Passive non-participation versus strategic defection in a collective risk social dilemma
| Date | 01 January 2016 |
| Author | Autumn Bynum,Oleg Smirnov,Reuben Kline |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629815586880 |
| Published date | 01 January 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2016, Vol.28(1) 138–158
ÓThe Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629815586880
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Passive non-participation
versus strategic defection in a
collective risk social dilemma
Autumn Bynum, Reuben Kline and Oleg Smirnov
Stony Brook University, Stony Brook,NY, USA
Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that non-participation underlies a variety of social dilemmas. In collec-
tive risk social dilemmas (CRSD), non-participation is viewed as strategic defection—a selfish
behavior that increases individual utility at the cost of the group. We conducted a hybrid
laboratory-then-online experiment to examine if non-participation in a CRSD may be fundamen-
tally different from the act of strategic defection. We confirmed that non-participation is a prob-
lem in a social dilemma. When participation is required, a randomly formed group of subjects
was virtually certain to reach the loss prevention threshold (0.999 probability). On the other
hand, when an empirically realistic non-participation option was introduced, the probability of
reaching the goal by a randomly formed group decreased to 0.599. We also found evidence that
the profile of a typical non-participant does not fit the profile of a strategic defector. Non-partici-
pants in the experiment were highly cooperative when they had to make a contribution decision.
Non-participants in the experiment did not try to increase their payoffs, including in the treat-
ment condition when non-participation led to a default contribution of 100% of the subject’s
endowment.
Keywords
Collective risk; cooperation; participation; public goods game; social dilemma
1. Introduction
A social dilemma arises when an individual can choose to benefit themselves at the
cost to the group (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965). Experimental evidence from a wide
Corresponding author:
Oleg Smirnov,Stony Brook University, SBS-7, StonyBrook, NY 11794, USA.
Email: oleg.smirnov@stonybrook.edu
array of social dilemmas has demonstrated that, while defection is by no means
non-existent, it is not as ubiquitous as traditional economic theory would predict it
to be (Ledyard, 1995). There is a wide range of factors that can influence defection
rates, including the group size, anonymity, and communication (Orbell et al., 1988;
Ostrom et al., 1994). A variety of experimental designs, however, limit the scope of
what can motivate defection and imply that defection is strategic, i.e. driven by a
motivation to increase individual benefit at the cost of the group.
Here we offer a novel experimental design, in which seemingly strategic defec-
tion may be caused by an alternative motivation—passive non-participation.Aswe
elaborate below, such defection is fundamentally different from the traditional
notion of strategic behavior. We show that passive non-participation may be
irrational—or anti-strategic—in that it can, depending on the default contribution
triggered by non-participation, decrease individual payoffs to the benefit of the
group. Unfortunately, in most real world social dilemmas because the default rate
of contribution is essentially zero, passive non-participation has the same impact
on the group outcome as strategic defection. Improving the prospects of social
cooperation may require different policies depending on the dominant motivation
of the individuals. Strategic defectors may choose to cooperate if there is a change
in incentives (such as reward or punishment). Passive non-participants may choose
to participate (and cooperate) if there is a change in their awareness or perceived
salience of the problem.
The survey research literature tells us that non-participation is an important
phenomenon in politics and empirical social dilemmas (Bennett and Resnick, 1990;
Campbell et al., 1960; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; O’Toole et al., 2003; Verba and Nie,
1972; Verba et al., 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Choice is often diffi-
cult, especially when individuals are asked to make non-routine decisions. Many
people prefer default options because status quo alternatives often require less
mental effort in the decision making process (Eidelman and Crandall, 2012). We
know that when there is a default option that allows the chooser to take no action,
we observe a large number of people defaulting to said option regardless of the
expected benefit (or disutility) it will yield (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). It was
shown, for instance, that when investment savings plan defaults are changed from
opting in (passive non-participation) to automatic enrollment with an opt-out
(active non-participation) choice, participation rates in personal savings plans
jump significantly (Madrian and Shea, 2001). In fact, the very individuals who ini-
tially fail to make contributions (passive non-participation) may subsequently end
up saving more of their monthly earnings than those who initially make voluntary
contributions (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Therefore, people are far more likely to
passively opt-out (stay with defaults through non-participation) than actively opt-
out of a course of action.
Observational studies have clearly demonstrated how switching from an opt-in
to a forced decision (i.e. a required yes or no response) can significantly increase
participation (Carroll et al., 2009). The aversion to actively opting away from the
status quo and higher propensity towards passively opting out of a course of action
is not limited to financial investments and is clearly evident in various forms of
Bynum et al. 139
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