R (South West Yorkshire Mental Health NHS Trust) v Bradford Crown Court

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLord Justice Pill,Lord Justice Chadwick,Lord Justice May
Judgment Date19 December 2003
Neutral Citation[2003] EWCA Civ 1857
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Date19 December 2003
Docket NumberCase No: C3/2003/0969

[2003] EWCA Civ 1857

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM HIS HONOUR JUDGE NEWMAN

AT BRADFORD CROWN COURT

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand,

London, WC2A 2LL

Before:

Lord Justice Pill

Lord Justice Chadwick and

Lord Justice May

Case No: C3/2003/0969

Between:
The Queen on the Application of South west Yorkshire Mental Health Nhs Trust
Claimant/Respondent
and
Crown Court At Bradford
Defendant/Respondent
and
"A"
Interested Party/Appellant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Interested Party/Respondent

MR K GLEDHILL (instructed by Switalski's, Wakefield WF1 2TF) for the Appellant

MISS K STERN (instructed by Hempsons, Harrogate HG1 1DY)

for the Trust

MR D PERRY (instructed by Treasury Solicitor) for the Crown Court and the Secretary of State

Lord Justice Pill
1

This is an appeal by Mr A ("the appellant") against a judgment of Newman J given on 27 March 2003 whereby he quashed an order of Goldring J dated 28 February 2001 made in the Bradford Crown Court ("the Crown Court"). Newman J ordered that the matter be remitted to the Crown Court and that the quashing order should not take effect until a judge of that court was seized of the matter at a hearing to deal with the remission. Newman J further ordered that the judge at the Crown Court "shall then make the proper order under Section 3 and 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 as amended by the Criminal Procedures (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991." Newman J refused permission to appeal and an application for certification of a point of law of general public importance.

2

Newman J made the order on the application of South West Yorkshire Mental Health NHS Trust ("the respondents"). The appellant appeared as an interested party to oppose the application. The Secretary of State for the Home Department ("the Secretary of State"), now jointly represented with the Crown Court, supported the application of the respondents to the court and both parties now submit that this court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal and, alternatively, that the appeal should be dismissed.

3

On 27 February 2001, A appeared before Goldring J at the Crown Court charged with the murder of his sister-in-law. The medical evidence was that A was suffering from paranoid psychosis characterised by persecutory delusions and hallucinations and that such illness was a mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983 ("the 1983 Act"). The procedure under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 ("the 1964 Act"), as amended by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 ("the 1991 Act"), was then followed. A jury was empanelled under Section 4 of the Act to determine the question of fitness to be tried. Upon a finding that the appellant was unfit to stand trial, a jury was empanelled, under Section 4A, to determine whether they were satisfied, as respects the count on which the accused was to be tried, that he did the act or omission charged against him as the offence. The jury concluded that the appellant did the act charged against him as the offence.

4

The question then arose as to what order Goldring J should make. It is now common ground that, in the circumstances, he was required to make an order under Section 5 (2) (a) of the 1964 Act, as amended. It provides that:

"……. the court shall ….. –

a) make an order that the accused be admitted, in accordance with the provisions of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, to such hospital as may be specified by the Secretary of State;…."

An alternative course under Section 5 (2) (b) was not available because the findings of the jury related to an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law (Section 5 (3)).

5

It was, however, submitted by leading counsel on behalf of A:

"Now, my Lord, the only qualifications to this that I have been able to discern are first of all that I take your Lordship, please, to page 756 of Archbold ……… and to the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 section 47. Now this appears to me to enable your Lordship to specify the hospital to which the defendant can go. Because under section 47, where there is a power, as here, under 47 (i) (d) you have the power to specify the hospital unit where he should go to. In other words Parliament is giving the judge who has heard the case the power to send to the hospital that he, no doubt on the evidence which he has heard, thinks is appropriate. So, in other words, it is a substitution of the Secretary of State's power as I understand it.

