R Christopher Rojas v Snaresbrook Crown Court
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MR JUSTICE HOLMAN |
| Judgment Date | 08 December 2011 |
| Neutral Citation | [2011] EWHC 3569 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | CO/11825/2011 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 08 December 2011 |
[2011] EWHC 3569 (Admin)
Mr Justice Holman
CO/11825/2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Mr H Blake-James (instructed by Bailey Nicholson Grayson) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
Mr S Hadley (instructed by CPS) appeared on behalf of the Interested Party
(As approved)
Subject to anything you may say Mr Blake-James or Mr Hadley, I will make an order in these terms:
Upon hearing counsel on behalf of the claimant and the CPS as interested party and upon the claimant's father, Jorge Rojas, personally undertaking to the court, on affirmation, that: (i) he will stand surety in the sum of £500 and personally inform the Snaresbrook Crown Court forthwith if the claimant breaches any conditions of bail; and
(ii) he will personally drive the claimant to Snaresbrook Crown Court on 9 January 2012, or whenever the date of sentence is fixed, and ensure his timely attendance for sentence.
So on those preambles it is ordered that:
(i) permission to apply for judicial review is granted;
(ii) the claim for judicial review is allowed;
(iii) the decision of the Snaresbrook Crown Court on 24 November 2011 not further to grant bail is set aside;
(iv) bail must forthwith be granted to Christopher Rojas upon the conditions in the schedule to this order. Are there any ways in which you propose amending or adding to that draft Mr Blake-James?
No my Lord.
Mr Hadley?
No my Lord.
I am going to ask then, when I have given a short judgment and risen, Mr Blake-James, you will liaise with the Associate, so as to get this fully and correctly typed up and drawn as rapidly as possible. If you have, as you appear to have, a laptop here, it may be that you can best type it out and email it to her address or something like that. But that is really up to you. He will not get bail, clearly will not be released until there is a sealed order of the court, communicated in whatever is the required form, to where he is being held. So it is down to you once I have finished it.
This is an application by Christopher Rojas for permission to apply for judicial review and, if permission is granted, for judicial review of a decision by a circuit judge sitting in the Snaresbrook Crown Court on 24 November 2011 to withdraw the bail which had previously been granted to him.
I wish to stress at the very outset of this judgment that, since statutory changes in 2003, the circumstances in which this court, that is, the High Court, can consider bail are now very limited and circumscribed. The only context or framework in which it can still give consideration to bail is that of judicial review on normal judicial review criteria; but many authorities, and in particular the judgment of Maurice Kay LJ in the well-known authority of M v Isleworth Crown Court [2005] EWHC 363 (Admin) all stress that this court must be very sparing before it interferes with any decision within the Criminal Justice System with regard to bail. As has been said, this court must adopt a robust approach.
That said, a stream of authorities clearly establishes that in certain limited circumstances this court can still, within judicial review, set aside a decision in relation to bail, and in even more limited circumstances, as I will later describe, substitute a decision of its own.
The essential background to this matter is that, on 25th May 2011, an affray took place in the vicinity of the exit doors to Waltham Forest Magistrates' Court. This claimant, Christopher Rojas, was one of the young people involved. He and others were clearly arrested at the scene, and the criminal process was underway effectively from the very moment that the offence was committed. At that time this claimant was still aged 16. He became 17 during September 2011. His trial took place in mid November 2011, less than a month ago, at a time when he was aged approximately 17 years and 2 months. At all times between the date of the offence, 25 May, and the date of the decision now challenged, namely 24 November, he was on conditional bail. The conditions were, in summary, first, not to go at all to Waltham Forest Magistrates' Court, second, not to contact the four co-defendants, and third, a home curfew between 10.00 pm and 6.00 am, with a doorstep condition.
The CPS are represented before me today as interested party by Mr Steven Hadley, who was also counsel throughout the trial to which I will shortly refer. I understand from Mr Hugh Blake-James, who appears as counsel on behalf of the claimant, that there is no suggestion of any breach of any of those conditions at any time in the period between 25 May and 24 November and Mr Hadley confirms that to be the case, so far as the prosecution are aware.
The trial apparently lasted about 7 days. There were initially five defendants including this claimant. After several hours of deliberation, the jury returned unanimous verdicts of guilty of affray in relation to this claimant and one other defendant.
At that point the judge gave a majority direction to the jury in relation to the three remaining defendants, in relation to whom they had not at that point been able to reach unanimous verdicts. The jury then retired to continue their deliberation in relation to those three defendants. As I understand it, although not material to what I now have to decide, the remaining three defendants were thereafter acquitted.
