Nuclear Energy and Dominance: Some Interrelationships between Military and Civil Aspects of Nuclear Energy in U.S. Foreign Policy since 1945
| Author | Gunnar Skogmar |
| Published date | 01 November 1980 |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083678001500403 |
| Date | 01 November 1980 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Nuclear
Energy
and
Dominance:
Some
Interrelationships
between
Military
and
Civil
Aspects
of
Nuclear
Energy
in
U.S.
Foreign
Policy
since
1945
GUNNAR SKOGMAR
Institute
for
History
and
Social
Sciences,
Roskilde
University
Centre
Skogmar,
G.
Nuclear
Energy
and
Dominance:
Some
Interrelationships
between
Military
and
Civil
Aspects
of
Nuclear
Energy
in
U.S.
Foreign
Policy
since
1945.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
XV,
1980, 217-235.
Some
features
of
the
American
dominance
in
the
nuclear
field
are
outlined.
A
basic
point
of
departure
is
that
the
military
and
civil
aspects
of
nuclear
energy
cannot
be
separated.
American
nuclear
policy
is
seen
as
passing
through
successive
stages
with
fundamental
changes
occurring
around
1953,
in
the
early
sixties,
and
after
the
energy
crisis
in
the
seventies.
The
themes
most
fully
discussed
are
the
American
deployment
of
nuclear
weapons
in
Western
Europe,
the
non-proliferation
policy,
and
the
control
of
the
nuclear
fuel
market.
One
main
conclusion
is
that
the
dimensions
of
non-proliferation
and
dominance/dependence
in
the
energy
field
are
closely
intertwined.
I .
INTRODUCTION
1
When
observing
international
relations
in
the
nuclear
field
it
is
necessary
to
realize
that
we
do
not
see
a
number
of
more
or
less
equivalent
states
and
capital
groups
moving
on
the
scene.
The
nuclear
field
is
even
more
hierarchical
than
most
other
fields.
It
is
dominated
by
the
United
States,
with
West-
ern
Europe
(France,
Western
Germany
and
Great
Britain)
and
Japan
as
subcenters
cooperating
as
well
as
competing
with
the
United
States.
The
American
role
in
the
origin
and
growth
of
nuclear
technology
can
hardly
be
overestimated.
The
United
States
has
initiated
and
dominated
both
the
milit-
ary
and
the
civil
side
of
the
technology
during
the
whole
postwar
period
(although
there
are
some
signs
that
the
American
position
is
weakening).
In
this
article
some
characteristics
of
the
American
dominance
will
be
pointed
out.
After
some
technical
and
terminological
clarifications,
I
will
give
an
overview
of
the
American
nuclear
policy
in
the
postwar
years.
In
my
judgment,
its
character
is
dif-
ferent
during
different
periods.
Then,
some
military
and
economic
functions
of
the
de-
ployment
of
vast
amounts
of
nuclear
weapons
in
other
countries
are
discussed,
and
the
question
whether
U.S.
policy
has
facilitated,
or
impeded,
the
proliferation
of
nuclear
weapons
is
addressed.
Finally,
some
American
means
of
control
over
the
nuclear
fuel
market
are
analyzed.
Because
of
various
technical
interrelationships,
this
problem
is
closely
related
to
that
of
nuclear
weapon
proliferation.
II.
SOME
TECHNICAL
AND
TER-
MINOLOGICAL
NOTES
An
analysis
of
nuclear
policy
in
general,
and
of
the
U.S.
nuclear
policy
in
particular,
should
be
based
on
the
fact
that
the
military
and
civil
aspects
of
nuclear
energy
are
very
closely
intertwined.
In
spite
of
this,
the
literature
as
well
as
the
general
debate
largely
focus
on
one
aspect
or
the
other,
or
can
mainly
be
placed
within
the
frame
of
reference
of
one
while
touching
upon
the
other.
In
many
countries
there
have
been
nuclear
weapon
debates
and
nuclear
power
debates,
yet
they
have
been
treated
as
separate
subject
matters
and
they
have
been
218
carried
on
at
different
times.
To
be
sure,
it
is
generally
admitted
that
there
is
a
connec-
tion
between
the
civil
and
military
aspects
of
nuclear
energy,
but
the
discussion
is
largely
limited
to
the
well-known
fact
that
plutonium
produced
in
power
reactors
can
be
used
as
explosive
in
nuclear
weapons.
