Norwegian Security Policy: Options and Constraints
| Date | 01 March 1972 |
| Published date | 01 March 1972 |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677200700114 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Norwegian
Security
Policy:
Options
and
Constraints
JOHAN
JØRGEN
HOLST
The
structure
and
assumptions
of
Norwegian
security
policy
in
the
context
of
the
evolving
political
order
in
Europe
and
the
codification
of
superpower
relations
are
outlined.
Attitudes
towards
the
future
evolution
of
NATO,
and
the
competing
pers-
pectives
which
were
brought
to
bear
on
security
policy
issues
in
the
EC
referendum
campaign
and
its
aftermath,
are
examined.
The
Norwegian
security
predicament
is
influenced
directly
by
the
naval
competition
of
the
superpowers.
Norwegian
defence
policy
is
examined
from
the
point
of
view
of
missions
and
force
posture.
Finally,
the
author
discusses
the
role
of
arms
control
in
Norwegian
security
policy.
I.
THE
PROBLEMS
OF
ADAPTATION
The
structure
of
Norwegian
security
pol-
icy
is
a
function
of
indigenous,
regional,
and
global
perspectives
and
pressures;
their
interaction
and
integration.
For
a
small
country
which
is
thrust
into
the
vortex
of
the
strategic
competition
of
the
superpowers,
the
salient
problem
is
fre-
quently
one
of
adapting
to
external
con-
straints.
Only
to
a
very
limited
extent
will
it
be
able
to
condition
the
nature
of
the
external
environment.
Policy-making
does
not,
of
course,
deal
only
with
the
im-
mediate
problems
of
the
moment.
The
ef-
fects
of
policy
decisions
are
seldom
in-
stantaneous.
In
a
temporal
perspective,
Norwegian
security
policy
will
focus
on
the
preservation
and
extension
of
essential
options.
In
operational
terms
this
concern
may
translate
into
policies
designed
to
minimize
the
external
constraints
which
apply
to
Norway
and
maximize
those
which
apply
to
the
policies
of
other
coun-
tries
towards
Norway.
However,
since
international
relations
develop
within
a
context
of
systemic
interdependence,
Nor-
way
is
observing
certain
self-denying
or-
dinances
for
purposes
of
inducing
re-
straint
on
the
part
of
other
powers
and
of
alleviating
concerns
which
might
produce
policies
and
actions
inimical
to
Norwegian
security.
Acceptance
of
rules
and
restraint
is
necessary
also
for
purposes
of
contributing
to
a
general
system
of
codified
behaviour
which
will
link
the
policy
options
vis-d-
vis
Norway
to
the
interests
and
stakes
vested
in
the
integrity
of
international
rules
and
norms.
Thus,
security
policy
has
to
be
concerned
with
linkages
to
interna-
tional
agreements
and
understandings,
or
with
the
explicit
abrogation
of
such
linkages.
Adaptations
to
a
given
perception
of
external
constraints
have
a
tendency
to
be
perpetuated
as
they
become
internalized
in
the
domestic
political
process.
Thus,
some
of
the
self-denying
ordinances
in
Norwegian
security
policy
have
become
’permanent
factors’
in
the
arsenal
of
national
assumptions
and
taboos.
While
such
developments
tend
to
limit
the
Nor-
wegian
freedom
of
reversal,
they
do
by
the
same
token
lend
political
credibility
to
the
policy
of
restraint,
and
thereby
stabilize
outside
expectations
of
Nor-
wegian
decisions.
Security
policy
adaptations
are
not
just
a
function
of
the
configuration
of
external
pressures.
They
have
evolved
in
Norway
also
from
the
predominant
perceptions
of
Norway’s
proper
role
and
position
in
relation
to
the
dominant
international
alignments
and
the
ideological
cleavages
obtaining
in
the
international
system.
The
security
policy
of
Norway
must
be
understood
in
the
context
of
the
con-
tinuity
of
national
traditions
and
ex-
periences.
Memories
and
’lessons’
from
the
Second
World
War
provided
a
dom-
inant
perceptional
framework
for
the
main
architects
of
post-war
Norwegian
security
policy.
Norwegian
security
policy
has
evolved
through
a
process
of
incremental
adap-
78
tations
to
altered
circumstances.
Systemic
changes
are
likely
to
occur
only
under
the
impact
of
traumatic
experiences
like
an
intense
international
crisis
focused
on
Northern
Europe,
or
an
eruptive
dissolu-
tion
of
the
domestic
social
consensus.
