Normative power and the logic of arguing: Rationalization of weakness or relinquishment of strength?
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836716640836 |
| Date | 01 December 2016 |
| Author | Holger Janusch |
| Published date | 01 December 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Cooperation and Conflict
2016, Vol. 51(4) 504 –521
© The Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0010836716640836
cac.sagepub.com
Normative power and the
logic of arguing: Rationalization
of weakness or relinquishment
of strength?
Holger Janusch
Abstract
The concept of Europe as a normative power can be understood as a theoretical attempt to
define a new type of protagonist in world politics, distinct from older concepts such as empire,
hegemonic power, or great power. Because many scholars have used universal norms as a
criterion for ‘normative power Europe’, the concept is often criticized as hidden Eurocentrism,
soft imperialism, or hegemony. In this article, a normative power is defined not by the universality
of the norms it seeks to diffuse, but by the underlying logic according to which it acts. A normative
power takes communicative actions and acts in accordance with the logic of arguing, not
consequentialism. This definition of normative power escapes the trap of a hidden Eurocentric
imperialism by abstracting the theoretical concept from the specific case of Europe and detaching
it from the criterion of universal norms.
Keywords
great power, logic of arguing, normative power Europe, norms in International Relations,
rationalism
Introduction
In the field of international relations, the role of Europe in world politics has been dis-
cussed for a long time. The issue of interest is mainly to what extent the European Union
(EU) as a postmodern state differs in its objectives, type of power, and behaviour from
modern nation-states such as the United States. The debate goes back to the concept of
‘civilian power Europe’ (Duchêne, 1973) and its critique – for example the contrasting
concept of ‘military power Europe’ (Bull, 1982). In recent years, Manners’ concept of
‘normative power Europe’ has provoked a debate about Europe’s role in world politics
Corresponding author:
Holger Janusch, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Findelgasse 9, 90402 Nuremberg, Germany.
Email: holger.janusch@fau.de
640836CAC0010.1177/0010836716640836Cooperation and ConflictJanusch
research-article2016
Article
Janusch 505
(Manners, 2002). While the concept of Europe as a normative power has been criticized
for lacking clear criteria (Aggestam, 2008; Sjursen, 2006b; Whitman, 2013), scholars
have identified as a decisive criterion that a normative power does not promote its own
particular norms but, rather, universal ones (Eriksen, 2006; Manners, 2008; Sjursen,
2006a). This criterion, however, has similarly been criticized for being an expression of
covert Eurocentrism (Diez, 2005; Hyde-Price, 2008; Merlingen, 2007), soft imperialism
(Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005), or hegemony (Diez, 2013). A further problem is that the
concept of normative power implies something new in comparison to older concepts
such as empire, great power or civilian power, yet few scholars adequately compare the
different aspects of these theoretical notions. Most scholars define normative power
without clarifying their understanding of other actors or principles of power in interna-
tional relations. In addition, although Tocci (2008a) and De Zutter (2010) clearly distin-
guish normative power from other actors of this sort, they are still confronted with
theoretical problems. While Tocci fails to solve the problem of hidden Eurocentrism, De
Zutter solves this problem, but only by neglecting the aspects that differentiate a norma-
tive power from classical powers. A promising approach comes from Forsberg (2011)
and Lenz (2013), who define a normative power by its use of ideational means instead of
the material means used by a military or civilian power.
In this article, normative power is defined as an analytical category in demarcation
from other concepts such as empire, hegemony or great power. At the same time, the
theoretical concept is detached from Europe and its Eurocentric perspective by taking
communicative actions based on the logic of arguing, rather than cosmopolitanism or
universality, as the centre piece of its definition. While Manners and others recognize
persuasion as being an aspect of normative power, they see persuasion as just one
means among others, rather than as its key characteristic (Eriksen, 2006; Forsberg,
2011; Keene, 2013). Although the present author is aware that normative power is a
manifold concept with various aspects, this article will focus on communicative actions
based on the logic of arguing as a – if not the – distinctive feature of normative power,
leaving other characteristics aside. Nevertheless, it will be seen that the proposed defi-
nition of normative power helps to solve central problems arising from the critique of
prior definitions, yet still retains the core aspects of Manners’ concept. By constructing
normative power as an analytical category based on communicative actions, and
demarcated from classical concepts such as great power, the proposed approach also
highlights the role of communicative actions in international relation theories. In this
respect the present article contributes not only to the literature about normative power
Europe but also to debates about power – understood as both actor and means – in
international relations. The fact that the proposed definition neglects different aspects
of normative power emphasized by other scholars should not be misunderstood as an
attempt to claim sole interpretive authority for it.
In the second section, the article summarizes the different definitions of normative
power and its critiques. In the third section, different forms of actions are distinguished
by using two dimensions regarding the behavioural logic of actors: norm compliance and
norm diffusion. This is intended to promote a better understanding of normative power
and facilitate comparison with other classical actors. In the fourth section, the article
addresses the critique that normative power Europe may be merely an expression of
To continue reading
Request your trial