Norway and Western European Economic Integration
| Author | Kaare Sandegren,Halle Jörn Hanssen |
| Date | 01 March 1969 |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083676900400103 |
| Published date | 01 March 1969 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Halle Jörn Hanssen Norway and
&
Kaare Sandegren
Western European
Economic
Integration
.
I. The dimensions of the problem
West appeared to Norwegians in ge-
neral, though very vocal dissenters could
In 1962 Norway was confronted with
be heard, as something trustworthy and
the necessity of deciding to apply for
assuring for a country that only recent-
membership in the Common Market. It
ly had achieved independence and had
meant asking for economic adherence
been disillusioned with the policy of
to a grouping of continental countries,
neutrality. In sharp contrast, the Con-
but also to a grouping which at that
tinent to the south of us had given
time was expected to develop into a
problems in the past; smaller but seri-
political one. The situation posed seri-
ous ones through the First World War,
ous psychological, economic and security
disastrous ones during the Second. The
questions.
larger countries on the Continent did
To consider the psycological aspect
not give the impression of being stable
first, it was not easy for political opin-
or durable democracies, and attitudes
ion in Norway to digest the thought
in these countries, particularly the re-
of turning economically and politically
ligious, besides the economic and polit-
southward to the Continent, although
ical ones, were rather different from
the electorate in general followed the
ours, or so we thought. Thus the ques-
leadership of the country in the final
tion of membership in the Common
instance. Thus, if public debate in 1962
Market became one of reconciling our-
was intense and emotional, it was due
selves to a rather different way of
to the fact that fairly deeply rooted
thinking, to a new concept, that of
attitudes were touched. To a small ex-
aligning ourselves to an increasing de-
tent during the First World War, more
gree with the continental countries.
so through the Second, during the Mar-
We had other doubts as well. There
shall aid period and the subsequent or-
was reluctance of a political-juridical
ganization of a Western defence system,
nature. In fact, as pointed out later in
Norwegians had either learned or had
this article, throughout the post-war
become used to turn westwards for se-
period, Norway either opposed or re-
curity and for assistance in solving
fused to join Western European cooper-
economic problems. Our obvious depen-
ation that would be of a supra-national
dence on shipping and on foreign trade
character. She did this consistently. To
had also helped us to turn west, both
leave substantial decision-making on
economically
and
psychologically.
matters affecting Norwegian interests
Furthermore, the relative stability and
to non-Norwegian authorities had been
durability of the democracies in the
out of the question in the Norwegian
48
national attitude and for the Norwegian
the importance of the Common Market
political and economic planner.’ It was
countries as trading partners for Nor-
feared that the Common Market would
way was on the increase. But when
develop into a body having supra-na-
Western Europe became divided into
tional authority, the negative possibili-
two markets, a decrease in the exchange
ties of which were emphasized in Nor-
with the Common Market countries
way. This, of course, did not constitute
followed. This was particularly the case
the essential reason for the Norwegian
on the imports side, where percentages
Government when in the 1940’s and
descended from 35.1 in 1959 to 29.2 in
1950’s it shied away from separate
1965, but also evident in exports, where
continental cooperation. The interests
the percentage has remained fairly
of Norway were, in the opinion of the
constant. However, the dependence of
Government of that period and of the
Norway on foreign trade and shipping,
public in general, closely linked with
and on the percentage from earnings
the
North American Powers and
in exports (exclusive of shipping earn-
Great Britain. Furthermore, it was
ings) of our gross domestic product
thought that adherence to the Com-
(approx. 24 °/o) is an accepted and real
mon Market would limit our oppor-
fact of our life. Total Norwegian ex-
tunities to plan our own economic de-
ports of goods to the Common Market
velopment, and that it might open the
in 1966 amounted to 2.7 billion Nor-
way for depopulation of areas with
wegian crowns. Assuming that the aver-
high cost production in agriculture and
age tariff for industrial goods in the
fishing.
Common Market amounts to approx.