And so your Lordship can in fact – if you go back to my note – you can in fact direct, if your think it right, that the defendant should be taken forthwith to the Newton Lodge Regional Secure Unit.

Of course, thereafter, if for example the Secretary of State, in consultation with the doctors, should decide that the defendant should go somewhere else, there are other provisions, as I understand it, which will enable his transfer within the system, but that at least gives your Lordship the power."

Counsel for the prosecution did not dissent from that view.

6

Having been informed that there was a bed for A at the Secure Unit, Goldring J stated:

"As I observed when speaking to the jury, it is a very sad case. I am going to make the only order that I can in the circumstances, I order that you be admitted to a hospital – I am going to specify that hospital, it is Newton Lodge Regional Secure Unit in Wakefield – where a bed is immediately available and I order that you be conveyed there immediately.

This addition to the order for admission is without limit of time and there is also a Restriction Order, again without limit of time."

7

Schedule 1 to the 1991 Act, headed "Orders for Admission to Hospital" specifies the effect of an admission order under section 5 of the 1964 Act. It provides in paragraph 1(1) that the order shall be sufficient authority for any person acting under the authority of the Secretary of State to take the person to whom the order relates and convey him at any time within the relevant period to the hospital specified by the Secretary of State. The relevant period for present purposes was one of two months beginning with the date on which the order was made (para.1 (4)). Paragraph 1 (3) provides:

"Where a person is admitted within the relevant period to the hospital specified by the Secretary of State, the admission order shall be sufficient authority for the managers to detain him in accordance with the provisions of the 1983 Act referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 below, as those provisions apply by virtue of those paragraphs." [paragraph 3 is not material in the present case]

8

Paragraph 2 of the schedule provides:

"(1) A person who is admitted to a hospital in pursuance of an admission order made otherwise than under section 14A of the 1968 Act shall be treated for the purposes of the 1983 Act

(a) as if he had been so admitted in pursuance of a hospital order within the meaning of that Act made on the date of the admission order; and

(b) if the court so directs, as if an order restricting his discharge had been made under section 41 of that Act, either without limitation of time or during such period as may be specified in the direction.

(2) Where the offence to which the special verdict, findings or appeal relates is an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law, the court shall give a direction under sub-paragraph (1) (b) above without specifying any period."

The special restrictions applicable to a patient in respect of whom a restriction order under Section 41 is in force are substantial and the consent of the Secretary of State is required if certain powers otherwise available under the 1983 Act are to be exercised.

9

For completeness, I refer to paragraph 1 (2). It provides that the court by which any such order is made may give such directions as it thinks fit for the conveyance of a person to whom the order relates to a place of safety and his detention there pending his admission to hospital within the relevant period.

10

Paragraph 4 (1) provides:

"(1) If, while a person is detained in pursuance of an admission order made by virtue of section 5 (1) (b) of the 1964 Act (findings of unfitness to plead etc.), the Secretary of State, after consultation with the responsible medical officer, is satisfied that that person can properly be tried, the Secretary of State may remit that person for trial either –

(a) to the court of trial; or

(b) to a prison; or

(c) to a remand centre provided under section 43 of the Prison Act 1952;

and on his arrival at the court, prison or remand centre, the

order shall cease to have effect."

11

It is common ground, that, unfortunately, the judge was led into error by the reference to section 47 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 which does not confer the power suggested by counsel. In the circumstances which existed, the court was obliged to make an admission order under section 5 (2) (a) of the 1964 Act, as amended. Moreover, by virtue of paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the 1991 Act, the court was required to give a direction that the appellant should be treated as if an order restricting his discharge had been made under Section 41 of the 1983 Act, without limit of time.

12

There was then a further error in that an officer at Bradford Crown Court issued a form of order which did not accord with the judge's ruling. It was headed "Hospital Order with Restrictions Ordered Under Section 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983". It recorded that A had been convicted of murder, that within 28 days from the date of the order the defendant should be admitted and detained in hospital,...

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