R Hunt v London Borough of Hackney
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Michael Fordham |
| Judgment Date | 18 September 2014 |
| Neutral Citation | [2014] EWHC 3510 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 18 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | CO/4029/2014 |
[2014] EWHC 3510 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Michael Fordham QC
(Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
CO/4029/2014
Ms S Luh (instructed by Hansen Palomares) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
Mr T Amraoui (instructed by Browne Jacobson) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
THE DEPUTY JUDGE: This is a claim for Judicial Review in which the Claimant seeks both permission for Judicial Review and interim relief. I was invited by the Defendant, the London Borough of Hackney, to deal today with both issues, permission and interim relief, and I will do so.
The Judicial Review itself is about an interim position. The circumstances are that, when requested to do so, the Defendant council agreed to undertake a needs assessment under section 17 of the Children Act 1989 in relation to the Claimant as a putative child in need. The dispute is about how the council itself dealt with the interim position pending that assessment. I am told by Mr Amraoui for Hackney that the envisaged timeframe is that the needs assessment ought to be completed by 27 October 2014 and could, depending on the circumstances, be completed before that.
What the council agreed on 27 August 2014 to do was offer the Claimant and her baby, pending that assessment, bed and breakfast accommodation in Southend and what I will call a "subsistence allowance", at that time £30 a week, subsequently increased to £32.52 a week.
The matter has been before Kenneth Parker J, who refused urgent interim relief on 27 August and HHJ Alice Robinson on the 11th of this month, who adjourned it to today. The application for interim relief is for an order directing the provision of accommodation in the London area, if possible in Hackney, pending a needs assessment and directing that the financial support be at a level no less than £80.78 a week, that being a comparator taken from the world of asylum seekers and family financial support.
I have been greatly assisted by the written and oral submissions by Ms Luh for the Claimant and Mr Amraoui for the Defendant. The order that I have decided to make is as follows.
I grant permission for Judicial Review. I will direct that within seven days of today, that is 4.00 pm on 25 September, the Defendant shall file and serve a witness statement explaining the consideration given by it, by then, to the questions of the suitability of Southend as a location in the light of the circumstances of the Claimant's case, explaining the position as to what alternatives are and have been available for accommodating the Claimant elsewhere, and explaining what further consideration has been given to the level of the subsistence allowance in the light of the concerns which have been raised.
I further direct that the Claimant is to have liberty to apply, in writing on notice, to make any application in the light of that witness statement for an interim order. The Defendant is to have 48 hours to respond to any such application. The application is to be put in the first instance to a judge on the papers.
I also direct that the parties also have liberty to apply for further or other directions.
That is the order that I propose to make and I shall give the reasons now why I am making that order and not making any further or other order.
Permission for Judicial Review is appropriate, in my judgment, because it is properly arguable that the Defendant council has not discharged its public law obligations in relation to the interim arrangements in the circumstances of this case. That is notwithstanding, as Mr Amraoui has emphasised in his submissions: that the Defendant is the primary decision-maker charged with the exercise of judgment in a very difficult decision-making context of competing demands; that it was addressing as an emergency the interim position prior to any recognition as to whether the child in this case is a child in need; that the claimant was putting herself forward as destitute and facing street homelessness; and that the defendant was acting, moreover, to address her position in what was always intended to be the short term.
Notwithstanding all of those and the other considerations of which I have been reminded, it is in my judgment arguable: that the Defendant has failed to address the relevant question of the suitability of Southend as a geographical location in the light of the Claimant's particular circumstances; and that that failure vitiates the action it has taken in law.
Further, in my judgment it is arguable that the Defendant council has failed to take account of legally relevant features of the Claimant's circumstances and needs, in adopting its focus on particular types of need for the purposes of calculating the subsistence allowance.
Further, the geography and cash are, in my judgment, linked in that it is arguable that the level of the subsistence allowance gave rise to special considerations when viewed alongside the offer of accommodation in Southend, given the circumstances of the Claimant and her support network in Hackney.
The geography together with the level of allowance, in my judgment, give rise to a package of isolation which is arguably contrary to law. The practicalities can be readily appreciated from reading the materials put forward on the Claimant's behalf as to her circumstances and those of the others who have helped her and continue to help her so that she and her young baby can stay among friends and supporters, notwithstanding the very difficult circumstances to which that gives rise for them all. The practicalities can also be tested by considering matters such as the need for travel in order to obtain food, the limitations, even from the perspective of basic provision for a baby in the assessment that has been made and the special considerations of travel and communications where it is being suggested that the Claimant ought to move with her baby to Southend at the time when the important assessment of needs is taking place and in circumstances where that would take her away from the framework of support to which I have referred.
I emphasise and fully accept that I am not the primary decision-maker in this case. It is not my role, whether on a substantive hearing or an interim relief hearing, to arrogate to myself the function of decision-making entrusted to local authorities.
I am not prepared to go further than the order that I have identified.
In my judgment, the arguability of this case and all the circumstances as they stand before me do not justify the court in either directing the immediate provision of accommodation in a particular place or directing subsistence at a particular level. It has often been said that the relationship between public authorities and the courts in the area of public law is one of partnership in which there is a respect for the division of labour between the primary decision-maker and the supervisory court. It is in that spirit that I have sought to approach the anxious problems that arise in this case.
I have been told by Mr Amraoui today, on instructions, that bed and breakfast accommodation in Southend was the only accommodation available at short notice at the time, that is to say 27 August. He also tells me on instructions that that has remained the only accommodation available and remains today the only accommodation available.
I can understand, in the light of previous comments made about the voluminous materials put forward in this case, why there has not been witness evidence submitted by the council, but the...
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