Oil, relative strength and civil war mediation
| Published date | 01 September 2016 |
| Date | 01 September 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0010836715610596 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Cooperation and Conflict
2016, Vol. 51(3) 325 –344
© The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836715610596
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Oil, relative strength and civil
war mediation
Govinda Clayton
Abstract
Civil conflicts within oil-rich states tend to last longer but are less likely to be mediated and end
in a peace agreement. This implies that oil-funded conflict is less likely to end through a mediated
settlement, despite offering a greater opportunity for peaceful resolution. This article builds
on this puzzle, focusing on the following research question: to what extent does the presence
of non-lootable natural resources impact on the onset and outcome of civil war mediation? I
argue that oil wealth raises the relative capacity of the incumbent, making it more challenging
for insurgents to force mediation and gain the guarantees against defection that are needed to
resolve the problem of credible commitment. This theory is tested on 319 civil conflict episodes
between 1946 and 2004. The results support the argument that non-lootable natural resources
exert a strong negative effect on both the onset and outcome of mediation. The analysis also
reveals that the negative effect of petroleum wealth increases relative to a state’s hydrocarbon
revenue (per capita). This is an important contribution to conflict research focused on natural
resources that has previously overlooked the relationship between resource wealth and civil
conflict management efforts.
Keywords
Civil war, conflict management, mediation, natural resources
Introduction
This article examines the influence that hydrocarbons have on third-party conflict man-
agement. Whilst many studies have explored the effect that natural resources have upon
the onset and duration of civil war, relatively little academic research has investigated
their impact on conflict resolution.1 In principle, the longer duration of oil-funded war
should offer a greater opportunity for conflict management (Lujala, 2010).2 Yet, many of
the most durable oil-funded conflicts have proved to be largely resistant to the entrance
of intermediaries and often take longer to resolve once mediation has begun (e.g. Nigeria,
Corresponding author:
Govinda Clayton, The Conflict Analysis Research Centre, The University of Kent, Canterbury
CT2 7NZ, UK.
Email: G.Clayton@kent.ac.uk
610596CAC0010.1177/0010836715610596Cooperation and ConflictClayton
research-article2015
Article
326 Cooperation and Conflict 51(3)
Sudan and Syria). This implies that oil-funded conflict is less likely to end through a
mediated settlement, despite offering a greater opportunity for peaceful resolution. This
article builds on this puzzle, focusing on the following research question: to what extent
does the presence of non-lootable natural resources impact on the onset and outcome of
civil war mediation?
I argue that hydrocarbons exacerbate bargaining problems by increasing the relative
capacity of the incumbent. Petroleum offers a significant source of state revenue that
raises the incumbent’s capacity to resist insurgent demands. This reduces the frequency
and effectiveness of mediation, as it is more challenging for relatively weak insurgents
to generate the costs that are required to compel the government to accept an intermedi-
ary and gain the guarantees against government defection that are needed for a settlement
(Clayton, 2013; Cunningham et al., 2009).
To empirically assess this argument, I use a Sartori selection model to analyse 319
civil conflict episodes drawn from the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen
et al., 2011). This dataset includes 1531 conflict years between 1946 and 2004, of which
236 involved mediation. Resource data indicating the spatial and temporal overlap of
resources and conflict is used to statistically assess the different mechanisms through
which hydrocarbons might impact mediation (Lujala et al., 2007). The results support the
argument that non-lootable resources exert a strong negative effect on both the onset and
outcome of mediation by raising the relative capacity of the incumbent. The analysis also
reveals that the negative effect of petroleum wealth increases relative to a state’s hydro-
carbon revenue (per capita).
The manuscript is structured as follows: I first discuss the influence that the distribu-
tion of belligerent power has upon the onset and outcome of civil war mediation. I
develop a theory and propositions linking non-lootable resources to relative belligerent
power. Finally, the method of empirical analysis is discussed and the statistical results are
presented.
Relative belligerent strength and civil war mediation
The incentives for mediation in civil war
Mediation is an extension of negotiation in which decision-making power remains with
the disputants, but some aspects of the dialogue are controlled by a third-party (Bercovitch
and Gartner, 2006). It incorporates a diverse collection of conflict management efforts,
ranging from loosely facilitated bilateral negotiations (e.g. the Cuban facilitation of
negotiations between Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the
Colombian government) to closely managed and manipulated dialogue processes (e.g.
The Dayton peace process).3 Mediated negotiation, in its various forms, is the primary
means through which civil war peace agreements are achieved (DeRouen et al., 2011;
Greig and Regan, 2008).
Mediation is a voluntary process that hinges on a third party being willing to offer
their services, and both belligerents being open to outside intervention. The asymmetry
in power and legitimacy provides insurgents with greater incentives to enter into media-
tion (Clayton, 2013; Gent, 2011; Zartman, 1995). For the rebels, the onset of a dialogue
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