‘Nobody is sure of tomorrow’
| Author | Precious Chiamaka Nwanosike,Oludayo Tade |
| DOI | 10.1177/0269758016634184 |
| Date | 01 September 2016 |
| Published date | 01 September 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
‘Nobody is sure of tomorrow’:
using the Health Belief Model
to explain safety behaviours
among Boko Haram victims
in Kano, Nigeria
Oludayo Tade
University of Ibadan, Nigeria
Precious Chiamaka Nwanosike
University of Ibadan, Nigeria
Abstract
This study investigates factors underlying adoption of safety behaviours among vicarious victims of
Boko Haram terrorism in Sabon Gari, a predominantly Christian community in Kano State. Using
the Health Belief Model, data were generated from non-indigenes in Sabon Gari. Findings indicated
that participants felt susceptible to being direct victims with expressions such as ‘nobody is safe or
sure of tomorrow’ because of their identities as Christians and non-indigenes. Loss of lives,
destruction of business, weakened bonds, and feelings of imaginary dangers captured perceived
severity. Perceived cost of adopting safety behaviours included an outright ban on evangelism,
utilization of visitation and isolation. Adopting cues to action, participants avoided crowded places,
and relocated family members to reduce collateral damages of anticipated victimization. Imple-
mentation of personal (avoidance of vain talks) and institutional preventive measures (purchase of
scanners and organization of security training) constituted control measures to prevent victimi-
zation. In conclusion, perceived susceptibility facilitated adoption of safe and secure behaviours.
Keywords
Boko Haram, terrorism, non-indigenes, Nigeria, perceived susceptibility
Corresponding author:
Oludayo Tade, Department of Sociology, University of Ibadan, PO Box 20322, Ibadan, Nigeria.
Email: dotad2003@yahoo.com
International Review of Victimology
2016, Vol. 22(3) 339–355
ªThe Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permission:
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DOI: 10.1177/0269758016634184
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Introduction
Kano State,reputed to be the commercial nervecentre for the whole of NorthernNigeria, is gradually
losing steam due to unending bombing by the Boko Haram terrorists. Kano attracts a pool of
industrious and migrant traders both indigenous to Kano/the North or from outside. Because one
of the agenda items of Boko Haram since its debut in 2009 is to Islamize Nigeria, non-indigenes
(mostly Christians) residing in that part have become prone to attacks. In Kano, the majority of the
bombings havebeen carried out in Christian dominatedareas such as Sabon Gari. Sabon Gari means
the strangers’ quarters of a town. On 20 January 2012, BokoHaram terrorists launched an onslaught
on the metropolitan city of Kano claiming 162 lives (Ndahi, 2012)
1
. This attack was to avenge the
persecution of its members in the city. The spiritual head of the sect, Abubarkar Shekau (quoted in
Vanguard, Ndahi, 2012) had threatened in a mail to the Kano State authorities that ‘unless urgent
steps are taken,the group will launch endlessand violent attacks on Kano andits environs because of
arbitrary arrest and persecution of its members’. When deaf ears were turned to the threat, the sect
increased its operations. On 18 March 2013, a motor-park bombing in Sabon Gari claimed 60 lives
and destroyed four luxury buses. In March 2013, 22 persons became victims of bombing in Kano
while on 29 July 2013, 20 people were killed in the SabonGari area of Kano with four bombs being
detonated in the neighbourhood (Uzodinma, 2013). On 23 June 2014, another bomb explosion
occurred at the School of Hygiene killing 8 while 20 persons were injured. While some other parts
of Kano had skeletal attacks, Sabon Gari has experienced more.
The primary focus of this study is on the vicarious victimization by Boko Haram among non-
indigenes in Sabon Gari
2
in Kano State. This focus departs from existing works on Boko Haram
which tended to highlight the causes, history and consequences of Boko Haram activities. Even the
studies that have touched on victimization typically have treated victims as homogenous. Non-
indigenes
3
in Sabon Gari are a unique population to study because of their vulnerabilities: they are
mainly Christians who have been part of the targets of Boko Haram; they are not likely to access
social protection, and they have a history of hostilities from the indigenes. Furthermore, there are
social demarcations along the lines of land possession (indigenes or non-indigenes) and religious
divides (moderate Muslims/radical Muslims/liberal Muslims). We contend that citizens are differ-
entially affected by Boko Haram activities according to several factors, one of which is being in a
neighbourhood created for strangers (non-natives).
Kano State has a significant history of violent riots rooted in religious fundamentalism. While
the notion of violent riots and protest cannot be said to be an affair solely found in the northern part
of Nigeria, more religion-influenced riots and violence have occurred in northern Nigeria. Writing
on Boko Haram, Adesoji (2010) avers that though the Boko Haram phenomenon was not the first
attempt at foisting a religious ideology on a secular state, it nonetheless broadened the context and
content of Islamic revivalism. Adesoji adds that the causative factors that precipitated the Mai-
tatsine riot are not totally different from those for Boko Haram. Many scholars have identified
predisposing factors, such as economic dislocation, deprivation, income inequalities and illiteracy,
as well as poverty facilitated by drought and deepened social exclusion. Other contributing factors
include the rejection of the secular nature of the Nigerian society and the impact of the success of
the 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini revolution in Iran (Albert, 1997, 1999a 1999b; Clarke, 1987; Falola,
1998; Hickey, 1984; Hiskett, 1987; Ibrahim, 1997; Isichei, 1987; Kastfelt, 1989; Lubeck, 1985;
Stock, 2004; Usman, 1987). A more recent study by Meagher (2014) identifies economic margin-
alization, governance failures, extremist operations and security failures as four explanatory fac-
tors accounting for Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.
340 International Review of Victimology 22(3)
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