R Obih v Secretary of State for the Home Department
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice King |
| Judgment Date | 08 June 2016 |
| Neutral Citation | [2016] EWHC 2711 (Admin) |
| Date | 08 June 2016 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO/1714/2016 |
[2016] EWHC 2711 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice King
CO/1714/2016
Mr M Biggs (instructed by Dylan Conrad Kreolle Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
Mr A Byass (instructed by the Government Legal Department) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
This is a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. What is under challenge is the lawfulness of the claimant's detention under the immigration powers of the Secretary of State. That immigration detention began on 17 January 2016. Today it is 8 June 2016. That is less than 5 months. It is agreed that the principles to be applied are those set out in the well known case of Hardial Singh as developed further in the judgment of Dyson LJ in R (I) v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 888 and Toulson LJ in R (A) v SSHD and Richards LJ in R (MH) v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 1112. There is no suggestion here that the period of time which has elapsed is in itself unreasonable. It is not suggested that the power of detention was initially wrongly exercised.
The background to the case is that the claimant was made the subject of a deportation order on 18 November 2015. This was under the automatic provisions of the Borders Act 2007 and was consequent upon his being convicted on 13 April 2015 of 3 offences in Harrow Crown Court for which he received a total sentence of 2 and a half years in prison. The offences included 3 counts of making threats to kill a person.
The principle being relied upon on behalf of the claimant by Mr Biggs is the Hardial Singh principle that if it becomes apparent to the Secretary of State that she is not going to be able to operate the machinery in the Act to remove a person intended to be deported, within a reasonable period it would be wrong for the Secretary of State to exercise or to continue to exercise that power of detention. Again, Dyson LJ in I said the deportee may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances. If before the expiry of a reasonable period it becomes apparent the Secretary of State will not be able to effect deportation within that reasonable period, she should not seek to exercise the power of detention.
The issue before me is whether it is arguable that there is not here a sufficient prospect of the Home Secretary being able to effect the deportation within a reasonable time, to warrant the continuing detention of this claimant.
As with Ouseley J, I regard this claim to be unarguable. The only thing standing between the claimant's deportation in the immediate future is the need to obtain a travel document from the Nigerian authorities and/or the determination by the Court of Appeal of an application by the claimant for permission to appeal a decision of the Upper Tribunal of Judge Jordan who had refused an application for permission to challenge the deportation order on human rights grounds and had certified it totally without merit.
I have looked at the decision of the Upper Tribunal Judge Jordan. I have looked at the grounds...
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