Progrssive Regrimes, Partnerships and the Involvement of Local Communities: A Framework for Evaluation
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9299.00234 |
| Published date | 01 December 2000 |
| Author | Mike Smith,Mike Beazley |
| Date | 01 December 2000 |
PROGRESSIVE REGIMES, PARTNERSHIPS AND
THE INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES:
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION
MIKE SMITH AND MIKE BEAZLEY
This paper examines the nature of community involvement in urban politics as it
is played out through regeneration partnerships. At a theoretical level, it explores
the potential for a community dimension to local governance, that is, a strategic
influence for communities within local power structures. It is argued that the nature
of involvement can be explicated by considering three concepts: power (as
expressed by urban regime theory), participation and partnership. The paper
explores these three broad themes and then focuses on the particular issues per-
taining to community involvement in partnership working. Building on this frame-
work, the paper develops a model – a ‘wheel of involvement’ – for analysing the
effectiveness of community involvement in regeneration partnerships. This model
enables the effectiveness of involvement to be ‘quantified by the use of a simple
questionnaire survey. It provides a tool for academic researchers and practitioners
concerned with evaluating partnerships to begin to explore the quality and level of
community involvement in the process of urban renewal. The results of an analysis
of two regeneration partnerships are presented as an illustration of the efficacy of
the evaluative technique.
INTRODUCTION
The move to multi-sector partnerships as the vehicle for delivering urban
policy objectives has created the opportunity for greater community involve-
ment. This is reflected in the frequency with which capacity building and
empowerment appear in bids for regeneration funds. But what is the reality
behind the rhetoric of involvement? Does greater community involvement
afford the scope for an impact on strategic decision making – a community
coalition or regime – or is partnership making merely a pragmatic response
to budgetary constraint by local policy makers? This paper develops a model
for measuring community involvement in regeneration partnerships by
drawing on three debates. It begins by exploring the explanations of com-
munity involvement to be found in urban regime theory and goes on to
consider the quality and level of involvement expounded by ideas of partici-
pation and partnership. This paper develops a survey technique by focusing
on selected literature relating to community partnerships, then distilling and
operationalizing the three concepts. The technique is then used to analyse
two regeneration partnerships and the results presented. The model provides
Mike Smith and Mike Beazley are in the School of Public Policy at the University of Birmingham.
Public Administration Vol. 78 No. 4, 2000 (855–878)
Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2000, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street,
Malden, MA 02148, USA.
856 MIKE SMITH AND MIKE BEAZLEY
a comparative tool for academic researchers and practitioners concerned with
evaluating partnerships to begin exploring the quality and level of com-
munity involvement in the process of urban regeneration.
THE CONTEXT FOR COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT I: POWER
STRUCTURES
Urban regime theory
Urban regime theory (URT), writes DiGaetano (1997, p. 846), ‘was
developed to explicate the nature of local power structures and their impor-
tance for political decision making’. URT developed, originally, in the
United States through longitudinal studies of decision-making hegemonies
in cities (perhaps most notably those of Stone and Sanders (1987), Stone
(1989) and Elkin (1987)). The theory is an attempt to explain the processes
of city governance that are said (Stoker 1995) to lie outside the scope of
pluralist or e
´litist traditions. It is no longer enough to identify a ruling e
´lite
or to prove the instability of a ruling e
´lite, today’s decision-making
coalition – its regime – is broadly based, and, moreover, offers long-term
stability. That is not to say that e
´lites do not exist or that some groups are
not advantaged in the resources and capabilities they can exert. As Elkin
(1987, p. 100) points out: ‘ The battlefield of city politics is not flat but is
tilted toward an alliance of public officials and land interests’. It is merely
that the complex environment in which the government of city space is
conducted requires the building of a capacity to govern which will of
necessity include a range of interests and actors.
In interpreting the use of political power, URT moves away from the
idea of power as a coercive force to its role in social production – the power
to get things done rather than the power of coercion. The concept of power
as it relates to regime theory takes a number of differing forms (Stoker
1995, pp. 64–6; DiGaetano 1997, pp. 846–7).
The context in which this theory has developed, however, is problematic
when seeking to apply it more generally. The theory is sensitive to the
institutional context in which it is applied; in the US, this may be oriented
toward certain outcomes which, at first glance, are not replicated in the
UK. At the heart of regime theory is the assertion that while constrained,
governing coalitions carve out a capacity for effective action. Of course, it
may be the case that private interests with greater access to resources have
an advantage here, but Stone argues that ‘systemic’ advantage does not
necessarily translate into effective regime formation (Stone 1989, p. xi).
Indeed, the theory does not exclude the notion of the community as a part-
ner in coalition building. Nevertheless, it is more usual for private sector
interests to be players in city governance: ‘land interests in coalition with
growth-oriented politicians dominate the agenda of city politics’
(Swanstrom 1988).
The involvement of communities within a governing coalition is not
ruled out by traditional regime theory. There have been numerous
Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2000
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