PRIME MINISTERS' DEPARTMENTS REALLY CREATE PROBLEMS: A REJOINDER TO PATRICK WELLER
| Date | 01 March 1983 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1983.tb00502.x |
| Published date | 01 March 1983 |
| Author | G. W. JONES |
PRIME MINISTERS’ DEPARTMENTS REALLY CREATE PROBLEMS:
A REIOINDER
TO
PATRICK WELLER
Apprehension about the consequences of establishing a prime minister’s
department in the UK arises from six kinds of evidence:
(1)
The voluminous literature on administrative and organizational theory about
the relationship between political control and bureaucracy, executive leadership,
spans
of
control, linkages between hierarchy and specialization, staff and line, the
behaviour and psychology of bureau officials, and inter-organizational
relationships.
(2)
The experience of the United Kingdom whenever assertive prime ministers
attempted to set up expanded staff units to serve only them, e.g. Lloyd George,
Neville Chamberlain, Winston Churchill and Harold Wilson.
(3)
Interviews with British civil servants and ministers about both current
arrangements and the implications of creating a prime minister’s department.
(4)
The experiences in the US of tensions between a large White House staff and
the agencies of the Executive Office of the Presidency with secretaries and their
departmental officials.
(5)
The experiences in West European countries
of
similar tensions between, on
the one hand, the staff serving presidents, prime ministers and the German
chancellor and, on the other, ministers and their officials.
(6)
The experiences of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, as
revealed in the literature on their respective governmental systems.
Prime
Minister
and
Cabinet
Whether the UK should establish a formal, structured and bureaucratic prime
minister’s department is a significant constitutional question.
If
one were to be set
up, a major constitutional change would have occurred, which is why the issue
is
so
hotly debated and
so
fiercely resisted. Those who advocate such a department
seek more than a trifling administrative alteration.
They wish to resha:e government to meet the needs
of
prime ministers who
want to intervene in detail in the policy process. Thus, the implication
of
their
proposal is to shift responsibility from ministers and the cabinet to the prime
minister. In our constitution, British government is ministerial government:
powers and duties are laid on ministers, not on the prime minister. They come
together in cabinet to resolve disputes between themselves and to determine a
common line. The prime minister’s task, amongst others,
is
to help the colleagues
reach agreement, to promote collegiality and a collective strategy. From time to
time prime ministers may try to push their own particular line, and are encouraged
to
do
so
by those who favour it; but such personal initiatives come up against the
constraints of cabinet government. The urging of the prime minister’s own policy
may hinder the achievement of a united cabinet. The logic of the British
Public
Administration
Vol.
61
Spring
1983
(79-84)
0
1983
Royal Institute
of
Public
Administration
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