Policing Reform in the South Korean Maritime Police After the Sewol Ferry Disaster
| Date | 01 May 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1757 |
| Author | Jieun Moon,Youngmin Oh,Seunghoo Lim |
| Published date | 01 May 2016 |
POLICING REFORM IN THE SOUTH KOREAN MARITIME POLICE
AFTER THE SEWOL FERRY DISASTER
SEUNGHOO LIM
1
, JIEUN MOON
2
*AND YOUNGMIN OH
3
1
Public Management and Policy Analysis Program, International University of Japan, Japan
2
Research Center for National Leadership, Seoul National University, Korea
3
Center for Performance Evaluation and Management, Korean Institute of Public Finance, Korea
SUMMARY
The disbanding of the Maritime Police was the Korean President’s political attempt to avoid blame after the Sewol ferry
accident. Under the government reorganization bill, which was drafted by the government and submitted to the National As-
sembly, the Maritime Police will be renamed the Maritime Safety Agency and put under the control of the newly created min-
istry of national safety. Furthermore, the Maritime Police’s investigation and intelligence functions will be transferred to the
National Police Agency, and its roles of rescue operations and maritime security will be moved to the new national safety
body. The reality of this policing reform is closer to “organization succession”than it is to “organization termination.”
Borrowing the concept of blame avoidance, we will examine the nature, causes, and consequences of the blame observed
in this process of policing reform, which is intertwined with the historical background of the developmental state in South
Korea. In this study, we expect to acquire important lessons about how the reformation of police organizations was used
by the Korean government as an instrument for responding to disaster by providing new insights into the study of the com-
plex forms of political interactions among multiple stakeholders in times of crisis. In particular, we will try to understand the
causes and effects of this extreme case, the Sewol ferry accident, and the subsequent disintegration of the Maritime Police
Agency through the perspective of the Korean police bureaucracy and the developmental states.
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
key words—policing reform; developmental state; blame avoidance; politicalization of disaster
INTRODUCTION
Over a year has passed since the Sewol ferry, with 476 passengers aboard, sank on 16 April 2014, in South Korea.
Approximately 300 passengers, consisting mostly of high school students on a trip, were drowned, with nine
remaining missing. Who should be blamed for this high death toll? If we tried to list the causes of this terrible
accident, there would be no end to the list: the unpardonable Sewol captain and crew, the deep-rooted and wide-
ranging insensitivity toward safety in Korean society, the unethical and corrupt ties between the government and
the shipping companies, and so on. All concerned political stakeholders have been busy trying to shift the blame
for the accident.
One of the final decisions that President Park Geun-Hye made after the Sewol ferry disaster was to disband the
South Korean Maritime Police (Blue House, 2014). No one doubted that the botched initial rescue by the Maritime
Police, who were sent to the accident site, resulted in the high death toll. However, when Park’s decision was an-
nounced, it surprised not only the Maritime Police but also other relevant stakeholders. While some supported the
President’s decision because the Maritime Police were bearing the brunt of public anger over the government’s
mishandling of the maritime disaster (Kim, 2014), others thought the president was simply taking advantage of
negative public sentiment against the Maritime Police and attempting to make it the scapegoat (Pyo, 2014; Shin,
*Correspondence to: J. Moon, Research Center for National Leadership,Seoul National University,Seoul, Korea.
E-mail: mtsophia7@gmail.com
public administration and development
Public Admin. Dev. 36, 144–156 (2016)
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.1757
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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