Parliamentary Control of Public Expenditure

Published date01 December 1954
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1954.tb01209.x
Date01 December 1954
AuthorFrank Tribe
PurZiunentury
Control
of
Public
Expenditure
By SIR
FRANK
TRIBE,
K.C.B., K.B.E.
This
addres.,
by
the
Comptroller and Auditor General was given
to
the
Annual
Conference
of
the Instirute
of
Municipal
Treasurers
and
Account-
ants
in
June,
1954,
and
is
reprinted here
by
kind
permission
of
the author
and
the
I.M.T.A.
HE
title of this paper may suggest to some cynics that its author is going
T
to talk about William Ewart Gladstone and the ideals and purposes
of his Parliamentary associates rather than with a live subject of topical
interest.
Has
not Parliament, they may ask, given up as a hopeless ideal
the attempt to limit and control expenditure? Some may even add, not
without some apparent justification, that on the whole this is a good thing
because recent history shows that Governments-independent of party-
are constantly resisting efforts by back-bench Members,
of
their own party
as well as of the Opposition, to put further burdens
on
the Exchequer. This,
they may say, is an inevitable consequence of universal suffrage
;
Members
of
Parliament have to pay regard to the wishes of their constituents and,
though they would deny that they are merely delegates bound to advocate
in Parliament what the majority
of
their constituents want or think they
want, they cannot forget that an election is pending in
less
than five years
and they would be more than human if they entirely ignored the wishes of
their constituents.
There is
no
doubt some substance in this cynical view, and there has
certainly been a change even in the last quarter century in the general attitude
of back-bench Members
of
Parliament to questions of expenditure. The
number of Members who now consistently press economy
on
the Government
is much smaller than
it
was. Even those who press for economies in some
directions, such as reduction of staff in Government Departments, may well
press for much greater expenditure in other directions, such as building
new roads. There appears to be a growing feeling that the back-bencher
is free to press for additional expenditure in any particular way that appeals
to him and
it
is the Government’s duty to obstruct or at least to point to
the financial consequences. The financial conscience of the nation, which,
so far as one can gather, was in Gladstone’s day shared broadly by the whole
House of Commons, is now largely the prerogative of the Crown and the
Executive though some back-bench Members and certain organs of the
Press do spasmodically urge the cause of economy. How completely has
the position changed from that recorded
in
our history books, whose pages
show that for some six centuries up to the end of the nineteenth the constant
fight was between the King and
his
Government who wanted to spend
more money and Parliament who wanted to
limit
their grants
so
as to prevent
more taxation!
A
full examination
of
the reasons for this change would merit a paper
in
itself. They appear to be bound up primarily with the growth of democracy
and
the enlargement
of
the franchise. But they may be partly related to a
tendency which has been noticeable in some Government Departments and
363
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
also, maybe, in some local authorities. Experience in Government Depart-
ments seems to show that the stronger the control which is vested
in
the
finance branch the weaker is the sense of financial responsibility among
the administrative branches. The ideal of course is that every administrative
officer should develop a full sense of financial responsibility, but that has
proved to be very difficult when the Chief Finance Officer has the predominant
say on
all
matters of expenditure. This does not mean, of course, that the
finance branch should be a mere accounting organisation, but rather that an
ideal system would recognise the financial responsibility of all officers.
Is
it
possible that, with the vast growth and complexity of public expenditure
in recent years and the inevitable interest of the Treasury in nearly every
political issue, individual Members of Parliament have unconsciously lost
some of their old sense of financial responsibility, feeling that financial issues
are safely left to the Treasury
?
Separation
of
Income and Expenditure
It
may be, too, that our Parliamentary system tends
to
encourage a
divorce between considerations of income and of expenditure. They are
really only brought together in the Budget.
Ways and Means
on the
one side and
Supply” on the other, to use the old terms enshrined in
Parliamentary phraseology, are given separate treatment. Proposed Supply
expenditure is dealt with in Estimates, considered by the Committee of
Supply, voted by the House and in the end legally apportioned in the Appro-
priation Act. The raising of the income to meet the expenditure
is
dealt
with by the Committee of Ways and Means and new proposals of the Budget
for raising the income emerge in the Finance Act.
It
is true, of course,
that the Committees of Supply and of Ways and Means are both Committees
of the whole House and are therefore composed of the same Members, but
in voting supply or debating Bills involving increased expenditure Members
do not at the same time have to consider
how
the money to meet the expenditure
is to be found.
I
sometimes think
it
might be a healthy thing if
it
became customary
in the House of Commons for all references to substantial expenditure to be
accompanied by a short statement of their effect on taxation. If, for instance,
a Member asks for
E60
million more voted money to be spent on roads or
colonial development or old age pensions, he might be expected to indicate
that he is advocating the equivalent of fourpence more on the standard rate
of income tax or 34d. more tax on a packer of
20
cigarettes. If he presses
for payment of post-war credits he should indicate how the money
is
to be
found; if he suggests payment out of the Consolidated Fund, he should
indicate how much the national debt and interest thereon will be increased.
Similarly, if a Minister indicates the Government’s intention to give
so
many millions to a Colony or to increase the Assistance Board’s rate by
so
many shillings, he might usefully indicate at the same time the equivalent
in increases of Purchase Tax or beer duty. This might do something to
associate income and expenditure in the minds of Members and encourage
a greater sense of financial responsibility.
One difficulty
of
course
is
that the Exchequer derives its income from
so many different sources and
it
is not possible, except in the case of broadcast
364

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