PATH DEPENDENCY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: THE CASE OF INDUSTRIAL EMISSION CONTROL IN SWEDEN
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00687.x |
| Published date | 01 December 2007 |
| Author | ANDREAS DUIT |
| Date | 01 December 2007 |
Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 4, 2007 (1097–1118)
© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road,
Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
PATH DEPENDENCY AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE: THE CASE OF INDUSTRIAL
EMISSION CONTROL IN SWEDEN
ANDREAS DUIT
Theory-independent measures of institutional change can be developed by identify-
ing and tracking changes in institutional reproduction mechanisms. Such measures
can then be used to assess the empirical validity of theoretical models of institutional
change. This article performs an analysis of reproduction mechanisms in a case study
of a Swedish institution for emission control during the period 1960 – 2000. The analy-
sis reveals the existence of a highly path dependent institutional development, pow-
erful enough to withstand a wide-ranging institutional reform implemented in the
late 1990s. The case study supports a gradualist model over a punctuated equilibrium
model of institutional change, but the analysis also demonstrates the need for path
dependency theory to pay greater attention to the question of how micro-level insti-
tutional interaction generates aggregate patterns of change and stability.
INTRODUCTION
This article deals with the evolution of an institution designed to monitor,
control and sanction environmentally harmful emissions from industrial
enterprises in Sweden. The institution was brought into existence through
the enactment of the Environmental Protection Act of 1969 ( SFS (Svensk
Författningssamling, the Swedish Code of Statutes) 1969 :387). The institution
remained virtually unchanged for 30 years, until, the late 1990s, a compre-
hensive legislative and organizational reform was carried out.
In light of the remarkably long period of institutional stability, the question
presented by this case is whether the institutional reform actually changed
the institution in a substantial way, or whether it merely amounted to a
bump on a road already travelled. Addressing this seemingly simple ques-
tion, ‘ Did it change? ’ , will in turn raise core issues about how the process of
institutional change and stability is theoretically modelled and empirically
investigated. Central for this task is the notion of path dependency: focus
will be on how analytical applications of path dependency theory can help
us better distinguish, analyse, and understand processes of institutional
change. Specifi cally, the central thrust of the article is, that by defi ning
institutional change in terms of changes in ‘ institutional reproduction
mechanisms ’ , a theory-independent measure of institutional change can be
Andreas Duit is in the Department of Political Science and the Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm
University.
1098 ANDREAS DUIT
Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 4, 2007 (1097–1118)
© 2007 The Author. Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
developed. This, in turn, enables more precise judgements about the effects
of institutional reforms and other processes of institutional change.
THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
A key question for institutional theory is: if institutions are the explanation
for stability, how can we understand processes of institutional change (see
Hall 1993; Peters 1999; Immergut 1998; Pierson 2000b ). As noted by several
commentators ( Orren and Skowronek 1993 ; Shepsle 2001 ; R. Lieberman
2002; Thelen 2003 ; Streek and Thelen 2005), institutional theory has, until
relatively recently, relied primarily (implicitly or explicitly) on Krasner ’ s no-
tion of ‘ punctuated equilibrium ’ as a model for institutional change. The
punctuated equilibrium model of institutional evolution denotes a develop-
ment that passes from one state of institutional inertia to another through
phases of rapid and fundamental reorganization. The punctuation of the
equilibrium can be brought about by external as well as internal forces, but
the key point is that genuine change can only occur when the old equilibrium
is wiped away and replaced by a new one ( Krasner 1984, 1988 ; see also
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones et al. 1998 ). Krasner ’ s model, in turn
drawing on the work of evolutionary biologists Eldredge and Gould (1972) ,
does resemble some historical processes (for instance, the fall of the Berlin
Wall; the storming of the Bastille; September 11th), but this is far from proof
of its applicability as a general model of political and institutional change.
While Krasner ’ s model of institutional change captures some aspects of our
more intuitive conceptions of how institutional changes seem to manifest
themselves, it is unclear how much an institution must change in order for
it to be regarded as a ‘ true ’ punctuated equilibrium and not just an insig-
nifi cant fl uctuation in institutional history.
On the other hand, it could be argued that this quest for genuine insti-
tutional change is futile, simply because institutional change is intrinsically
incremental. This is roughly the view advocated by Kathleen Thelen when
discussing institutional change ( Thelen 1999, 2000, 2003 ; Streek and Thelen
2005). Her claim is that institutions adapt to new circumstances through a
process of layering and gradual adjustments rather than through periods
of drastic and rapid change: ‘ The picture of institutional evolution that
emerges from these analyses is one in which it is not so useful to draw a
sharp line between cases of institutional stability versus change ’ ( Thelen
2000 , p. 106, original italics). Thus the conclusion is that institutional change
is better understood as an ongoing process of adaptation, where institu-
tions evolve gradually by taking on new functions and dispersing old ones:
‘ The idea of functional conversion (and the related idea of institutional
evolution through layering) suggested here represents the kind of incre-
mental or bounded change that may constitute the more common ways that
things move in politics ’ ( Thelen 2000 , p. 107). Streek and Thelen have gone
on to develop a typology of institutional change consisting of fi ve general
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