R v Chaaban
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE JUDGE |
| Judgment Date | 20 March 2003 |
| Neutral Citation | [2003] EWCA Crim 1012 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) |
| Docket Number | No: 2001/3526/W5 |
| Date | 20 March 2003 |
[2003] EWCA Crim 1012
Lord Justice Judge
Mr Justice Grigson
His Honour Judge Stephens Qc
(Sitting as a judge of the CACD)
No: 2001/3526/W5
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
MISS P ROSE appeared on behalf of the APPELLANT
MR A HAYCROFT appeared on behalf of the CROWN
The appellant is a family man of previous good character, in his early forties. On 25th May 2001 in the Crown Court at Middlesex Guildhall before His Honour Judge Blacksell QC and a jury, the appellant was convicted of blackmail. He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. His co-accused, Kevin Lindon Muhammed changed his plea at the latest possible stage to guilty of blackmail. He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment. The appellant appeals against conviction and sentence with leave of the single judge.
The appeal against conviction is founded in part on criticisms of the trial judge's handling of the case, and quite separately, on the basis of fresh evidence coming to light after conviction, from the prison in which the co-accused and the appellant himself were serving their sentences. Before examining these matters more closely we must briefly summarise the essential facts.
This was a classic case of blackmail with a real victim, a widow, living in London supported by her family, who became involved in a sexual relationship. Given her culture and background the family would have been horrified if they had discovered the relationship with the co-accused, Muhammed. The consequences to her would have been extremely unpleasant. For her, therefore, exposure would have been catastrophic.
The appellant worked for the victim. He was regarded as a confidante. His wife was regarded by the victim as a friend. Through the appellant, though the precise circumstances of the introduction are of no great importance, the victim was introduced to the co-accused. He was a security man and at one time, at any rate, acted as a bodyguard. For the reasons already given the affair required the exercise of the greatest possible discretion.
In March 2000 the victim handed the co-accused £25,000 in cash, part of a withdrawal of £31,000 from her account on 2nd March. She believed that he needed the money in connection with court proceedings. Later on, unknown of course to her, a video recording was made of their sexual activities at the hotel where they met on 10th and 14th September 2000. Subsequently the victim was sent a copy of the tape which was made, together with a letter demanding £750,000.
The Crown's case was that the appellant and Muhammed were jointly involved in this plot to blackmail. The appellant's case was that he was in fear of his co-accused; such part as he had played in this incident was entirely innocent; he had been acting as a go-between, but he was certainly not involved in the criminal part of the enterprise created by the co-accused.
Taking the matter in a little more detail. The evidence of the victim relating to the blackmail letter was that she was told to hand the money to the appellant. The letter threatened disclosure if she did not comply. She called upon the appellant's wife, and then the appellant for help. According to her the appellant discouraged her from calling the police. In due course the appellant handed her a package which he said had come from the co-accused —that is of course the victim's former lover. Inside, apart from a video, there was an article, in effect a mock up of a well-known Sunday newspaper. She wanted to tell her family and the police, but the appellant, according to her, refused to take her to the police, telling her not to go as the paparazzi would be involved and the situation would become worse. She eventually did go to the police. She gave them everything she had. When she gave it to them, according to her evidence, all the various different envelopes and papers and packages had been opened. She thought she had opened the package containing the video tape. She also believed that the appellant had touched various items and indeed everything that she had touched herself.
It is not irrelevant that none of the contacts were being made directly by the co-accused. Everything that he was doing was done through the appellant, and it was the appellant who was communicating to the victim saying things like, "this was the way the co-accused wanted it done".
There was an occasion when the victim's daughter was at home in early October when a man arrived at the house, possibly she thought a mini-cab driver, and handed over two bulky envelopes, one was addressed to her and the other she put on her mother's bed. She too gave evidence that the appellant had told her mother that the police should not be involved. She said that she heard him say to her mother that she should pay to have it sorted out. She also said that the appellant pointed out that if she did not pay, his, the appellant's, son would be killed.
The victim's driver also spoke to the appellant about these matters. He said that they should tell the police. According to his evidence the appellant said that this would magnify things. It was "only a simple matter". The driver appreciated that the appellant and the co-accused Muhammed were friends so he suggested that they should all meet. To his surprise the appellant said that he did not know how to contact the co-accused, nor did he have his address. They communicated via a pager. Pagers and telephone calls have some importance, as we shall see later in the judgment. After a good deal of such discussion, which the driver insisted had taken place with the appellant, he and the victim decided that the police should be contacted without the appellant being told. The appellant in his evidence denied that any such discussion had taken place. Indeed far from him discouraging attendance on the police, according to his account, he advised the victim and her daughter that the police should be informed. Their evidence, when these points were put to them, was adamant to the contrary. If the jury disbelieved the appellant's evidence about his attitude to the police, then they were entitled to conclude that for a confidante or friend his attitude was extremely odd, unless he may in some way have been involved.
In circumstances to which we shall come later in the judgment, having pleaded guilty immediately before the trial was due to take place, Kevin Muhammed, the co-accused, gave evidence for the Crown. He explained how he had been an acquaintance of the appellant, and how he had met the victim. She knew that he was a married man but they spoke together of marriage. He said that the appellant acted as some sort of chaperone. There came a time when he and the victim started to argue. He suggested that there was some business he could help the victim with. The precise details are unimportant but he said that he received £25,000 from the victim. According to his evidence, denied later by the appellant, he gave half of this sum of money to the appellant. He understood from him that the appellant had a sick nephew who was in need of medical treatment and had to be flown from the Lebanon to Switzerland. Then, again according to the co-accused's account, he began to think that the victim might be, to use the colloquialism, two-timing him. He spoke about this to the appellant. The appellant confirmed his fears. The victim in fact denied that she had associated with any other men. Returning to the co-accused's account, he said that they both, that is he and the appellant, decided that the victim should be taught a lesson. According to Muhammed the idea came from the appellant and he went along with it. The appellant also had some grievance of his own about pay.
Muhammed described the occasion when he and the appellant bought a laptop. According to him, the co-accused typed the letters but they were in effect jointly compiled. At first the intention was to ask for £250,000, but according to this evidence it was the appellant's idea to increase it to £750,000. The letters, he said, were prepared before the video was made. He also maintained that it was the appellant who set up the equipment for making the video. They shared the cost of the purchase of an alarm clock camera from a shop called Spymaster. The details of how the video were made and what is shown on it are obviously irrelevant to this judgment. The tape was edited at the flat of the appellant's brother. Something like half an hour of what are usually described as "highlights" were made and three copies were made. The appellant, he said, kept two. The first tape and a letter were sent to the victim. He denied that he had sent anything to the daughter or to the complainant. He said that thereafter he made contact with the appellant by pager. He said the letter 'Z' was used to identify the appellant. He said that that too was the appellant's idea. He assumed that the money would be split equally and he added that they did not take precautions to avoid fingerprints.
He was of course rigorously cross-examined about the circumstances in which he had come to change his plea at the very last moment. He agreed that he had lied to the police throughout the interviewing process and the police investigation. Nevertheless, he insisted that he had been involved with the appellant and so far as he was concerned he wanted to teach the victim a lesson because she had lied to him.
There were a number of other matters of evidence on which the Crown relied. First, the pager contact record subsequently examined showed references to this man Z and indeed an...
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