Public opinion and conflict in the separation of powers: Understanding the Honduran coup of 2009
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629812453216 |
| Date | 01 January 2013 |
| Published date | 01 January 2013 |
| Author | Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson,Joseph Daniel Ura |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Public opinion and conflict in
the separation of powers:
Understanding the Honduran
coup of 2009
Journal of Theoretical Politics
25(1) 105–127
©The Author(s) 2012
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DOI:10.1177/0951629812453216
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Michelle M.Taylor-Robinson
Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, USA
Joseph Daniel Ura
Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, USA
Abstract
Formal constitutional systems of separated powers often fail to sustain meaningful systems of
checks and balances in presidential-style democracies. What conditions support balance in the
separation of powers and what conditions provoke instability and conflict? We draw on Madis-
onian political theory and research addressing the separation of powers in the United States to
develop a game theoretical model of inter-institutional stability and conflict within a separation
of powers system. Two factors emerge as catalysts for institutional instability and conflict among
the branches of government: high-stakes institutional rivalry combined with uncertainty about
the public’s relative support for various branches of government. We apply the model to the
experience of Honduras in 2008–2009 that resulted in the coup ousting President Zelaya which
illustrates the difficulty of developing credible checks and balances.
Keywords
checks and balances; consolidation of democracy; Honduras; separation of powers
Introduction
While presidential democracies are synonymous with constitutional arrangements that
create multiple branches of government that have formal powers to check each other,
actual governance is often dominated by the executive with few effective checks and
little actual balance. Empowering multiple governmental agents requires ‘institutional
Corresponding author:
Michelle M.Taylor-Robinson, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, 4348 TAMU, College
Station, TX 77843-4348, USA.
Email: m-taylor11@pols.tamu.edu
106 Journal of Theoretical Politics 25(1)
emergence’, that is, the development of governing practices and norms after formal insti-
tutions are elaborated in a written constitution (Knight and Epstein, 1996; Chavez et al.,
2011). Although institutional emergence may be erratic, once an institutional practice is
established it often prevails for manyyears. For example, the practice of judicial review in
the United States is not supported by specific constitutional texts; rather, judicial review
gradually emerged as a result of strategic choices made by Supreme Court justices, pres-
idents, and members of Congress (see, e.g., Knight and Epstein, 1996; Kramer, 2004;
Burns, 2009; Friedman, 2009).
Yet, the institutional emergence of stable separation of powers systems is not
inevitable. Repeated experiences in Latin America and elsewhere demonstrate the dif-
ficulties of developing effective and sustainable checks and balances among branches of
government, particularly checks on the powerof the president (Hochstetler, 2006; Pérez-
Liñán, 2007; Helmke, 2010; Castagnola and Pérez-Liñán, 2011). The histories of many
presidential-style democracies are marked by either the intense concentration of power
in the executive branch of government or open conflict between branches of government,
sometimes escalating to violent confrontations. The contrast among the practice of stable
and effective checks and balances, the development of imperial presidencies, and out-
right conflict between branches of government indicates a critical question for scholars
of democratic development and the separation of powers: What conditions support the
institutional emergence of balanced separation of powers systems?
The importance of this question continues to bear on contemporary political develop-
ments. On 28 June 2009, Honduras received the world’s attention whenPresident Manuel
Zelaya was arrested by the military and removedto Costa Rica. The international commu-
nity condemned Zelaya’s ousting as a threat to democracy and a portent of a return to the
military rule that marked Latin American politics before the Third Wave of democracy.
However, closer examination indicates that the crisis was not an attempt by the military
to take control of the government, but rather evolved from efforts to establish norms of
inter-institutional checks and balances as part of the ongoing consolidation of democracy.
Honduras in 2008–2009 actually has much in common with struggles to establish effec-
tive checks and balances in the early nineteenth-century United States where establishing
a norm of other branches being able to check the president was risky and uncertain at the
time. As such, Honduras is only the most recent example of the challenges of political
development in separation of powers political systems, raising the question: Why did the
Honduran separation of powers devolve into conflict between the branches of government
and ultimately the ousting of the president rather than operating within the boundaries of
constitutional checks and balances or acquiescing to expanded executive authority?1
We arguethat the answers to our general question about the dynamics of institutional
emergence and our question about the course of events in Honduras in 2009 are inter-
twined. In this paper we seek to develop an explanation for why checks and balances will
develop to rein in a presidential executive or why presidents are willing to risk escalating
conflict with the court or congress. Drawing on Madisonian political theory and research
addressing the separation of powers in the United States, we develop a simple game the-
oretical model of inter-institutional stability and conflict within a separation of powers
system that emphasizes the role of the interplay between high-stakes institutional rivalry
and public opinion in creating or undermining checks and balances. In particular, the
premises ‘that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority
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