Passionate rationalism: the role of emotion in decision making
| Pages | 438-450 |
| Published date | 06 July 2010 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/09578231011054707 |
| Date | 06 July 2010 |
| Author | Gabriele Lakomski,Colin W. Evers |
| Subject Matter | Education |
Passionate rationalism: the role
of emotion in decision making
Gabriele Lakomski
Graduate School of Education, University of Melbourne, Melbourne,
Australia, and
Colin W. Evers
School of Education, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to argue that emotion has a central role to play in rational
decision making based on recent research in the neuroanatomy of emotion. As a result, traditional
rational decision-making theories, including Herbert Simon’s modified model of satisficing that sharply
demarcates emotions and values from rationality and rational decision making, need substantial
revision. The paper concludes by outlining some central features of a theory of emotional decisions that
is biologically more realistic than the traditional rationalist-cognitive model.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper employs contemporary scientific as well as traditional
philosophical criteria in its argumentation. Methodologically, it can be described as an example of
applying naturalistic philosophy to a central issue of human thought and experience, and how humans
are able to value things at all on the basis of their neuroanatomy.
Findings – The paper presents some initial features of a new theory of emotional decisions that is
biologically more realistic than the traditional rationalist-cognitive model.
Originality/value – The significance and originality of this paper lies in the fact that it proposes
causal investigations of the real bases for rational decision making as a central human feature which
runs counter to conventional wisdom and has far reaching implications for education, to name just one
discipline; it demonstrates the importance and necessity of interdisciplinary research; and it outlines an
exciting new research agenda that promises to be more productive in terms of understanding and hence
planning for, the way in which humans make decisions.
Keywords Cognition, Decision making, Epistemology, Individualbehaviour
Paper type Conceptual paper
Introduction
Decision making has long been identified with the rational coordination of beliefs and
desires, both in its non-technical, folk-psychological expression, and in the more arcane
models of maximising expected utility, or multi-criterial modelling under various
epistemic conditions. Because the medium of analysis of what goes on inside the heads of
decision makers is linguistic/symbolic, these processes are usually treated in a way that
abstracts from the causal machinery of cognition and instead focuses on certa in
normative canons of reasoning defined over symbolic representations.
Mental activity so defined was considered the hallmark of what it means to be
a rational human being. The modern legacy of this assumption is played out in
many domains of the social sciences, including economic theory and theories of social
choice. In the domain of administrative-organisational theory, Simon’s (1976) view of
decision making is one prominent example that continues to be influential. But there are
good reasons for revising such approaches in light of the development of greater
understanding of the causal processes of thought.
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0957-8234.htm
JEA
48,4
438
Received May 2009
Revised November 2009
Accepted February 2010
Journal of Educational
Administration
Vol. 48 No. 4, 2010
pp. 438-450
qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
0957-8234
DOI 10.1108/09578231011054707
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