Immediately after the jury had retired, following the majority direction, the following event took place. I read now from paragraph 13 of the advice in relation to judicial review, drafted by Mr Blake James, dated 28th November 2011. He was, counsel at trial on behalf of the claimant. He says in paragraph 13:
"Immediately after the majority direction had been given, and the jury had retired once more, the judge simply stated to Christopher Rojas: 'a custodial sentence is inevitable—you will be remanded into custody'. I [that is, Mr Blake-James] indicated to the judge that I would seek to persuade otherwise, to which the answer was 'no'. The learned judge had clearly made up his mind and it was clear that further argument was neither invited nor welcome."
I do not have available to me any transcript or other contemporary record of those events. However, as I have said, Mr Steven Hadley was present then and is also present now, on behalf of the CPS. He expressly confirms that that passage by Mr Blake-James is a fair and indeed full account of that brief but significant event. I asked Mr Hadley whether at any stage during those recorded exchanges the judge had invited him, on behalf of the Crown, to express any view as to whether bail should now continue or be withdrawn. Mr Hadley says that the judge did not invite him to do so but, somewhat to my surprise, that it is not the practice in the Crown Court for judges ever to consult or ascertain the views of the Crown before making decisions with regard to bail, at any rate after conviction and before sentence.
So, it is that decision, which has had the effect that between then and now the claimant has been detained in Feltham Young Offender Institution, that he seeks to challenge by this claim for judicial review.
To my mind the claim is clearly arguable and so, as a first decision, I grant permission to apply for judicial review. Following the approach adopted in a number of authorities, I immediately proceed to consider the substantive judicial review.
Section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 provides at subsection (1):
"(1)A person to whom this section applies shall be granted bail except as provided in Schedule 1 to this Act."
I note the mandatory word "shall". By subsection (4), section 4 does apply to a person, which was the position of this claimant at the material time, who has been convicted of an offence and whose case is adjourned by the court for the purpose of enabling enquiries or a report to be made to assist the court in dealing with him for the offence.
So, one turns next to Schedule 1. Paragraph 2 of schedule 1 to the Act provides that:
"2.(1) The defendant need not be granted bail if the court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the defendant, if released on bail (whether subject to conditions or not) would -
(a)fail to surrender to custody, or
(b)commit an offence while on bail, or
(c)interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, whether in relation to himself or any other person."
Although there is no reason to suppose that the judge had it in mind in the present case, I mention also paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 which provides that:
"The defendant need not be granted bail if the court is satisfied that the defendant should be kept in custody for his own protection or, if he is a child or young person, for his own welfare."
So the judge could only lawfully not grant bail if he was satisfied that that there were substantial grounds for believing that one or more of conditions (a), (b) or (c) applied. One then reverts to section 5 of the Act itself. Section 5(3) provides:
"Where a magistrates' court or the Crown Court—
(a)withholds bail in criminal proceedings…and does so in relation to a person to whom section 4 of this Act applies [and the claimant was such a person], then the court shall… give reasons for withholding bail or for imposing or varying the conditions."
There was clearly,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
R Uddin v Crown Court at Leeds
...Crown Court [2010] EWHC 723 (Admin), R (on application of) NB v Central Criminal Court [2010] EWHC 667 (Admin) and R (on the application of) Rojas v Snaresbrook Crown Court [2011] EWHC 3569 (Admin). 22 In Shergill Collins J described the law as of 2005 as not being in a happy state in relat......
-
R Iqbal v The Crown Court at Canterbury
...without giving any proper reasons for doing so. 22 Reference is made to R (on the application of Rojas) v Snaresbrook Crown Court [2011] EWHC 3569 (Admin) (“ Rojas”) (at [21]), where the statutory duty to give reasons for removing bail which had previously been granted was emphasised Whils......
-
Farhia Ali v Crown Court at Kingston
...the authorities do not assist Mrs Antenen's case. Her case depended very much on the decision of Holman J in R (on the application of Rojas) v Snaresbrook Crown Court [2011] EWHC 3569 (Admin). If that case is correctly decided, it does at least afford some support to Mrs Antenen's contentio......
-
The King (on the application of Shafaquat Afzal Hussain) v Crown Court at Leeds
...protection against any risks of absconding or failure to surrender to bail” (§11). In R (Rojas) v Snaresbrook Crown Court [2011] EWHC 3569 (Admin), judicial review (again of a refusal of bail) succeeded. There too the reasons were inadequate in legal terms. In Rojas the remedy went further......