Peace Facilitation by Small States
| Author | John Stephen Moolakkattu |
| Published date | 01 December 2005 |
| Date | 01 December 2005 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0010836705058225 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Peace Facilitation by Small States
Norway in Sri Lanka
JOHN STEPHEN MOOLAKKATTU
ABSTRACT
It is now four years since Norway formally embarked on the difficult
task of facilitating negotiations in the protracted ethnic conflict in Sri
Lanka.With an international record in peace-making and development
assistance, Norway entered the fray with unmatched legitimacy. Unlike
Norway’s previous efforts aimed at brokering peace, the Sri Lankan
facilitation was undertaken by assigning a conspicuous role to key gov-
ernmental functionaries, and was less secretive in nature. Although a
ceasefire has been signed and six rounds of talks between the govern-
ment and the Tamil Tigers have been held, Norway’s third-party role
has been criticized by nationalists for being partial towards the Tigers,
and by a section of peace activists for focusing on a minimalist agenda
of peace. In this article,I examine the qualifications and motivations of
Norway as a facilitator and also the different perceptions that the key
stakeholders have about its third-party role. Furthermore,I assess the
nature of the Norwegian efforts so far and the hurdles ahead for taking
the peace process forward.
Keywords facilitation; liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); Sri
Lanka mediation; monitoring mission; Norway
Introduction
Organized violent conflict in Sri Lanka has a history of more than two
decades. A whole generation has grown up in the north of the country
without much contact with the south because of the conflict over claims for
secession. Nobody would have thought that, after several years of fighting
and terrorist campaigns accompanied by government repression, it would
be possible for the conflicting parties to engage in direct talks in 2002. It
was neither the result of the emergence of a ‘ripe moment’ nor a ‘hurting
stalemate’, as some theorists of conflict resolution argue (e.g. Zartman,
2003). Yet a ceasefire was signed in Sri Lanka in early 2002 and six rounds
of talks have been held in the period September 2002 to March 2003.
Norway has been credited with the role of facilitator in these talks. It has
been found that, after regional organizations,smaller states have a greater
chance of success as mediators than larger states have. In addition, the
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association
Vol.40(4): 385–402. Copyright ©2005 NISA www.ps.au.dk/NISA
Sage Publications www.sagepublications.com
0010-8367. DOI: 10.1177/0010836705058225
legitimacy of the mediator is often identified as a key determinant in the
success of mediation (Bercovitch, 1996).
The fact that Norway was able to find a role in mediating an intractable
conflict in far-flung Sri Lanka against heavy odds suggests that the country
has established for itself an altogether different niche from the power poli-
tics paradigm that continues to dominate international politics. It also
points to the possibilities of smaller states with a good international record
to broker peace as well as provide third party assistance in conflict regions
where the role of super powers may be suspect. The entry of a third party,
even as a facilitator, turns a dyadic conflict into a triadic relationship
(Bercovitch, 1996). This makes Norway’s role crucial.In this article, I exam-
ine the context in which Norway emerged as a third-party facilitator in Sri
Lanka, and how the key stakeholders in the conflict perceive its role. I also
attempt to assess the Norwegian facilitation to discern its key characteris-
tics and identify its enabling and constraining aspects. When referring to
Norway I mean the Norwegian government, which alone has been given the
mandate to facilitate talks between the Sri Lankan government and
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Norway’s Qualifications as a Mediator
How a small state like Norway can assume demanding third-party roles in
protracted conflicts in places like Sri Lanka is indeed a matter of curiosity.
While smallness is a constraint, it is also,in a sense, an opportunity.Galtung
says that the small size ‘gives Norway a chance as an arbiter in international
relations, between countries that are big,rich and Western,and those dom-
inated by them, particularly Third World countries’.By offering third-party
assistance Norway can present itself as part of the ‘Western world with a
human face’ and thus gain ‘political currency’.This ‘creates a vested inter-
est in such conflicts,and in seeing them as symmetric with Norway as impar-
tial and disinterested in-between’ (Galtung, 1980: 311). Yet the desirability
of such an impartial role is questionable in asymmetric conflicts,since there
is no guarantee that the interests of the weaker parties will be protected, as
the outcome of the Oslo Accords for the Palestinians has suggested (Jones,
1999). It is claimed that Norway has shown considerable sympathy with the
victims of personal, structural and cultural violence everywhere,making its
peace-making role an integral element of its humanitarian mission. It is tied
to fundamental Christian values of the Lutheran variety around which a
societal consensus has been formed in the country (Galtung, 1980:312). The
relatively strong social democratic heritage of the country is an added
reason for this sympathy (Ford, 2000).
Scandinavian countries in general act as what Ingebritsen (2002) calls
‘norm entrepreneurs’ in international politics, especially in areas relating to
sustainable development practices, peaceful resolution of conflict,transfer-
ring of resources from rich to poor and participation in international insti-
tutions. Interestingly, this multifaceted internationalism has been
accomplished outside the normal power-based framework of international
386 COOPERATION AND CONFLICT 40(4)
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