existence of neutrality provides neutral states with a compara-
tive advantage in brokering new ideas in international relations. With their far-reaching
historic track record in being both idealistic and realistic, neutral states are well posi-
tioned to further advance international norms in highly contested areas of international
relations. This point is illustrated with reference to the example of peacebuilding, where
it is explained why neutral states are particularly well suited to contributing to norm
development in highly sovereignty-sensitive areas. Thus, the objective of this article is to
present a plausible extended role concept (Gaupp, 1983; Holsti, 1970) for neutral states
in international relations today. The argument is based on historical and theoretical
reflections and utilizes some examples that serve as empirical illustrations.
Reflections are developed by first going back to the historical and conceptual roots of
neutrality. In a second step, neutrality can be categorized as a political idea in general and
related to peacebuilding in particular. Third, existing research on the role of ideas in
international relations is summarized, with particular attention being given to the condi-
tions under which new ideas enter international politics. The three dimensions of con-
tent, actors and institutions can also be separated, reflecting the particularities neutral
states might and should contribute in each of them. In this article, these arguments are
illustrated through the inclusion of selected empirical examples of recent peacebuilding
ideas. To conclude, the article summarizes the implications of the argumentation for the
policy orientation of neutral and alliance-free states.2
Neutral states as norm entrepreneurs
This article now elaborates on the neutrality functions, on their realistic and idealistic
sides, and on the historic track record of neutral states in acting as ‘norm entrepreneurs’.
In short, being neutral means not taking sides in military conflict between third-party
states. Yet, to understand the deeper meaning of this foreign and security policy stance, it
is necessary to understand neutrality’s roots. Neutrality as a recognized foreign and secu-
rity policy concept originated at the same time as the concept of state sovereignty, which
dates from the end of the Middle Ages when the universal authority of the Church began
to fade. As a correlative, neutrality represented the right of states to abstain from war
314
Cooperation and Conflict 46(3)
whenever it fitted their interests. Thus neutrality is an expression of sovereignty and can
only be understood within this context: its original purpose was to help states defend their
interests in an international environment characterized by conflicts and the preponderance
of states as international actors (Frei, 1968; cf. Agius and Devine, [this issue]).
Stemming from its raison d’être, neutrality traditionally fulfilled several political
functions, which can be called realist (Goetschel, 1999: 120). Its most important function
was to guarantee a country’s political independence. Neutrality was a strategy of survival
in an international environment characterized by a state’s legitimate right to wage war in
order to achieve international objectives in accordance with its national interests. In a
realistic perspective, this legitimate right of a neutral state not to wage war aimed at
increasing its chances of maintaining its independence and territorial integrity. Typically,
neutral states were small states and were thus seen as weaker compared to their neigh-
bouring states. Not having to take part directly in power-related interactions diminished
their relative vulnerability. In order to be respected and effective, neutrality also had to
offer third-party states something: well known in this respect was neutrality’s interna-
tional equilibrium function: Switzerland acted as the guardian of the Alpine passes in
monarchical Europe, serving together with Austria as the ‘neutral separator’ (neutraler
Riegel) in Cold War Europe. Sweden was the centrepiece of the ‘Nordic balance’ in the
same period. These are the classic manifestations of neutrality (Gehler, 2001; Riklin,
1992; Thomas, 1996).
Besides these realistic functions, however, neutrality always had an idealistic side too,
which originated from neutral states’ renunciation to project their own military power and
from their commitment to restrict and regulate the use of force in international relations
(Joenniemi, 1993). Neutral states were also subject to internal and external pressure to
justify their policy: avoidance of military battles – often based on conflicting world-views –
had to be compensated for by some other fundamentals or ideas of ‘grandness’. The more
a war had the character of a conflict of world-views, the more neutrals felt the need to
highlight their own role in the international system. For that reason, they conceived their
policy as something ‘higher’, like an ideal of justice (Frei, 1968). As part of this, neutral
states have always tried to underline their policy’s usefulness for the international system.
Many neutral states have participated in implementing specific norms aimed at fostering
peace. A good example is the active involvement of European neutrals (like Austria,
Sweden and Ireland) in developing UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War
(Schmidl, 2000). However, their services consisted of far more than mere military protec-
tion and equilibrium functions. Neutral states also acted as arbitrators and mediators and
provided their so-called ‘good offices’ (Probst, 1989). Within...
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