Of Stag Hunts and secret societies: Cooperation, male coalitions and the origins of multiplicity

AuthorNicholas Lees
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221098493
Published date01 September 2022
Date01 September 2022
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221098493
Cooperation and Conflict
2022, Vol. 57(3) 367 –383
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00108367221098493
journals.sagepub.com/home/cac
Of Stag Hunts and secret
societies: Cooperation, male
coalitions and the origins of
multiplicity
Nicholas Lees
Abstract
In many circumstances where multiple, autonomous actors exist, cooperation is only a viable
strategy if other actors also pursue a strategy of cooperation. Such situations can be characterised
in terms of the Stag Hunt, based on a parable told by Rousseau. Although traditionally interpreted
as a device for understanding how mutually beneficial cooperation can emerge, Harrison Wagner
points out that would-be exploiters must overcome similar problems to succeed at subjugating
others. Successful cooperation may have the ironic consequence of enabling deeper conflict
within and between a multiplicity of societies. Despite its canonical status, the importance of
the Stag Hunt for understanding the interaction between multiple societies may have been
underestimated.
Nonetheless, rational choice theory alone cannot explain how cooperation-for-predation
became established, while historical sociology’s conventional ‘materialist metanarrative’ of
the origin of war and the state may have unduly neglected the role of gender relations. The
phenomenon of men’s secret societies, found in many stateless societies, indicates that fraternal
solidarity within coalitions of men competing to control women’s labour and bodies may provide
a path to the nucleation of warlike states. If this is correct, it becomes clear that in many societies,
men and women experience multiplicity in qualitatively different ways.
Keywords
feminist security studies, game theory, historical sociology, multiplicity, war
Introduction
The classical social contract theorists sought to imagine how free individuals might
come together to establish legitimate civil government. Harrison Wagner (2007) instead
invites us to consider the consequences that arise from individuals forming groups to
oppress others, in competition with one another. Subverting the usual preoccupations of
Corresponding author:
Nicholas Lees, Department of Politics, University of Liverpool, 8-12 Abercromby Square, Liverpool L69
3BX, UK.
Email: nlees@liverpool.ac.uk
1098493CAC0010.1177/00108367221098493Cooperation and ConflictLees
research-article2022
Article
368 Cooperation and Conflict 57(3)
social contract theory, Wagner also inverts the realpolitik tradition’s concern with anar-
chy. Instead of emphasising the implications of the absence of a world government,
Wagner argues that the problem of human insecurity arises from the positive existence of
multiple groups wielding deadly force. Wagner’s attempt to redefine the problem
addressed by theories of realpolitik therefore has a great deal in common with Rosenberg’s
multiplicity research programme, which examines the consequences of the fact that
human society is not singular but multiple. As the multiplicity research programme is an
outgrowth of historical materialist research in International Relations, the affinity
between Wagner and Rosenberg’s projects suggests that a compelling synthesis between
political economy and realpolitik accounts of International Relations might be possible
(Lees, 2020). But what happens if we take a further step and acknowledge the feminist
political theorist Carol Pateman’s (1988) argument that, as far as there have ever been
social contracts establishing political communities, they have been social contracts
among men?
To investigate this question, this article examines a formalised version of Rousseau’s
parable of the Stag Hunt, in which a group of hunters struggle to catch a stag because
individual members of the group are tempted to temporarily satisfy their hunger by
snatching a hare. This scenario is similar to situations where cooperation is only a viable
strategy if other actors pursue a strategy of cooperation. The Stag Hunt is important for
understanding not only cooperation within and between societies, but also for explaining
organised patterns of predation and exploitation, as would-be predators must overcome
similar problems to subjugate others. Successful cooperation may have the ironic conse-
quence of enabling much deeper conflict within and between societies, giving rise to
political multiplicity driven by competition between predatory groups.
The philosopher Brian Skyrms argues such scenarios are of fundamental importance
for understanding the evolution of the social contract. Drawing on both game theoretic
and feminist accounts of the origin of states and social cooperation, this article argues
that despite its canonical status, the importance of the Stag Hunt for understanding the
interaction between multiple societies has been underestimated in International Relations
research. However, rational choice theory cannot by itself provide a sufficient explana-
tion of why cooperation emerges, and materialist accounts of the origin of war and the
state may have unduly neglected the role of gender. Marital and fraternal relations can be
a source of social power, as such ties can enable groups to cooperate and dominate oth-
ers. The phenomena of men’s secret societies, clandestine groups of initiated men that
exclude and even terrorise women, suggest that fraternal solidarity is a widespread
means of overcoming the collective action problems involved in dominating others.
Competition among coalitions of men to control women’s labour and bodies may itself
have been an important condition for the nucleation of groups organised for warfare. If
this is correct, it may be necessary to incorporate an analysis of gendered sources of
social power into theorising about multiplicity, as it indicates that in many societies, men
and women experience multiplicity in qualitatively different ways.
The Stag Hunt and multiplicity
Game theoretic accounts of politics start from the assumption that multiple distinct deci-
sion-makers exist, their actions influenced by the strategies they believe other actors will

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT