Organizing evaluation: Assessing combat leadership quality
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629819833177 |
| Published date | 01 April 2019 |
| Date | 01 April 2019 |
| Author | William A. Wagstaff |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2019, Vol.31(2) 132–155
ÓThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629819833177
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Organizing evaluation:
Assessing combat leadership
quality
William A. Wagstaff
Air War College, USA
Abstract
What determines military effectiveness? Previous literature has examined factors such as military
doctrine, culture, and capabilities,as well as regime type and civil–military relations, but has largely
ignored military leadership quality. Competent military leaders positively influence battle out-
comes by ensuring proper implementation of battleplans and quick reaction to an increasingly
dynamic battlefield. This paper formally models the relationship between high-ranking military
commanders and their immediate subordinates to examine the commander’s ability to evaluate
her personnel. I vary the ability of the subordinates to signal their commander to determine how
different signaling structures influence what commanders may learn. This analysis reveals that
commanders opt for less informative signals from subordinates as the military professionalizes,
potentially impeding their ability to identifyand remove incompetent subordinates. Leaving incom-
petent subordinates in command reduces the ability of the military to improve. Evidence fromthe
US Army’s leadership decisions after the Battle of Kasserine Pass and Operation Avalanche illus-
trates these results.
Keywords
Bureaucratic politics; military command; military effectiveness; principal–agent relationship
1. Introduction
The structure of militaries around the world vary greatly. Some, such as Iraq under
Saddam Hussein or the Soviet Red Army of the 1930s, concentrate authority at
the top, while others, such as North Vietnam during the Vietnamese War and the
Corresponding author:
William A. Wagstaff,Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, MaxwellAFB, AL 36112-6006, USA.
Email: drew.wagstaff@gmail.com
United States during World War II, devolve autonomy to low-level commanders
(Talmadge, 2016). They may have many levels of command, such as the Chinese
Communist forces during the Chinese Civil War, or they may have few levels of
command, such as the Russians during the Russo-Japanese War (Grauer, 2016).
Despite a large body of scholarship on military effectiveness – the ability of mili-
taries to use combat in pursuit of political goals – we know little about the conse-
quences of military structure, especially in how it affects leadership quality, or
‘professionalism.’ Previous work has focused on technology (Cipolla, 1965;
McNeill, 1982; Parker, 1996; Van Creveld, 1989), force employment (McNeill,
1982; Raudzens, 1990), strategy (Biddle, 2004; Posen, 1984), regime type (Reiter
and Stam, 2002), culture (Snyder, 1984), and civil–military relations (Biddle and
Zirkle, 1996; Feaver, 2003; Kier, 1995; Talmadge, 2015). Work that does address
military structure focuses on coup-proofing (e.g., Talmadge, 2013, 2015, 2016) or
how militaries gather information from and respond to a dynamic battlefield
(Grauer, 2016).
This vast literature assumes that militaries need only obtain superior technol-
ogy, implement the proper strategy, or have the appropriate structure to produce
battlefield success. In other words, it assumes that, if there is a failure, it is a failure
of planning, not implementation. Yet, we know that inept commanders increase
the likelihood of failure. They allow their troops to become bogged down (e.g.,
Mark Clark at Anzio; Blumeson, 1993), position themselves too far from the bat-
tlefield to make timely decisions (e.g., Lloyd Fredendall in the Kasserine Pass;
Carr Jr, 2003), or are too timid (e.g., Union General McClellan; McPherson,
1988). Competent leaders not only ensure correct implementation, they can also
inspire troops, efficiently coordinate subordinate units, and adapt to a dynamic
battlefield environment (see Ricks, 2012, for further discussion). In short, compe-
tent leaders improve battlefield outcomes. So how do commanders ensure they
have competent subordinates?
Commanders may examine battlefield outcomes and feedback from subordi-
nates to make personnel decisions. Commanders often use some metric of combat
outcomes to determine whether subordinates are performing adequately (Blanken
and Lepore, 2014; Gartner, 1997; Gartner and Myers, 1995). These metrics may
contain limited information, leaving commanders relatively uncertain as to how
individual subordinates contributed to the outcome; or they may contain so much
information that commanders are overwhelmed (see Murray, 2011). Commanders
may also question their subordinates about each other’s performance, as
Eisenhower did throughout his command during World War II (Carr Jr, 2003).
Subordinates may provide information about individuals, but may also lie.
Commanders consider these two sources of information in making their personnel
decisions.
Modeling these dynamics provides insights into a number of factors that influ-
ence the ability of commanders to evaluate their subordinates. For example, it can
be costly to replace a subordinate. Replacements take time to settle into their new
command and removing subordinates may damage relationships with other col-
leagues. How do these costs influence a commander’s personnel decisions? I
Wagstaff 133
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