The
main
explanation
for
this
division
is
probably
that
the
same
interests
that
have
introduced
and
developed
nuclear
energy
technology -
and
have
a
sufficient
overview
of
the
entire
field
of
activities
as
well
as
strong
propaganda
resources -
also
have
an
interest
in
establishing
and
maintaining
a
marked
line
of
division
between
the
military
and
the
peaceful
atom.
The
technical
connections
between
milit-
ary
and
civil
nuclear
energy
are
essentially
of
three
kinds.2
2
Firstly,
the
same
object
can
be
used
for
either
military
or
civil
purposes.
An
en-
richment
plant
producing
material
for
bombs
can
alternatively
be
used
to
produce
nuclear
fuel
(but
not,
without
extension,
vice
versa).
Bombs
can
be
used,
for
exam-
ple,
to
extract
natural
resources
and
are
then
labelled
’peaceful
nuclear
explosives’.
Propulsion
reactors
for
submarines
and
other
warships
can
also
function
in
maritime
commerce.
During
the
fifties
and
sixties
the
latter
two
fields
of
use
were
considered
as
big
future
markets
to
be
exploited
by
American
entrepreneurship,
but
they
have
successively
receded
into
the
background.
The
technical
and
economic
problems
have
proved
to
be
very
difficult.
It
has
not
been
possible
to
eliminate
the
radioactivity
from
nuclear
explosions.
Floating
nuclear
power
stations
in
ships
are
not
prone
to
be
ac-
cepted
at
a
time
when
the
risks
of
stationary
nuclear
power
have
become
more
apparent.
They
have
also
become
too
expensive.
Secondly,
military
usage
can
later
give
civil
effects
and
vice
versa.
A
nuclear
weapon
stockpile
can
be
converted
to
nuc-
lear
fuel.
A
power
reactor
in
operation
pro-
duces
plutonium,
which
can,
after
repro-
cessing,
be used
as
bomb
material
or
as
new
nuclear
fuel.
Thirdly,
research
and
development
for
military
and
civil
nuclear
energy
is
identical
or
similar.
The
technology
of
propulsion
reactors,
for
example,
is
very
close
to
the
technology
of
power
reactors.
The
Ameri-
can
light
water
technology
has
originated
from,
and
been
related
to,
a
series
of
some
hundreds
of
submarine-reactors
produced
in
the
fifties
and
sixties.
All
together,
these
interconnections
imply
that
a
productive
capacity
for
civil
nuclear
energy
can
also
become
military
by
adding
a
cost
of,
say,
ten
per
cent.
If
a
’nuclear
weapon
ladder’
has
ten
rungs,
nine
might
be
needed
for
civil
nuclear energy.
A
primarily
military
productive
capacity
can
with
moderate
supplements
become
civil
and
after
that
strongly
support
a
civil
capacity.
The
emerging
nuclear
capital
in
a
nuclear
weapon
state
will
have
a
competitive
ad-
vantage
in
the
world
market
for
nuclear
power,
because
most
of
the
enormous
costs
of
research
and
development
and
a
large
part
of
the
productive
apparatus
have
been
financed
by
the
state
for
military
reasons.
This
kind
of
economic
pressure
has
cer-
tainly
contributed
to
the
nuclear
weapon
proliferation
in
the
cases
of
Great
Britain
and
France
(and
might
have
done
so
in
the
case
of
Sweden
in
the
fifties
and
early
sixties).
In
Great
Britain
the
official
line
in
the
fifties
was
something
called
’dual
pur-
pose’ :
the
prototypes
for
power
reactors
would
simultaneously
produce
plutonium
for
bombs
and
the
two
purposes
would
thus
reinforce
each
other.4
4
Finally,
a
couple
of
terminological
points.
The
term
nuclear
energy
is
used
here
as
a
comprehensive
concept
covering
both
fission
and
fusion
energy,
which,
in
controlled
or
uncontrolled
form,
can
be
used
for
various
military
and
civil
purposes.
When
referring
to
the
use
of
nuclear
energy
just
for
the
production
of
electricity
and/or
heat
I
use
the
term
nuclear
power.
For
practical
reasons
I
use
the
names
of
nation-states
without
any
attempt
to
pene-
trate
the
problems
of
specific
combinations
of
capital
groups
and
states
in
the
activities
To continue reading
Request your trial