Norway — the Not So Reluctant Ally
| Author | Nils Petter Gleditsch,Sverre Lodgaard |
| Published date | 01 November 1977 |
| Date | 01 November 1977 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/001083677701200401 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Norway —
the
Not
So
Reluctant
Ally*
SVERRE
LODGAARD
Department
of
Political
Science,
University
of
Oslo,
and
International
Peace
Research
Institute,
Oslo
(PRIO)
NILS
PETTER
GLEDITSCH
PRIO
Lodgaard,
Sverre
&
Gleditsch,
Nils
Petter.
Norway -
the
Not
So
Reluctant
Ally.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
XII
,
1977,
209-219.
The
article
examines
the
Norwegian
policies
of
peacetime
arms
restraint,
in
particular
base
policy
and
nuclear
policy.
Officially,
these
policies
are
presented
as
unilateral
arms
control
measures.
Two
alternative
interpretations
are
emphasized
by
the
present
authors.
First,
the
base
and
nuclear
policies
are
the
result
of
political
compromises
at
the
domestic
level.
Second,
they
are
largely
based
on
military
convenience.
A
few
issues
from
the
field
of
nuclear
weapons
are
examined
in
depth,
notably:
(1)
nuclear
weapons
in
transit in
Norwegian
harbours,
and
(2)
military
navigation
and
communi-
cation
stations
on
Norwegian
soil.
Sverre
Lodgaard,
Department
of
Political
Science,
University
of
Oslo,
and
International
Peace
Research
Institute,
Oslo
(PRIO).
Nils
Petter
Gleditsch,
PRIO.
1.
THE
NATO
MEMBERSHIP
Norway
has
been
a
member
of
NATO
since
its
foundation.
At
the
time
of
entry
in
1949,
there
was
considerable
opposi-
tion
to
this
sharp
break
with
the
tradi-
tional
policy
of
neutrality.
Apart
from
the
communists,
feelings
against
the
Western
alliance
also
ran
particularly
high
in
the
governing
Labour
Party.
However,
the
opposition
was
overcome
quite
easily.
Sporadic
attempts
to
reopen
the
issue
since
then
have
not
been
successful.
In
1972,
when
Norway
rejected
full
mem-
bership
in
the
European
Common
Mar-
ket,
it
also
probably
Flosed
the
door
to
the
option
of
a
future
European
defence
community.
By
and
large
Norway
may
be
considered
one
of
the
members
least
likely
to
leave
the
NATO
alliance.
However,
for
reasons
we
will
go
into
later,
several
restrictions
have
been
placed
upon
Norway’s
military
integration
within
NATO.
From
abroad
these
restrictions
are
frequently
viewed
with
either
alarm
or
admiration,
depending
on
whether
the
observer
is
friendly
or
critical
to
NATO
and
the
common
Western
military
effort.
What
these
reactions
have
in
common
is
an
underlying
assumption
that
the
Nor-
wegian
reservations
are
really
important
in
the
context
of
’the
military
balance’.
In
this
article
we
shall
discuss
this
as-
sumption,
which
we
find
reasons
to
mod-
ify.
II.
ARMS
CONTROL
RESTRICTIONS
As
early
as
February
1949,
i.e.
two
months
before
the
NATO
treaty
was
signed
and
six
months
before
it
entered
into
force,
the
Norwegian
government
declared
that
Norway
’will
not
open
bases
on
its
territory
for
the
armed
forces
of
foreign
nations,
as
long
as
Norway
is
not
attacked
or
exposed
to
threats
of
attack’.1
1
This
declaration
came
in
re-
sponse
to
a
Russian
note.2
In
February
1951
the
Minister
of
Defence,
Hauge,
made
an
important
state-
ment
elaborating
the
1949
policy
in
some
detail.
The
’no
bases’
policy
did
not
exclude:
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