Preference vote and intra-party competition in open list PR systems
| Published date | 01 January 2020 |
| Date | 01 January 2020 |
| Author | Gisela Sin,José Antonio Cheibub |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629819893024 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2020, Vol.32(1) 70–95
ÓThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629819893024
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Preference vote and intra-
party competition in open list
PR systems
Jose
´Antonio Cheibub
Texas A&M University,College Station, TX, USA
Gisela Sin
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA
Abstract
Open list proportional representation (PR) systems require that candidates seek personal votes
in order to be successful. This feature of the system is considered to lead to intense competition
among co-partisans and, ultimately, to weak electoral and legislative parties, narrow public poli-
cies, localism, clientelism, and corruption. We examine the distribution of personal votes among
candidates from the same party for seven elections to the Brazilian national chamber of deputies
(1990–2014). These elections are widelyseen as hyper-competitive, particularly among candidates
from the same list. Yet, the patterns in the dataare not compatible with such a view. We find that
the level of overall competition is considerably lower than the absolute number of parties and
candidates competing would suggest. More significantly, we find that the number of viable candi-
dates within party lists is limited and that their votes are distributed in such away that indicates a
contained competition among co-partisansduring the election. These findings add to recent work
that builds a more nuanced view of ballot structure, competition, and personalism.
Keywords
Proportional representation; personal vote; open list PR; intra-party competition; electoral sys-
tems; elections in Brazil
Corresponding author:
Jose
´Antonio Cheibub, Texas A&M University, 2010 Allen Building,4348 TAMU,College Station, TX 77843,
USA.
Email: cheibub@tamu.edu
1. Introduction
Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems are based on the principle that
seats are first allocated to a collective entity: the party. In all cases, the party gains
seats in proportion to the share of votes it receives. However, PR systems differ in
the way parties allocate seats to individual candidates. In closed-list systems
(CLPR), parties rank candidates and voters cast a ballot for the party. The seats
are allocated to individual candidates according to their rank in the list the party
builds prior to the election. If the party receives nseats, the top ncandidates, as
ranked by the party, are those who win seats in the legislature. By contrast, in
open-list systems (OLPR), parties present a set of candidates running under their
label, but do not rank them prior to the election. Voters cast a ballot for an indi-
vidual candidate (a preference vote), and parties receive seats in proportion to the
sum of votes received by all the candidates running under their label. Seats are dis-
tributed to individual candidates according to the number of personal votes they
received. If the party receives nseats, the top ncandidates, as determined by the
number of votes they personally received, are those who win the legislative seats.
1
Scholars have claimed that because in CLPR systems voters cannot alter the
order of candidates the party presents, competition occurs among parties; candi-
dates’ attributes play little or no role in voters’ decisions. In contrast, it is argued,
in open-list systems competition is mostly among co-partisans and it is based on
candidates’ personal attributes. Although parties receive seats in proportion to
their votes, candidates within each party win seats because they obtain the highest
number of personal votes. For this reason, candidates emphasize their individual
attributes to make sure that one of the seats the party wins goes to them and not
to one of their co-partisans. Thus, scholars posit that competition in OLPR elec-
tions occurs not only among parties, but also among candidates.
2
In these systems,
elections are characterized by both inter- and intra-party competition.
We argue, in contrast, that lists in OLPR systems are composed in such a way as
to minimize the need for candidates from the same party to fight with one another
during the election. We suggest that intra-party competition in an OLPR system is
much more constrained than initially thought. We find this to be true especially for
small districts and for larger parties, where coordination is easier to achieve. For
larger districts, we find that coordination is more difficult to attain, although it is
not impossible.
Using data from elections for the Brazilian national Chamber of Deputies (CD),
which are universally seen as highly competitive and personalistic, we provide evi-
dence in support of the view that intra-party competition is significantly controlled.
Our analysis reveals that even in these most unlikely settings, intra-party competi-
tion is limited; many lists are carefully built so that competition among co-partisans
is significantly reduced as candidates seek votes.
This article is organized into five additional sections. In Section 2, we review
new literature on electoral systems to which this article is related. In Section 3, we
explain the basics of elections for the Brazilian CD. In Section 4, we analyze the
absolute number of candidates in party lists. We distinguish irrelevant candidates,
Cheibub and Sin 71
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