Party, candidate, and voter incentives under free list proportional representation
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629819893023 |
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2020, Vol.32(1) 143–167
ÓThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629819893023
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Party, candidate, and voter
incentives under free list
proportional representation
Thomas Mustillo
University of Notre Dame, USA
John Polga-Hecimovich
U.S. Naval Academy, USA
Abstract
Under free list proportional representation voters can: (a) cast preference votes for candidates;
(b) cast multiple preferences; and (c) distribute preferences across multiple lists. Alternatively,
they can cast a list vote. Our theory shows that office-seeking candidates face incentives to pur-
sue the personal vote, while non-candidate partisans seek the party vote. Voters are in the cross-
currents of these forces. Also, since preference voting is so cognitively and informationally
demanding, voters have incentives to use shortcuts, especially (a)list voting; (b) casting fewer than
their allotment of preferences; and (c) preference voting for well-known or highly placed candi-
dates. We find support for our expectations using linear mixed-effects regression of the propor-
tion of preference votes in candidate-level electoral data from Ecuador. Personal voting is more
prevalent as magnitude increases, where the local party is strong, and for candidates that are
incumbents, male, high on the list, and in the position of first loser.
Keywords
Free list proportional representation; panachage; personal vote; preference voting; voto cruzado
1. Introduction
Switzerland and Luxembourg first adopted free list proportional representation
(PR) for national legislative elections more than a century ago. About 100 years
Corresponding author:
John Polga-Hecimovich,U.S. Naval Academy,121 Blake Road, Annapolis, MD 21402, USA.
Email: polgahec@usna.edu
later, Ecuador, Honduras, and El Salvador followed.
1
The free list provides voters
with broad choice over candidate selection and would seem to encourage personal
voting. Generally, within the family of PR, the comparative literature suggests that
incentives to cultivate a personal vote depend upon the district magnitude and
whether or not lists are open or closed (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Marsh, 1985).
Under closed list PR, where there is no intraparty electoral competition, scholars
maintain that candidates’ personal characteristics are of decreasing usefulness as
magnitude grows, and with it the incentives to wage campaigns based upon per-
sonal reputation. By contrast, when lists are open or flexible, legislators’ individual
vote earning qualities are useful to voters, and increasingly so as magnitude
increases. However, we know little about the free list, and whether these regulari-
ties apply. With very few exceptions (e.g. Selb and Lutz, 2015), the scholarly litera-
ture has failed to consider how the free list shapes the incentives of political actors
to rely upon a personal vote. In this paper, we examine the incentives of candi-
dates, non-candidate party members, and voters under free list PR.
Free list PR is an electoral system with three dimensions of voter choice beyond a
conventional closed list. Voters can: (a) cast preference votes for candidates; (b) cast
multiple preference votes, usually equal tothe district magnitude (M); and (c) distri-
bute their preference votes to candidates from multiple party lists. Although the free
list is widely viewed as giving voters more choice compared to openlist rules without
mixing, we show that the behavioral outcomes it generates must be qualified. The
system creates different incentives for different political actors.The mechanics of the
system, and our decision-theoretic theory of candidate campaign behavior will
reveal that candidates and non-candidate party actors are pressed towards strongly
divergent preferences with respect to personal and party vote-seeking, and that vot-
ers are easily overwhelm ed by the scope of the choices that the y are given.
Specifically, we demonstrate how the pursuit of a personal vote is a dominant
strategy for office-seeking candidates. Yet since many voters do not cast preference
votes, or do not fully utilize all their preference votes, it is clear that other forces
are shaping voting behavior. Building upon this, we add other dimensions to the
basic theoretical model, including the strong preference non-candidate party mem-
bers have to cultivate the party list vote. We also explain how the preference option
leads voters towards using shortcuts that simplify the cognitive and information
challenge that they face.
We use these theories to develop four empirically testable implications of the free
list. First, as parties become older,more national, and stronger, personal voting will
decline. Second, as district magnitude increases, personal voting will increase (net
the other effects, including ballot order). Third, as the candidate’s position on the
ballot drops, preference voting will decline. Fourth, candidates in marginal ballot
positions will have higher rates of personal voting, net the other effects.
We test our expectations using linear mixed-effects regression models of the pro-
portion of preference votes in candidate-level electoral data from Ecuador in 2006
and 2009. We find support for all but the first of these hypotheses. The results sug-
gest that despite incentives for candidates in free list systems to pursue the personal
vote, countervailing forces push voters towards casting a party list vote.
144 Journal of Theoretical Politics 32(1)
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