There was also reluctance lest ad-
5 °/o on raw materials, approx. 7 °/o for
herence to the Common Market should
factory goods, and approx. 10 °/o for
lead to a weakening of our security
finished goods, it appears that our ex-
arrangement with the United States and
ports to the Common Market, under
Great Britain, and some feared that a
certain specified constant conditions
separate relationship with the Conti-
could increase by 9 °/o if present cus-
nental states, not including the Ameri-
toms tariffs disappear. This would mean
cans and British, would lead us into an
an increase of the value of our exports
uncertain future, full of risks, too great
to the Common Market by approximat-
to be worthwhile taking. The immediate
ely 250 mill. Norwegian crowns per
past of certain Continental states was
year.2 Also, at the time of the British
still alive in our minds.
and Danish application in 1962, British
However, when definite changes in
and Danish membership in the EEC
these attitudes came - and now we
would put 3/4 of the Norwegian export
turn to the other side of the coin -
market into the Community.
they were due to a variety of factors,
Clearly, this indicates a rather im-
which also indicate the dimensions of
portant dimension of the relationship
the problem for the Norwegians. First
between Norway and the Common Mar-
and foremost, the question of trade and
ket. In fact, Common Market discrimi-
economic growth. In 1965 one fourth of
nation exercised against Norway in
Norwegian exports went to the EEC.
industrial production and exports of,
Before 1962, between 1954 and 1959,
for example, ferro-silicon, aluminium,
49
and processed wood products affects us
of the Atlantic countries which would
seriously. It was and still is important
guarantee the security relationship be-
for us to eradicate that barrier, since it
tween Western Europe and the North
is difficult to find substitute markets for
Atlantic powers. British membership,
these products; the Nordic outlet is only
we thought, would make it less possible
partly one.
for the Continental countries to form a
At the same time, there were other
political union or a separate defence
factors which reduced our fear that
organization, assuming that it would
membership in the EEC would narrow
continue to be British policy to secure
the options we could choose between
the Atlantic defence system against
for running our own economic life.
changes or limitations. On the psycho-
Norwegian participation in the OEEC
logical side, our cooperation with con-
system of liberalization of imports had
tinental countries in the OEEC in par-
contributed to this; we had learnt to
ticular, perhaps also general develop-
adapt our economy and attitudes to-
ments within Germany, as well as her
wards a freer exchange with other
moderation and loyalty in her adher-
states. International economic develop-
ence to the Atlantic pact, made an im-
ment had deepened and accelerated our
pact on the reluctance of both the for-
realization of the extent and meaning of
eign political milieu and public opinion
Norway’s dependence on and connec-
in Norway and contributed to it being
tion with the economic life of the rest
reduced, although this is difficult to
of Western Europe, North America,
establish.
and the other continents. During the
However, a most decisive factor be-
period of OEEC liberalization, and later
sides the economic one was the British
through cooperation in EFTA, our
decision to try to join. To remain out-
authorities had increasingly learned to
side if Great Britain did not join would
cope with the problem of planning and
be acceptable, however difficult. To
influencing internal economic develop-
remain outside if Great Britain went in
ment in a system with a relatively free
would be directly contrary to Norwe-
exchange of goods and service with
gian trading, shipping, and political
other states.
interests; for our trade it would be
Our reluctance to endorse the pos-
disastrous, or so it seemed for some. It
sible development of a supra-national
was also conceived as being contrary
authority in the Market was offset
in the long run to our security to remain
somewhat by the prospect of sharing
alone vis-A-vis the Market with Great
membership with like-minded countries
Britain as a member. Of course, this
such as Sweden, Denmark, and Great
was at the time considered a rather
Britain, while at the same time devel-
hypothetical question, because it was
opments in the Common Market ev-
thought that Great Britain would never
olved towards something less than sup-
leave Norway out while, or in return
ranational. On the security side appre-
for getting in herself. In any case, in
hensions were diminished by the possi-
those days it was assumed that Nor-
bility of Great Britain joining the
way’s relationship with Great Britain
Market; this assured a bridge between
was economically so close that the op-
the continental countries and the rest
tion of remaining outside the EEC if
50
Great Britain...
To continue reading
Request your trial