R (Pluckrose) v Snarebrook Crown Court

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLORD JUSTICE PILL,MR JUSTICE CRANSTON
Judgment Date09 June 2009
Neutral Citation[2009] EWHC 1506 (Admin)
Date09 June 2009
CourtQueen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
Docket NumberCO/3590/2008

[2009] EWHC 1506 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

DIVISIONAL COURT

Before: Lord Justice Pill

Mr Justice Cranston

CO/3590/2008

Between
David Pluckrose
Claimant
and
Snaresbrook Crown Court
Defendant

Mr Stuart Frame (instructed by Messrs Horwich, Cohen, Coghlan) appeared on behalf of the Claimant

Mr Piers Wauchope (instructed by CPS) attended to assist the court

LORD JUSTICE PILL
1

Cranston J will give the first judgment.

MR JUSTICE CRANSTON
2

This is an application for judicial review, where the claimant challenges the decision of the Crown Court at Snaresbrook not to award costs in his favour.

Background

3

The facts were that, on 30 November 2007, the claimant had pleaded guilty at the Magistrates' Court at Barking to an offence of contravening a red traffic light signal, contrary to section 36 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The magistrates fined him £60, ordered him to pay a £15 victim surcharge, and endorsed his licence with three penalty points. The upshot of that was that the claimant then had 12 penalty points on his licence and, under the legislative scheme, he was liable for disqualification from driving.

4

The claimant argued that to be disqualified would be exceptional hardship. Notwithstanding his representations, the magistrates decided that he should be disqualified from driving for a period of six months. Before the magistrates, the claimant was not legally represented.

5

Pursuant to section 108 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, the claimant appealed against his sentence to the Crown Court, and in particular against the decision to disqualify him from driving. That appeal was heard in February 2008 at Snaresbrook Crown Court before Ms Recorder G Amakiye and two lay justices, Mrs Hassell and Mrs Ash. At this point, the claimant was legally represented by Mr Stuart Frame, who appears on his behalf before us today.

6

The claimant submitted that the disqualification would cause exceptional hardship. He gave evidence to that effect. He contended that he needed his licence to pick up his children; that his wife was not able to drive; but in particular, that he was a black cab driver. The consequence of the disqualification was that he would not be able to earn his living. After hearing his case the court decided that his appeal against sentence should be allowed. The £60 fine and the £15 victim surcharge remained, but the disqualification was removed.

7

At the end of the hearing, Mr Frame, on behalf of the claimant, applied for costs. The learned Recorder refused. She said that no exact figure had been provided. Mr Frame responded by saying that no figure for costs was available, but that the application was for costs to be assessed. Mr Frame persisted with the application, and the learned Recorder again refused, saying that the claimant had pleaded guilty in the court below. In response to that, Mr Frame said that the appeal was in relation to sentence, not in relation to conviction. The learned Recorder reiterated that the court was refusing to award the claimant the costs of the appeal from central funds. No further explanation was given.

The law

8

The law relevant to this case turns partly on section 35 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Sub-section (1) of section 35 provides that, in cases where a person has been convicted of an offence involving obligatory or discretionary disqualification, and the penalty points to be taken into account number 12 or more, the court must order him to be disqualified for not less than the minimum period “unless the court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that there are grounds for mitigating the normal consequences of the conviction and thinks fit to order him to be disqualified for a shorter period or not to order him to be disqualified”. Section 35(4)(b) provides:

“(4) No account is to be taken under subsection (1) above of any of the following circumstances—

(b) hardship, other than exceptional hardship …”

9

The other relevant area of law relates to costs before the Crown Court. Section 16 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 provides in sub-section (3) that where a person is convicted of an offence by the magistrates and appeals to the Crown Court under section 108 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, and in consequence a less severe punishment is awarded, “the Crown Court may make a defendant's costs order in favour of the accused”. In addition, sub-section (9)(b) of section 16 provides that the amount to be paid out of central funds in pursuance of a defendant's costs order may be specified in the order if the person agrees, or may be determined in accordance with regulations.

10

No indication is given in the statute itself as to how the discretion in section 16(3) is to be exercised. However, the Practice Direction on Costs in Criminal Proceedings of 18 May 2004 contains a guide to discretion in II.2.1:

“Where a person is not tried for an offence for which he has been indicted, or in respect of which proceedings against him have been sent for trial or transferred for trial, or has been acquitted on any count in the indictment, the court may make a

defendant's costs order in his favour. Such an order should normally be made whether or not an order for costs between the parties is made, unless there are

positive reasons for not doing so. For example, where the defendant's own conduct has brought suspicion on himself and has misled the prosecution into thinking that the case against him was stronger than it was, the defendant can be left to pay his

own costs. The court when declining to make a costs order should explain, in open court, that the reason for not making an order does not involve any suggestion that the defendant is guilty of any criminal conduct but the order is refused because of the positive reason that should be identified.”

11

The Practice Direction reflects the jurisprudence. The leading authority is Cunningham v Exeter Crown Court [2003]...

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