The
evolution
of
security
policy
adaptations
will
proceed
within
a
framework
of
ex-
pectations
and
preferences
with
regard
to
the
future
of
the
security
arrangements
in
the
European
and
Atlantic
areas.
Norway
borders
on
one
of the
super-
powers,
i.e.
the
Soviet
Union.
The
area
immediately
east
of
the
Soviet-Norwegian
border
is
particularly
sensitive
from
the
point
of
view
of
Soviet
strategic
interests
and
contains
a
large
concentration
of
military
might.
It
seems
clear
that
Nor-
wegian
defence
measures
as
a
rule
will
have
no
appreciable
influence
on
the
Soviet
allocation
of
resources
for
defence
during
peacetime.
The
particular
Nor-
wegian
defence
measures
may,
however,
influence
the
tactical
allocations
of
an
adversary’s
forces
in
wartime.
The
Soviet-Norwegian
military
’con-
frontation’
is
characterized
by
a
salient
asymmetry
in
the
distribution of
military
capabilities.
There
are
no
prospects
for
constructing
a
local
balance
of
forces
by
the
mobilization
of
indigenous
resources.
The
Soviet
military
establishment
on
the
Kola
peninsula
is
primarily
oriented
to-
wards
the
global
competition
with
the
United
States
and
its
allies.
Redressing
the
balance
by
the
stationing
of
American
troops
in
Norway
would
carry
the
costs
of
imposing
the
superpower
confrontation
on
the
politics
of
Northern
Europe.
The
asymmetries
in
strategic
interests
and
the
geographical
circumstances
of
the
two
superpowers
would
most
likely
contri-
bute
towards
converting
Northern
Europe
into
an
unstable
bone
of
contention
dom-
inated
by
pressures
and
probes
on
the
part
of
the
superpowers,
if
American
troops
were
to
be
stationed
in
Norway.
Furth-
ermore,
an
American
military
presence
would
make
Norway
extremely
vulner-
able
to
superpower
bilateralism
in
pe-
riods
of
detente
and
arms
limitation.
Thus
the
policy
of
not
permitting
foreign
troops
in
Norway
is
one
designed
to
pre-
serve
flexibility
both
in
terms
of
regional
patterns
of
interaction
and
Norwegian
freedom
of
manoeuvre.
Norwegian
security
policy
reflects
a
deliberate
balance
between
deterrence
and
reassurance
vis-d-vis
the
Soviet
Union.
It
evolved
under
the
oscillating
pressures
of
cold-war
confrontation.
To-
day
Oslo
is
faced
with
the
task
of
ad-
justing
to
the
emerging
patterns
of
a
new
milieu;
the
contours
of
which
are
still
ob-
scure
and
the
direction
conjectural
and
uncertain.
II.
NORWAY
IN
NATO
Norway’s
membership
in
NATO
con-
stitutes
the
major
deterrence
component
in
her
security
posture.
It
is
important
to
understand
that
the
guarantee
inherent
in
the
alliance
commitment
has
always
been
viewed
primarily
in
political
terms.
It
has
constituted
a
long
term
insurance
policy
against
harassment,
intimidation
and
at-
tack.
The
insurance
derives
from
the
formal
linkage
to
the
coherence
and
in-
tegrity
of
the
security
order
of
which
the
alliance
constitutes
the
formal
expression.
Membership
in
NATO
has
provided
Nor-
way
with
an
identity,
role
and
position
within
the
larger
structure
of
security
arrangements
which
emerged
from
the
ruins
of
the
Second
World
War.
The
Structural
Calculations
The
logic
of
deterrence
which
is
sup-
posed
to
inhere
in
the
Norwegian
mem-
bership
in
NATO
presumes
that
the
value
to
the
allies
of
defending
Norway
in
an
emergency
exceeds
the
intrinsic
value
of
any
piece
of
Norwegian
real
estate
which
may
be
at
stake.
A
violation
of
the
integrity
of
any
part
of
Norway
would
at
the
same
time
constitute
a
challenge
to
the
integrity
and
credibility
of
the
total
system
of
guarantees
on
which
the
al-
liance
is
founded.
Hence,
the
risk
calculus
of
any
would
be
aggressor
has
to
be
in-
79
fluenced
by
estimates
of
the
chance
that
any
struggle
f or
Norway
would
not
be
confined
to
a
struggle
with
Norway.
Thus
the
alliance
commitments
structure
deter-
rence
around
expectations
of
political
escalation
of
even
limited
aggression.
The
credibility
of
the
NATO
commit-
ments
to
Norway
is
supported
by
Norway’s
participation
in
the
political
and
military
activities
of the
alliance,
the
construction
of
NATO
infrastructure
installations
in
Norway,
the
implementation
of
allied
manoeuvres
in
and
around
Norway,
and
the
location
of
NATO’s
Northern
Com-
mand
(AFNORTH)
at
Kolsis
outside
Oslo.
It
is
true,
of
course,
that
the
political
pay-offs
of
a
successful
violation
of
Nor-
wegian
integrity
would
also
exceed
the
intrinsic
value
of
the
piece
of
Norwegian
real
estate
thus
acquired,
in
that
it
would
demonstrate
the
inability
of
the
alliance
to
meet
its
commitments;
and
thus
sow
doubts
about
the
reliability
of
the
alliance
at
other
times
and
at
other
places.
Should
Norway
in
the
eyes
of
the
rest
of
the
al-
liance
constitute
a
salient
weak
spot,
her
continued
membership
could
become
a
distinct
liability
to
NATO
as
a
whole.
The
structure
of
this
calculation
of
costs
and
risks
constitutes
an
important
external
constraint
on
Norwegian
security
policy.
T he
Public
Consensus
Norway’s
entry
into
NATO
constituted
an
ostensible
break
with
the
’traditional’
neutrality
of
the
young
state
which
emerged
as
an
independent
actor
on
the
European
scene
in
1905.
Actually
the
break
came
with
the
German
invasion
of
1940.
The
basis
for
a
transition
to
alignment
with
a
strong
Anglo-Saxon
bias
was
laid
by
the
Government
in
exile
in
London
during
the
war.,
The
abortive
negotiations
for
a
Nordic
Defence
Union
in
1948-49
reflected
some
of
the
tensions
and
con-
flicting
perspectives
and
priorities
within
Norway
as
well
as
among
the
three
Scan-
dinavian
countries
(Denmark,
Norway,
Sweden)
in
regard
to
foreign
policy
com-
mi tments.
2
It
has
been
suggested
that
Norway
carried
with
her
into
the
alliance
a
legacy
and
attitudes
of
neutralism
which
caused
her
to
insist
on
certain
restraints
in
re-
gard
to
foreign
troops
and
nuclear
weap-
ons.
In
the
view
of the
author,
such
ob-
servations
do
at
best
reflect
gross
over-
simplifications.
It
is
clear
that
any
dem-
ocratic
government
will
be
concerned
about
the
stability
of
its
course
in
foreign
policy
by
mobilizing
a
broad
consensus
in
its
favour.
The
policy
itself
will
at
least
reflect
the
minimum
requirements
of
such
a
consensus.
Secondly,
the
restraints
as
exercised
by
Norway
are
explicable
in
terms
of
rational
calculations
of
costs
and
benefits,
risks
and
opportunities.3
It
is
true
that
Norway’s
membership
in
NATO
has
had
the
quality
of
a
marriage
of
convenience
rather
than
one
based
on
passion.4
The
convenience
has,
however,
remained
persuasive
and
stable
through-
out
the
period
of
Norwegian
participation
in
the
alliance.
That
perception
is
also
reflected
in
the
public
opinion
polls
on
attitudes
towards
NATO
membership.
In
November
1972,
64
°/o
of
the
respondents
thought
that
NATO
contributed
towards
securing
the
country,
6
°/o
thought
it
in-
creased
the
danger
of
attack,
17
°/o
thought
it
made
no
difference,
and
13
°/o
did
not
know.
Such
a
poll
has
been
taken
annually
since
1965.
The
number
of
respondents
who
thought
membership
in
NATO
in-
creased
the
danger
of
attack
reached
a
peak
of
12 °/o
in
1967.
The
same
year
those
who
thought
it
contributed
to
secur-
ity
reached
a
low
of
-19 °/o.
The
mean
percentages
from
the
nine
public
opinion
polls
since
1965
are
9’Vo
and
58 °/o
re-
spectively.
In
June
1949,
54
°/o
thought
Norway’s
security
had
increased
as
a
re-
sult
of
her
membership
in
NATO;
17 °/o
thought
it
had
decreased
The
Institute
of
Social
Research
has
posed
the
question
in
a
more
direct
form.
If
we
eliminate
those
with
no
opinion,
in
the
fall
of
1972
85
°/o
of
the
respondents
thought
that
Nor-
way
should
remain
a
member
of
NATO
while
15 °/o
were
in
favour
of
withdrawal.
In
1965
and
1969
the
corresponding
figures
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