PREFABS: A STUDY IN POLICY‐MAKING
| Date | 01 December 1987 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1987.tb00672.x |
| Published date | 01 December 1987 |
| Author | OONAGH GAY |
PREFABS: A STUDY IN POLICY-MAKING
OONAGH
GAY
This article examines the administrative process which led to the constructirm of
160,000
prefabs between 1946 and 1948. The links of industrialists with government, the influence
of
Churchill, the rivalry between the key Ministries of
Works
and Health, and an influx
of enthusiasts
for
prefabrication into the administration, all had their part
to
play in the
adoption
of
the prefab programme. Implementation, however, involved unforeseen delays
and expense, and a major unintended consequence was a move against increased centraliza-
tion of public house-building. The prefab programme was one of the first examples
of
the dangers
of
relying on technology as a solution to housing shortage, but the manner
in which this badly planned and expensive panacea made its appearance also illustrates
how far policy-making in practice falls short
of
the ideal 'rational' model. Instead
of
choosing
between conflicting policy options the wartime government preferred to pursue a number
of them simultaneously.
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the general election Mrs Thatcher has declared the inner city
to be a major area of concern and some form of action is considered politically
necessary.
But
there are also suggestions that the solution of private sector-led
initiatives has been decided upon before the problem has been properly defined;
this is because the private sector is the answer the Government want to find. This
process has numerous antecedents, one of the most interesting being the develop-
ment of prefabrication as a solution to an expected housing crisis after the Second
World War. The birth of the prefab, set within the context of the development of
permanent prefabricated housing (also implemented in the late 1940s) bears fruitful
examination for students of both public housing and public policy formulation.
About
160,000
prefabs were actually built in Britain between 1945 and 1948.
A further
315,000
permanent houses were completed in that time by the public
sector, of which a substantial proportion were of non-traditional or prefabricated
design. Four main types
-
Arcon;Aluminium, Uniseco and Tarran
-
made up
90 per cent of the programme. They were intended to have a ten year life, but
in 1975, the latest date for which figures are available,
10,OOO
were still standing.
Varying
degrees of prefabrication were involved
in
the designs; the most advanced,
the Aluminium or
AIROH
bungalow, could be erected in 24 hours.
Oonagh Gay is a researcher specializing in housing.
Public Administration
Vol.
65
Winter 1987 (407-422)
C
Royal 1nsti:ute
of
Public Administration
ISSN
0033-3298
53.00
408
OONAGH
GAY
The adoption of prefabrication illustrates how technology can be used as a short-
cut to social change. Instead of a complete reorganization of the building industry
so
that it could face future challenges, the wartime administration adopted an
emergency solution -with the encouragement of leadmg industrialists and building
contractors
-
to what was perceived as a temporary problem. The whole episode
is an example of how wartime connections between government and industry
influenced a range of policy options.
The design of prefabs has particular interest in the history of public housing.
The literature often lacks an appreciation of the importance of design (Swenarton
1981).
The types of public houses chosen bear investigation because of the clues
they offer to underlying policy assumptions. For example, the lower standards of
1930s
housing compared to the early
1920s
were a physical assertion of government
belief in council housing as suitable only for ex-slum dwellers.
The impressive interiors of the prefabs, complete with luxury items such as
refrigerators, signalled that these dwellings were intended for a better class of people,
while the use
of
prefabrication underlined a commitment to technology as an
instrument of social change. The concept of prefabrication was to flourish again
(with disastrous consequences) in the
1960s
systems built blocks (Dunleavy
1981).
It is possible to see the roots of prefabricated high-rise programmes in both the
temporary and permanent prefabricated housing erected immediately post-war;
both were dominated by a small number
of
large firms grown powerful on war
contracts, who put forward their
own
systems of building instead of co-operating
to develop a series of standardized components
-
the most efficient use of
prefabrication as a building technique.
A
major result of the prefab programme was however unintended by all
involved; its administrative failure was a major factor in halting the trend towards
centralization in house-building. The delays and unforeseen expense it generated
seems to have thwarted the creation of a powerful central ministry to take over
local authority house-building. The prefabs were the first and last general-purpose
housing built directly by government.
The story of the prefab also has implications for the general field
of
public policy
formulation. The ideal model of policy-making postulates that a problem is first
well-researched, then defined carefully.
A
solution to the problem is eventually
found after rational consideration of the various options available. Banting has
examined a series of implementations of social policy proposals. His definition of
policy-making contains the foIlowing phrases: awareness, salience, definition of
the problem, specification of alternatives and choice (Banting
1979).
In practice,
this ideal is rarely attainable. This article attempts to describe in detail how a
particular policy came to be accepted in a way falling far short of the ideal model.
The process leading to the adoption
of
prefabs also illustrates Banting’s premise
that the making of public policy is both an intellectual activity and an institutional
process (Banting
1979,
p.
4).
Institutional realities exercise tight control over the
way new ideas penetrate government,
if
they penetrate at
all,
and how those ideas
are applied. Social policy can be seen as a continuous interaction of intellectual
and institutional change, but these processes run in different cycles, paced by
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